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This dissertation investigates the political incentives for redistribution of in-
come and allocation policies in competitive democracies. In Chapter 2, I examine
incentives for political redistribution through in-kind transfers. By analyzing the po-
litical game between o¢ ce-motivated politicians and self-interested citizens, I rst
show that in economies with competitive markets in-kind transfers are not required.
Politicians can win elections targeting groups of voters with di¤erential cash transfers.
However, in-kind transfers arise in the presence of externalities in consumption. In
that case, targeting groups of voters with in-kind rather than cash transfers allows
politicians to attract simultaneously voters in additional groups with the same amount
of resources. Politicians undertake political redistribution depending on the expected
electoral returns obtained from targeting both cash and in-kind transfers into di¤er-
ent groups. Furthermore, electoral competition leads the economy to achieve Pareto
e¢ cient allocations that markets cannot reach. Politicians internalize the presence of
external e¤ects when competing for marginal voters who could swing their vote.
In Chapter 3, this dissertation investigates the politiciansincentives to pursue
income redistribution when governments are constrained to levy taxes on labor income
and this creates distortions. Politicians who strive to be elected may strategically
redistribute through in-kind rather than cash transfers and overprovide consumption
of goods. I show that the overprovision of in-kind transfers reduces the disincentive
e¤ects of taxation in labor e¤ort and enlarges the pool of resources for political
redistribution. As a result, politicians are able to implement larger redistributive
transfers and improve the well-being of swing voters. Hence, electoral competition
for pivotal voters provides politicians incentives to implement redistributive schedules
that reduce distortions in labor markets and improve the e¢ ciency of the taxation
system
In Chapter 4, I investigate the e¤ect of ideological preferences over the pub-
lic provision of goods on the scope of government and the political redistribution
of income. I rst point out that the presence of both ideological politicians who
compete for o¢ ce and electoral uncertainty generates a partisanship e¤ect. In partic-
ular, I show that pro-market (right-wing) politicians commit to lower public provision
of goods and taxation schedules that implement larger income inequality than pro-
government (left-wing) politicians. Furthermore, I nd out that the public funding of
goods through income taxation confers an electoral advantage to pro-market ideolog-
ical positions. In fact, pro-market politicians can court moderate pro-leftist voters by
promises of higher income which pro-government politicians are not willing to fund
completely. As a result, right-wing party exhibits larger chances of winning elections
and its proposal supports lower ideological sacrice than the left-wing party
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For any policy, e¢ ciency is a good place to start, but alone is not
adequate because of distributional judgments. Kenneth J. Arrow
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions
Democratic governments raise taxes over income in order to fund cash transfers
and public provision of goods and services such as health care, education or national
defense. Overall, the average size of redistributive and allocation policies in the
OECD represents around 40% of GDP.1How are these signicant policies chosen?
Governments that implement economic policies are composed of politicians who are
elected by citizens through elections. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider that
citizens and politicians exhibit conicts of interests and heterogeneity of tastes on
policies. On the one hand, citizens care about their own economic well-being and
therefore support taxation policies that redistribute income towards them. On the
other hand, individuals may hold di¤erent preferences regarding the extent of public
provision of goods. Hence, the conict emerges as to decide the size of provision
and who should bear the cost of funding these goods. Furthermore, politicians might
compete for power because of the rents associated to holding o¢ ce. As an alternative,
1See OECD Economic Outlook 2010 for a detailed discussion on that evidence.
2conict among politicians could raise by di¤erent views of how society should operate.
The existence of these conicts of interests raises political constraints and
democracies have to solve them through mechanisms of collective choice (Drazen,
2000). Hence, this dissertation examines how representative democracies make re-
distributive and allocation policy decisions in the presence of political constraints.
Furthermore, this thesis investigates the implication of political mechanisms of col-
lective choice on economic outcomes.
The thesis starts by investigating the political incentives to modify the distri-
bution of income generated by competitive market economies. In fact, the analysis
focuses on the political choice among di¤erent policy tools to redistribute income.
In particular, next chapter asks whether politicians do need to provide goods rather
than fund cash transfers to redistribute income among groups of voters. The chapter
also examines how political redistribution of income is a¤ected by the presence of
external e¤ects and equity concerns.
The funding of redistribution through labor income taxation generates distor-
tions and deadweight losses. How does it a¤ect the scope of government? Chapter
3 investigates the e¤ect of output losses on the extent of political redistribution.
Furthermore, it analyzes whether distortions a¤ect the political composition of redis-
tributive transfers.
An appealing research of this dissertation lies in the normative analysis of
the political allocations. Indeed, I examine the e¤ect of electoral competition on
allocative e¢ ciency. In particular, do politicians have incentives to implement e¢ cient
allocations? Why? Under what circumstances might e¢ ciency be achieved? The
analysis focuses on the ability of political mechanisms to correct market imperfections
and to increase the e¢ ciency of the taxation system.
Last chapter considers that citizens and politicians might exhibit di¤erent ide-
ological positions on the extent of government provision of goods. These goods must
3be funded through income taxation and therefore it emerges a suggestive interaction
between ideological and distributive conict. How do democracies solve the simulta-
neous presence of both conicts? This chapter analyzes the e¤ect of both conicts on
the scope of government and the distribution of income. Furthermore, the presence
of partisan politicians allows us to examine whether ideological positions a¤ect the
extent of competition between political parties.
1.2 Modeling
In order to investigate the political incentives for redistribution and allocation
policies, I build di¤erent electoral competition models. Each model exhibits particu-
larities to analyze specic research questions. Nevertheless, theoretical models share
a common structure, and that is why the present dissertation analyzes similar policy
choice problems from di¤erent perspectives.
I consider economies in which citizens belong to groups that are associated
to levels of gross income obtained by individuals in a market economy. Income is
formalized as either a xed endowment or the result of labor e¤ort decisions.
Through an electoral process citizens choose a government to rule economic
policy. In particular, I examine polities in which government can redistribute income
among groups through income taxation and group-specic transfers. Transfers can
take the form of both cash and in-kind transfers. By in-kind transfers, Public Eco-
nomics refers to government expenditures intended to provide the consumption of
specic goods, regardless of whether production is public or private. Furthermore,
I analyze the case in which governments fund the uniform provision of goods with
revenues raised by income taxation. When income is considered as a xed endow-
ment, taxes and expenditures do not distort economic decisions. Nevertheless, when
labor e¤ort choices determine income, the analysis takes into account that taxation
introduces frictions and creates income losses.
4The government is elected from two political parties that compete for o¢ ce.
I consider the possibility of both o¢ ce-motivated and ideological politicians. In the
rst two chapters, politicians uniquely care about the spoils of o¢ ce. In the last
chapter, partisan politicians hold di¤erent ideological views on the extent of public
provision of goods. Regardless of their motivation, politicians can credibly commit to
policy platforms. Therefore, the party that attracts the larger number of votes (i.e.
majority voting) wins elections and implements the announced economic policies.
Individuals care about the net income, which results from taxation, and the
consumption of goods that might be subject to public provision. I assume that all
individuals share a common self-interested goal: citizens prefer to pay lower taxes
and receive more transfers to increase their own economic well-being. Thus, there
emerges a distributive conict because of the possibility of income redistribution.
On the other side, one of the crucial elements of this dissertation is the dif-
ferent assumptions on citizenspreferences over the consumption of goods subject
to government intervention. I examine three cases that imply a di¤erent economic
nature of these goods. I rst consider that individuals only value the e¤ect of goods
consumption on their private well-being. In that case, these goods are analyzed as
pure private goods. Later, I examine the case in which individuals also care about the
consumption levels of the goods in other groups of citizens. Therefore, I introduce
a public good component because these goods exhibit some degree of non-rivalry.
Finally, I investigate the situation in which individuals uniquely care about the level
of public provision of goods but not on the e¤ect on their own economic well-being.
In this case, goods are non-rival and non-excludable (i.e. pure public goods).
The undertaken analysis does not impose severe constraints on policy tools
and works in a multidimensional policy space. The problems associated to exis-
tence of equilibrium in high-dimensional policy spaces are well-known (Plott, 1967).
However, probabilistic voting models have been proposed as simple useful devices to
tractably handle political equilibria with multidimensional policy space (Coughlin,
51992; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). I adopt two types of probabilistic voting electoral
competition models. On the one hand, I introduce in a competitive market economy
a stochastic partisanship probabilistic voting model based on Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987). In this case, individuals have biases towards xed ideological positions of
political parties that are not related with economic policy. On the other hand, I
present a stochastic preference probabilistic voting model. In this kind of models, in-
dividuals and politicians hold heterogeneous partisan preferences on economic policy.
Furthermore, following Enelow and Hinich (1989), both probabilistic voting models
consider the presence of aggregate uncertainty regarding electoral outcome. In the
three chapters, this randomness is introduced through a stochastic relative valence of
politicians competing for o¢ ce.
1.3 Chapters and Basic Results
The models proposed along this dissertation provide new insights on the e¤ects
of political incentives on redistributive and allocation policies.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Political In-kind Redistribution
In chapter 2, I examine the incentives for political in-kind redistribution. The
common view in political economy literature sustains that in-kind transfers emerge
as a political instrument to redistribute income among groups of voters (Fernández
and Rogerson, (1995); Epple and Romano (1996a,b) and Levy (2005)). Nevertheless,
my research shows that those results are driven by severe policy constraints imposed
to ensure the existence of equilibrium.
I nd out that politicians have incentives to undertake political redistribution
of income and modify a competitive market allocation. However, politicians can win
elections targeting only di¤erential cash transfers across groups of voters. Hence, a
pure redistributive motive does not explain the use of in-kind transfers by politicians.
6In order to rationalize the huge amount of in-kind transfers funded by elected
politicians, I consider the possibility that goods subject to in-kind transfers exhibit
non-rivalness. In particular, I introduce two types of interdependent preferences,
which lead politicians to nance the consumption of particular goods. I rst charac-
terize redistributive schedules when the consumption of one group generates a positive
externality for the rest of the population. Then, I explore how incentives for political
redistribution are a¤ected by the presence of egalitarian preferences on the consump-
tion of specic commodities. The proposed model allows us to examine the factors
that determine the size of in-kind transfers and how groups of citizens support the
cost of funding external e¤ects.
An appealing result of my research relies on the normative properties of the
allocation that results from the political process. I show that electoral competition
leads the economy to achieve Pareto e¢ cient allocations that markets cannot reach.
Politicians internalize the presence of external e¤ects when competing for marginal
voters who could swing their vote. Hence, an important contribution of this chapter
relies on pointing out the role of political competition as a mechanism to increase
e¢ ciency in the presence of market imperfections.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: The Scope of Political Redistribution
The main novelty introduced in chapter 3 consists in considering that income is
the result of labor e¤ort decisions by individuals. This assumption opens the door to
investigate politiciansincentives to pursue income redistribution when governments
are constrained to levy taxes on labor income and this creates distortions and output
losses.
As in previous chapter, politicians who strive to be elected have incentives
to modify competitive market allocation. However, the scope of political redistribu-
tion is limited by deadweight losses associated to taxation. In this case, I show that
politicians may strategically redistribute through in-kind rather than cash transfers.
7In particular, politicians might constrain individuals to consume more in-kind trans-
fers than the amount that they would buy in private markets if targeted resources
were given in cash. That overprovision reduces the disincentive e¤ect of taxation in
labor e¤ort and enlarges the pool of resources for political redistribution.
The model developed in this chapter characterizes the equilibrium political
choice of income taxation, which is close to the optimal linear income taxation prob-
lem analyzed by Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz (1987). I extend this classical analysis
allowing for group-specic cash and in-kind transfers. Furthermore, a crucial contri-
bution consists in demonstrating that the implemented redistributive schedules can
be the equilibrium outcome of the electoral competition between o¢ ce-motivated
politicians.
This chapter also examines how the political composition of redistributive
spending a¤ects allocative e¢ ciency. Indeed, I nd that electoral competition for
pivotal voters provides politicians with incentives that allow implementation of redis-
tributive schedules that reduce distortions in labor markets and improve the e¢ ciency
of the taxation system.
1.3.3 Chapter 4:Distributive Politics and Economic Ideology
Chapter 4 introduces citizens and politiciansheterogeneous ideological posi-
tions on the extent of public provision of goods. In particular, this chapter highlights
that examining the ideological conict on the role of government also requires ana-
lyzing the distributive conict generated by the possibility of redistribution. Hence, I
investigate the e¤ect of ideological preferences on both the scope of government and
the political redistribution of income.
I rst point out that the presence of both ideological politicians and electoral
uncertainty generates a partisanship e¤ect in economic policies. In particular, I show
that pro-market politicians announce lower public provision of goods, and commits
8to taxation schedules that implement larger income inequality than pro-government
politicians.
Furthermore, this chapter analyzes how the presence of partisan preferences
over economic policies a¤ects the extent of political competition between parties.
An interesting result shows that the public funding of goods through income taxa-
tion confers an advantage to pro-market ideological positions. Pro-market politicians
strategically target larger income to groups with higher concentration of moderate
pro-leftist citizens who could swing their vote. As a result, pro-market politicians
exhibit larger chances of winning elections and their policy proposals support lower
ideological sacrice than pro-government politicians.
It is important to notice the contribution of this chapter to the literature of
political competition and electoral advantages of political parties. This literature
introduces exogenous elements non-related to economic policy (e.g. valence and in-
cumbency advantage) in order to create advantages in the electoral race between
politicians. Instead, this chapter examines the existence of an electoral advantage
that depends on chosen policy platforms and therefore it is an endogenous variable
in the electoral competition game.
1.4 Methodological Contributions
1.4.1 Extending Distributive and Partisan Politics
The theoretical framework proposed in chapters 2 and 3 relies on the distrib-
utive politics workhorse model proposed by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit
and Londregan (1996). These contributions focus on the factors that determine the
political allocation of cash transfers among groups of voters. In particular, the charac-
terization of redistribution schedules across groups must mainly consider the expected
electoral returns of targeting transfers. This dissertation follows distributive politics
approach and also nds that groups of voters with low income and large concentration
9of pivotal voters are favored by politics. Furthermore, this thesis extends the classical
framework introducing new elements that enrich the existing results in the literature.
The new components can be summarized in four elements: i) allowing re-
distribution through group-specic in-kind transfers in economies with competitive
markets; ii) considering the presence of interdependent preferences among groups of
voters (i.e. external e¤ects); iii) introducing labor e¤ort decisions and analyzing the
e¤ect of distortionary income taxation on political redistribution; and iv) examin-
ing ideological conict among political agents in the presence of distributive conict.
Along the following chapters I examine with detail how these new elements a¤ect the
characterization of redistribute politics.
On the other side, the theoretical model presented in chapter 4 builds on the
workhorse model of partisan electoral competition with commitment proposed by
Wittman (1977, 1983) and Calvert (1985). However, Wittman-Calvert models of
partisan competition focus on unidimensional policy space. For this reason, such the-
oretical framework has not been considered to investigate how partisan preferences
a¤ect the simultaneous political choice of public goods provision and income taxation
schedules. Chapter 4 extends previous analysis introducing a stochastic preference
probabilistic voting model that allows us to handle equilibria in pure strategies with
multidimensional policy space. The proposed model provides a new framework to ex-
amine the incentives of partisan politicians to provide public goods and redistribute
income among groups of voters. In contrast with signicant prior political econ-
omy contributions, I show that the identity of political parties matter and that the
composition of government spending depends on the ideology of the party that wins
elections.
1.4.2 From Normative to Positive Analysis
Overall, the main goal of this dissertation consists in moving the analysis of
redistribution and allocation policies from the normative to the positive analysis. The
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economic literature usually approaches to policymaking from normative Public Eco-
nomics based on the Pigouvian paradigm (Besley, 2007a). In particular, economic
theory assumes that policies are chosen by a planner (i.e. benevolent government)
who implements optimal policies that maximize the weighted welfare of individuals.
However, Political Economy has identied two critical weaknesses in this method-
ological approach.
On the one hand, who is the planner? Besides, are governments benevolent?
Therefore, does identity of government not matter for policy? Indeed, governments
that make policy choices are formed by politicians elected by citizens, both of them
with their own motivations and constraints. Hence, examining policy design making
use of a normative perspective can be misleading. This critique was rstly raised by
Public Choice literature (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) and is at the heart of Political
Economics (Drazen, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Besley, 2007a).
On the other hand, how should the planner weigh the welfare of individuals?
Welfare Economics proposes di¤erent social welfare functions based on normative
criteria of social justice. However, these functions embody exogenous ad hoc dis-
tributional value judgments on how society should weigh the well-being of di¤erent
individuals (Sen, 1977; Besley and Coate, 2003; Besley, 2007a). As an alternative,
Political Economy focuses on the endogenous determination of the weights that im-
plicitly are maximized in the political process.
These two essential aws are enough to justify why this thesis takes a positive
political economy approach to analyze democratic policymaking. Along this disserta-
tion, the characterization of redistributive schedules and allocation policies does not
result from the optimal choice of a benevolent government that maximizes normative
criteria of social justice. Instead, economic policies are the equilibrium outcome of a
political game between politicians and voters.
Furthermore, the developed positive analysis does not need to rely on value
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judgments on the weight of groups in society in order to characterize economic poli-
cies. Indeed, redistributive schedules and allocation policies announced by politicians
depend on the political inuence of groups of voters. By using probabilistic voting
models, I can identify how these political weights emerge from both politicians and
citizensoptimization choices subject to political and economic constraints. This ap-
proach has also empirical support because recent contributions have shown that it is
possible to identify the empirical counterparts of political weights in probabilistic vot-
ing. As an example, Besley and Preston (2007) and Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010)
undertake empirical work that measures the groups inuence on policy depending on
individualsattachments to parties.
1.4.3 Normative Analysis of Political Allocations
The normative properties of the political allocations discussed in this disserta-
tion are especially suggestive. The common view in Economics suggests that politics
introduces frictions, distorts economic decisions and raises allocative ine¢ ciencies.
Indeed, political economy has extensively discussed the potential distortions and wel-
fare losses introduced by democratic policymaking (Besley and Coate, 1998; Lizzeri
and Persico, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2008, 2009, 2011).
However, this dissertation formalizes some of the insights raised informally by
Wittman (1989, 1995) on the e¢ cient properties of competitive democracy. Wittman
argues that political competition produces the same type of e¢ cient outcomes as
market competition does. Therefore, incentives to be elected should force politi-
cians to increase allocative e¢ ciency. Nevertheless, at a formal level scarce work has
investigated the welfare enhancing role of political competition. This dissertation
contributes to ll this gap.
The use of probabilistic voting plays a crucial role in my ndings on the welfare
improving e¤ect of political competition. Coughlin (1982, 1992) rstly formalizes the
Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting. In fact, I nd that
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when one party promises policies such that pivotal voters in some group of citizens
could be made better o¤without making critical voters in other groups worse o¤, the
opponent party could announce policies that Pareto dominates its policy platforms.
Hence, competition for marginal voters provides politicians with incentives to exhaust
potential Pareto improvements in the economy. The main normative contributions of
this dissertation consist in showing that electoral competition might lead to internalize
the presence of external e¤ects and to choose redistributive schedules that reduce the
e¢ cient cost of income taxation.
1.5 Roadmap
This dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter, I investigate
distributive conict in competitive market economies. Furthermore, the chapter an-
alyzes the role of in-kind transfers as a tool of political redistribution of income in
the presence of external e¤ects. Chapter 3 examines the scope of political redistri-
bution when income taxation generates distortions in labor markets. In particular,
research focuses on the composition of political redistributive spending and its e¤ect
on allocative e¢ ciency. Chapter 4 explores the interaction between distributive and
ideological conict in competitive democracies. Moreover, this chapter analyzes the
e¤ect of partisan preferences on the extent of political competition between ideological




The Political Economy of In-Kind
Redistribution
2.1 Introduction
In advanced democracies, governments raise taxes and redistribute resources
on a large scale. Evidence shows that a signicant part of this redistribution is
undertaken through in-kind transfers such as health services, education, housing or
child and elderly care.1For instance, public health care spending in 2008 represented
on average 7% of GDP and 16% of government expenditures in OECD countries.
In the US, public spending in primary and secondary education stands at 5% of
GDP. Overall, in-kind transfers in the OECD represent around 15% of GDP.2Why do
politicians redistribute resources through in-kind rather than cash transfers? The goal
of this chapter is to examine political incentives for in-kind government redistribution.
In particular, I investigate whether politicians who compete for o¢ ce need to
make use of in-kind transfers when there are no constraints in the available taxation
1By in-kind transfers I refer to government expenditures intended to provide the consumption of
specic goods, regardless of whether production is public or private.
2Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2009 and OECD Health Data 2010; See Currie and Gahvari
(2008) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for a detailed discussion on that evidence.
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policy tools. The common view in political economy literature is that in-kind transfers
emerge as an instrument to redistribute resources across groups of citizens.3However,
my rst main result shows that in-kind transfers are not required when politicians
can court groups of citizens with di¤erential cash transfers.
In order to analyze the political choice between cash and in-kind transfers, I
consider a society in which individuals belong to a nite number of groups. Citizens
care about their available income and the consumption of goods that might be subject
to public provision such as health and education. Through a political process, citizens
have to elect a government who can raise taxes to fund cash and in-kind transfers.
There are no constraints in the available taxation policy that government can use and
economic policies are non-distortionary.
The government is elected from two o¢ ce-motivated political parties that com-
pete for power. Politicians credibly commit to a combination of net taxation policy
and in-kind transfers targeted to groups in order to maximize their chance of win-
ning elections. Furthermore, each party holds xed ideological positions non-related
with economic policy such as positions on value issues. Citizens have heterogeneous
attachments toward those parties ideological views and share a common valuation
of the competing parties. Hence, each citizen votes for the party that maximizes her
own well-being given promised economic policies, ideological views and the valuation
of political parties. The party that obtains the majority of the votes wins the election
and implements the announced policies.
With the purpose of focusing the analysis on the distributional side, I assume
the existence of competitive rms that produce goods such as health care or edu-
cation. In a market economy without government intervention, the access to those
goods depends on individuals income, but the market allocation is not politically
sustainable. Once electoral competition is introduced, politicians have incentives to
3See for instance Epple and Romano (1996a,b), Gouveia (1997) and Currie and Gahvari (2008).
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redistribute resources in order to win elections. The gainers of the political process
are the groups with lower initial amount of resources and homogeneous ideological
positions.
However, this does not imply that redistribution must occur through in-kind
transfers. Politicians compete for pivotal voters that could swing their vote but
can court those swing voters by targeting di¤erential cash transfers across groups of
citizens. Hence, why is in-kind redistribution so prevalent? Normative analysis jus-
ties in-kind transfers as optimal responses of a benevolent planner to either market
failures or equity concerns.4Currie and Gahvari (2008) survey normative theoretical
explanations for in-kind transfers and review limited empirical evidence. They con-
sider interdependent preferences such as externalities and paternalism as the leading
candidates to explain governmentsuse of in-kind transfers.5I introduce this type of
preferences into the distributive politics game. In that situation, I nd that in-kind
redistribution is politically necessary. Politicians can attract more voters making use
of in-kind rather than cash transfers. I focus on two particular cases in order to
analyze how political redistribution is a¤ected by interdependent preferences.
I rst discuss the role of in-kind transfers in the presence of consumption ex-
ternalities. Specically, I explore the case in which the available health care coverage
of the elderly generates a positive externality for the rest of the population. In that
case, politicians can court simultaneously swing voters in all groups targeting in-kind
transfers to the group whose consumption generates a positive external e¤ect. These
political incentives lead the economy to increase the overall consumption levels of the
good subject to in-kind transfers.
4See Stiglitz (1995) and Rosen and Gayer (2010) for a textbook treatment of failures in markets
for health and education such as asymmetries of information, liquidity constraints or spillover e¤ects;
Musgrave (1959) and Besley (1988) for paternalistic motives on the individuals lack of skills and
myopia to make good choices on merit goods.
5Currie and Gahvari (2008) also discuss the extensive literature on the role of in-kind transfers
as screening device to redistribution in the presence of asymmetric information (Nichols and Zeck-
hauser,1982; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988; Bruce and Waldman, 1991). However, they highlight
the limited practical feasibility of such self-selection mechanism.
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I then explore how incentives for political redistribution are a¤ected by the
presence of egalitarian preferences on the consumption of specic commodities. For
instance, individuals could believe that health and education are fundamental rights.
These rights should not be dependent on citizensability to pay or any other cir-
cumstances. I show that politicians implement in-kind transfers in order to reduce
inequalities. However, an egalitarian distribution is not attainable because of the
political incentives for di¤erential treatment across groups. O¢ ce-motivated politi-
cians exploit individualsconcerns for their own economic well-being, courting voters
with di¤erential in-kind transfers. Those incentives also lead to decreasing aggregate
consumption levels of goods subject to egalitarian views.
An appealing result of my research is that the electoral competition for mar-
ginal voters exhausts potential Pareto improvements in the economy. Politicians re-
distribute resources using available policy tools in such a manner that the allocation
of resources that results from electoral competition and individualsmarket decisions
is Pareto e¢ cient. The e¢ ciency argument in electoral competition was made infor-
mally by Wittman (1989, 1995). Furthermore, Besley and Coate (1998) and Besley
(2007) highlighted that e¢ ciency should be reached in static political economy models
without constraints in policy tools. The novelty of my contribution relies on showing
that this e¢ ciency result holds in the political choice of cash versus in-kind redistri-
bution in the presence of externalities and equity concerns. Politicians competing for
marginal voters lead the economy to achieve Pareto-e¢ cient allocations that markets
cannot reach.
It is important to notice that this e¢ ciency result is not the choice of a benevo-
lent planner that implements in-kind transfers either to correct market imperfections
or to satisfy equity concerns. Instead, the e¢ cient allocation is the equilibrium out-
come of the political game between politicians and voters. The political process does
not generate allocative ine¢ ciencies and the implemented allocation in the Pareto set
depends on the political clout of di¤erent groups.
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One of the advantages of the present positive analysis over the normative one
is that we do not need to rely on value judgments on the weight of groups in society
in order to characterize economic policies. The characterization of redistributive
schedules announced by politicians depends on the political inuence of groups. Such
an inuence is explained by the expected electoral returns obtained from targeting
both cash and in-kind transfers into di¤erent groups.
The model builds on previous work on probabilistic voting developed by Lind-
beck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) to study political redistri-
bution of cash transfers across groups of voters.6I extend that framework, allowing
politicians to court groups of citizens with both cash and in-kind transfers when mar-
ket provision of the targeted goods is also feasible. By exploiting a probabilistic voting
model, this chapter can tractably handle political equilibria with multidimensional
policy space without imposing severe constraints into policy tools. This modeling
strategy allows me to show that previous results on the political use of in-kind trans-
fers are driven by policy constraints imposed in order to ensure the existence of
equilibrium. Inuential contributions such as Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), Epple
and Romano (1996a,b) and Levy (2005) rationalize the use of in-kind transfers as
tool of political redistribution across groups of citizens. Those transfers could emerge
without the necessity of assuming market failures or equity concerns. However, this
chapter shows that a pure redistributive motive does not explain the political use of
in-kind transfers once a su¢ ciently rich set of policy instruments is available.
Essential for my results is the possibility of allowing the targeting of in-kind
transfers toward groups of citizens. That form of targeting has been mainly ignored
by both the literature on redistributive politics and theoretical research on in-kind
transfers. Those contributions have generally assumed that politicians o¤er universal
homogeneous provision of health and education. However, evidence supports the
6Those models were extended by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (2004) to
analyze the size and scope of government spending.
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possibility of targeting in-kind transfers. The most obvious cases are the Medicare and
the Medicaid programs targeted to the elderly and the poor in the US. Furthermore,
even in systems of universal provision the coverage is not uniform. As an example,
the co-payments schedules in European public health systems depends on citizens
age, level of income or employment status. Similarly, the exemptions of course fees in
public universities are determined by family income or geographic mobility. Hence,
this chapter opens the way to new empirical analysis on the political targeting of
in-kind transfers towards specic groups or constituencies.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the bench-
mark of a competitive market allocation. Section III analyzes the role of in-kind
transfers as a tool of political redistribution. Section IV introduces external e¤ects
into the distributive politics game. Section V explores political redistribution in the
presence of equity concerns. Finally, the last section concludes and discusses potential
further research.
2.2 The Economy: Market Allocation
Consider an economy with a continuum of citizens whose measure can be nor-
malized to 1. Citizens are divided into a nite number of groups, j 2 f1; :::; Jg, with
measure j. No group constitutes a majority of the population. Each individual in
group j has an endowment of wj units of a numeraire good. This endowment can be
thought as the level of income or money obtained by citizens of a given occupation or






Competitive rms produce health services at di¤erent quality levels, h,7 using
a linear technology that requires qh units of the numeraire commodity to produce
7For expositional reasons, I focus on health care but the analysis is also valid for education.
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one unit of health services at quality h. All individuals in the population have the
same preferences over the consumption of the numeraire commodity, c, and health
care quality, h, represented by the following utility function:
U j(cj; hj) = u(cj; hj) 8j (2.2)
This function is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing (uc > 0; uh >
0) and strictly concave (ucc < 0, uhh < 0) in c and h. Marginal utilities are bounded
away from 0 and uc(0; h) = 1 and uh(c; 0) = 1. There are no complementarities
between health quality and the numeraire (i.e. uch = 0) and both commodities are
assumed to be normal goods.
I assume perfectly competitive markets.8Firms with constant returns to scale
produce whatever quality of health care that citizens demand at price, ph, equal
to marginal cost, q. Competitive rms make zero prots. Citizens endowed with
available resources, wj, purchase in competitive markets the quality of health care
that they desire at market price ph. The residual amount of resources is left for
consumption of the numeraire commodity. Thus, individuals budget constraint is
given by:
wj = cj + phh
j (2.3)
The choice problem for individual i located in group j who acquires health
services in the market is dened as follows:
8i 2 j max
hj
U j(cj; hj) = u(wj   phhj; hj) s.t. hj  0 (2.4)
where the FOCs for an interior optimum are:
[hj]   phuc + uh = 0! uh = phuc 8j (2.5)
8I abstract away potential market imperfections such as asymmetries of information and imperfect
competition. This assumption is made in order to focus the analysis on the distributional side. i.e.
how di¤erences of available income a¤ect access to health care quality.
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The optimal market choice, (cjm ; h
j
m) 8j, for individuals with initial endowment










From this relation, we can implicitly dene the marshallian demand functions








j; ph) 8j (2.8)
Denition (Market Allocation): A competitive market equilibrium is an al-
location of numeraire commodity and health services quality for each group of the
polity, fcjm ; hjmgJj=1, such that consumers solve problem (2.4); and competitive rms
with constant returns to scale produce whatever amount citizens demand at price









m = w (2.9)
In a competitive equilibrium, the rate at which consumers are willing to trade
health services for numeraire commodity, MRSh;c, is equal for all individuals and
equal to the rate at which the economy is able to transform numeraire into health
care quality, MRTh;c. Therefore, Market allocation is Pareto Optimal.
MRSjh;c =MRTh;c = q 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (2.10)
Market equilibrium yields an allocation of resources such that individuals who
belong to groups with larger amount of initial endowment choose higher quality of
health services and consume larger amounts of numeraire good than individuals who
belong to groups associated to low initial endowments. This folllows directly from
assumptions about homogeneity of preferences and normality of both goods. Is this
market allocation politically sustainable?
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2.3 The Polity: Political Allocation
2.3.1 Political Game
The initial distribution of the endowment across groups can be modied by
public intervention. Through a political process the polity has to choose a government
who can raise taxes and devote these scal revenues to redistribute resources through
both cash (i.e. numeraire) transfers and the public provision of health services. Public
provision is modeled as conditional transfers. Citizens receive non-tradable transfers
that can be uniquely spent to purchase health services in markets.9I do not impose any
constraint on the taxation schedule that government can use and economic policies
are non-distortionary.10
There are two purely o¢ ce-motivated political parties, P 2 fA;Bg, competing
for o¢ ce. Hence, parties announce taxation policy and in-kind transfers to each group
j in order to maximize their chances of winning elections. I assume majority voting,
therefore winning corresponds to obtaining the support of more than fty percent of
the population. Voting is costless and nobody abstains.
Let yjP denote the amount of numeraire commodity promised by party P to
group j. This net income is the result of taxation policy targeted to j by P . Fur-
thermore, politicians can announce group-specic in-kind transfers. Let hjgP be the
publicly provided quality of health care promised by P . The marginal cost of the
public funding of health services quality is equal to the market price, ph. Politicians
can credibly commit to a policy platform xP = fyjP ; hjgPgJj=1 to be implemented if
party P wins the elections. The allocation of resources after government intervention
9As an alternative, I could assume that governments can directly produce these services with ex-
actly the same technology available to the private sector. In that case, results in terms of allocations
of resources would be the same.
10Formally, those assumptions imply that governments are able to tax away all the initial endow-
ment of resources. Then, politicians redistribute that xed budget across groups allocating cash
and in-kind transfers. See Lizzeri and Persico (2004) for a close approach in economies with cash
transfers and pure public goods.
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gP = w (2.11)
This constraint denes a budget set of private and public spending allocations
that are feasible. The policy set of available and attainable policies that captures all
restictions, X  R2J , is non-empty, convex and compact.
Citizens care about their own economic well-being represented by preferences
(3.3) and have access to health care markets. Once one of the parties P wins the
elections and implements announced policies, individuals are able to purchase health
services, hjmP , at price ph. The overall quality of health services in group j under
government P would be the sum of the public and private provision, hjP = h
j
gP +
hjmP . The residual amount of available resources are allocated to the consumption of
numeraire commodity, cjmP = y
j
P   phhjmP .
In addition to economic policy, citizens care about non-economic issues. Specif-
ically, I adopt a partisanship probabilistic voting model.11 Political parties hold xed
and di¤erentiated positions in some dimension other than economic policy. For in-
stance, parties A and B could represent respectively conservative and liberal positions
on value issues (e.g. pro-life versus pro-choice views), foreign policy or the role of re-
ligion in public life. Individuals have biases toward those partiesideological views.
Dene i as the relative attachment that individual i has to party Bs positions (i.e.
i = iB   iA). This ideological bias can be positive or negative.
Parties do not know the party attachment of each individual. However, the
group-specic distribution of relative ideological biases for each group is common-
knowledge. I assume that the idiosyncratic biases for citizens in group j are drawn
from a uniform distribution over the range [ja; 
j
b]:
11I use the specication of individuals concerns on non-economic ideological issues and popularity












8i 2 j (2.12)
Groups might di¤er with respect to both their average ideological bias, j =
(ja+
j
b)=2, and the ideological homogeneity within the group. Groups with a broader
support of party biases (i.e. greater ideological dispersion) have a lower density j =
1=(jb ja). Denote  =
PJ
j=1 
jj the weighted average of ideological heterogeneity
across groups. In spite of bias diversity within and across groups, I assume that there
is no aggregate ideological bias in the overall population. Furthermore, there are
ideologically neutral voters, i = 0, in all groups.
Citizens value the personal attributes of the politicians running in the elec-
tions. I assume that between the announcement of cash and in-kind policies and
elections each party receives aggregate shocks, "A and "B, common to all voters in
the population. I normalize the common shock, " = "B   "A, which measures the
perception that voters have on party Bs candidate with respect to candidate A at
the time of elections (i.e. average relative popularity of candidate B). I assume that
the common shock " is uniformly distributed, independently from i; with density  
and expected value, E("), equal to 0.






The timing of the political game is as follows: 1) Political parties simulta-
neously and non-cooperatively credibly commit to their economic policy platforms,
xA = fyjA; hjgAgJj=1 and xB = fyjB; hjgBgJj=1. 2) The random idiosyncratic, i, and
common popularity shocks, ", are realized. 3) Citizens vote for the candidate that
they prefer, fA;Bg. 4) Whichever party P that obtains the majority of the votes,
wins the election and implements the economic policy promised at the beginning of
the game. Finally, 5) individuals make consumption choices through competitive
markets, fcjmP ; hjmPgJj=1.
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2.3.2 Stages of the Game
The political game presented above has three stages:
Stage 1 - Policy Announcements: taking its opponents policy platfom as
given, each party chooses the net taxation policy and in-kind transfers for each social
group that are economically feasible and maximize its chances of winning elections.
Parties take into account expected voting decisions of citizens, knowing that they can
supplement health services quality in competitive markets.
Stage 2 - Elections: citizens vote for the party that they prefer given eco-
nomic policy announcements, their ideological biases and the popularity of politicians.
Stage 3 - Market Decisions: once one of the parties wins the election and
implements announced policies, individuals make market choices. Individuals can
make private purchases of health care with their available income.
I characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game by
backward induction.
Third Stage: Market Decisions
In the last stage of the game, given implemented policies by winner party P ,
fyjP ; hjgPgJj=1, individuals decide whether to purchase health services through compet-
itive markets, fhjmPgJj=1  0. The residual available resources are allocated to the
consumption of the numeraire commodity, fcjmPgJj=1.






Consumer i 2 js choice problem can be written as:
max
hjmP
U j(cj; hj) = u(yjP   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) s.t. hjmP  0 8j (2.15)
25
The FOCs for a maximum are given by:
[hjmP ] uh + 
j
h = phuc 8j (2.16)
jhh
j
mP = 0 ; 
j
h  0 8j (2.17)
where jh is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint,
hjmP  0. The choice problem for group j yields two alternatives. In the rst al-
ternative, individuals decide not to make private purchases of health care, hjmP = 0,





gP )  phuc(yjP ; hjgP ) 8j (2.18)
Given group js available income, yjP , the quality of publicly provided health
services to this group, hjgP , is such that the marginal benet of acquiring one unit
of health care is lower than the marginal cost in terms of lower consumption of
numeraire commodity. Individuals do not purchase private coverage and net income
is fully devoted to the consumption of the numeraire commodity, cjmP = y
j
P . Hence,
the indirect utility function for groups that do not supplement (NS) public health









gP ) 8j and 8 P 2 fA;Bg (2.19)
Otherwise, when the sign of condition (2.18) is reversed, individuals make




P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) = phuc(yjP   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) 8j (2.20)
This condition implicitly denes the ordinary demand function of health ser-






gP ; ph) 8j. Using
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P   phhjm(yjP ; hjgP ; ph) 8j (2.21)
The indirect utility function for groups that make private purchases (S) under





gP ; ph) = u(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) 8j and 8 P 2 fA;Bg (2.22)
Second Stage: Voting
At the voting stage, individuals consider announced policies, xA and xB, credi-
ble commitments that parties implement if they win elections. Citizens value promised
policies according to the impact on their own economic well-being. Individuals take
into account that they will be able to make private decisions on health care markets
once policies had been implemented. Thus, individuals valuation of policies are sum-
marized by either indirect utility function (2.22) or (2.19) depending whether they
supplement or not the quality of health care publicly provided.
Suppose that a member of group j is promised economic policies (yjA; h
j
gA) by
party A and (yjB; h
j
gB) by B. Given ideological biases and the popularity of politicians,











gB) + i + " (2.23)
where V jP = maxfV jSP ; V jNSP gJj=1 8j and for P 2 fA;Bg. While voting for party B
if this inequality is reversed.
In each social group will be citizens with an idiosyncratic ideological bias, j,
such that they are indi¤erent between voting for party A or B. The swing voter type
in each group j is dened as:




gA)  V jB(yjB; hjgB)  " (2.24)
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where V jP = maxfV jSP ; V jNSP gJj=1 8j for P 2 fA;Bg. Voters located in group j with
and ideological type i below (above) the cut-o¤ ideological type nd optimal to vote
for A (B). Previously, I assumed that the idiosyncratic ideological preferences are
uniformly distributed in each group. Furthermore, there is no ideological bias to any
of the parties in the overall population. Therefore, the overall vote share for party A
is dened as:







The complement share of citizens votes for party B, SB.
First Stage: Policy Announcements
At the rst stage of the game, when politicians announce policy platforms, the
common shock has not been observed. The swing voter type in each group depends on
both policy platforms and the realized value of the shock, j = j(xA; xB; "). Hence,
parties are uncertain about the location of the ideological cut-o¤ type in each group
and voting is a random variable from politicianspoint of view. I assumed majority
voting, therefore o¢ ce-motivated politicians care about the probability of obtaining
more than fty per cent of the total vote. Given the swing voter type in each group
(3.27) and distributional assumptions on biases and shock, the probability that party
A wins the election can be expressed as:















gA)  V jB(yjB; hjgB)
#
(2.26)
Party B anticipates winning the election with the complementary probability
1   P (xA; xB). This function captures the uncertainty regarding electoral outcome
and summarizes expected voting behavior of citizens given announced policies and
implied market decisions. The probability is a function of the weighted average of
di¤erences in indirect utility due to partiesproposals of cash transfers and provision
of health services. The weights depend on the heterogeneity of ideological biases
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within a group.12
Probabilistic voting provides continuity of the probability function. Continu-
ity of both individualsutility function and distribution of ideological biases insures
continuity in both policy platforms of the probability that A wins the election. Fur-
thermore, I assumed concavity of citizensutility functions and uniform distribution of
idiosyncratic ideological positions. Given these assumptions, the probability function
is quasi-concave in xP for each party P .13
Taking the opponents economic policies as given, each political party chooses
a combination of available income and public provision of health care for each group,
fyjP ; hjgPgJj=1 for P 2 fA;Bg, that maximizes its chances of winning elections subject
to economic feasibility and non-negativity constraints. Parties take into account
citizensexpected voting decisions (stage 2 ) and individualschoices in competitive
markets (stage 3 ).
The policy choice problem of party A is given by:
max
fyjA;hjgAgJj=1
P (xA; xB) s.t. (2.11) and y
j
A  0 8j ; hjgA  0 8j (2.27)
The policy choice problem is symmetric to political party B. The First Order























+ jjhP = ph
jP 8j (2.29)
12See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a detailed discussion on the properties of probability of
winning functions in this kind of electoral competition models.
13Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Banks and Duggan (2006) present excellent surveys on
probabilistic voting with o¢ ce-motivated politicians. Specially relevant are their technical discussion

















P = 0 8j ; jhPhjgP = 0 8j (2.31)
P  0 jyP  0 8j ; jhP  0 8j (2.32)
where jyP and 
j
hP are the multipliers associated to the non-negativity constraints
yjP  0 and hjgP  0 for all groups j 2 f1; :::; Jg for P 2 fA;Bg;and P is the
Lagrange multiplier associated to the economy feasibility constraint for P 2 fA;Bg.
2.3.3 Political Equilibrium
Denition: A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the probabilistic
electoral competition game is i) a menu of economic policies announced by each
political party P , xNP = fyjNP ; hjNgP gJj=1; ii) a voting decision for each individual of
the polity, fA;Bg; and iii) individualsprivate choices through competitive markets
under Ps government, fcjNmP ; hjNmPgJj=1, such that:
1) Each political party announces a policy proposal that maximizes its
chances of winning elections taking as given its opponentspolicy announcements, the
economy feasibility constraint and citizensexpected voting and market decisions.
2) Each citizen votes for the party that maximizes her own well-being
given announced economic policies, ideological biases, popularity shock and decisions
in competitive markets.
3) Each individual, given implemented policies, chooses the bundle of nu-
meraire commodity and health services that maximizes her utility given her available
resources.
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Proposition 1 (Existence) A SPNE in pure strategies exists.
Proof. Given that i) the feasible set of strategies for both political parties is
non-empty, compact and convex; and ii) candidates objective functions are continuous
in policy strategies (xA; xB) and quasiconcave in xA and xB for each party respectively.
Furthermore, given that i) individualsbudget set is also non-empty, compact and
convex; and ii) citizensutility functions are assumed to be continuous and concave
in both goods. Then, according to Glicksbergs Theorem, there does exist a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
Political Allocation
Solving backwards, I characterize the Political Equilibrium of the game.14For
both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for
any group j, (yjNP ; h
jN





















8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg, such that economic feasibility holds. In the pre-
election stage, politicians announce policies such that the marginal benet of targeting
one unit of in-kind transfers in terms of probability of winning elections is equal to
the marginal opportunity cost. That cost is measured by the marginal decrease in
probability due to a reduction of targeted net income by ph units.
The presence of competitive markets allows the existence of multiple equilib-
rium policies for each group j. In the pre-election stage, politicians take into account
that in the post-election stage individuals have access to health care markets. In
equilibrium, both political parties are indi¤erent to announce di¤erent combinations
of net taxation policy and in-kind transfers for each social group j. However, the
14See Mathematical Appendix A.1. for a detailed discussion and complete characterization of the
political equilibrium and the propositions presented in this subsection.
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targeted consumption bundle of numeraire and health care to group j is the same










where cjNP = y
jN
P   phhjNmP and hjNP = hjNgP + hjNmP 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg.
The combination of choosen policies, fyjNP ; hjNgP gJj=1, imply consumption bun-
dles for all groups that satisfy the economy feasibility constraint. That set of bundles,
fcjNP ; hjNP gJj=1, is the one that maximizes politicianschances of winning elections given
expected voting, competitive equilibrium behavior of citizens and economic feasibility.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Policies) Politicians are indi¤erent between announc-
ing pure private provision, pure public provision or a combination of public and pri-
vate provision of health services for each group j such that the consumption bundle
intended for the groups is reached and economic feasibility holds.
Corollary 1 (In-kind transfers not necessary) O¢ ce-motivated politicians need
not resort to in-kind transfers to win elections.
The existence of competitive markets allows any consumption bundle to be
reached targeting di¤erential cash transfers. That result contrasts with previous
signicant political economy contributions such as Fernandez and Rogerson (1995),
Epple and Romano (1996a,b) and Gouveia (1997). In that literature, in-kind transfers
emerge as the political instrument to redistribute resources across groups of voters.
However, those results are driven by severe policy constraints imposed in order to en-
sure the existence of political equilibrium. Specically, those models do not allow the
possibility of income redistribution. Therefore, those insights cannot be generalized
when cash transfers are allowed.
One exception in the literature is Levy (2005) who analyzes the possibility
of in-kind transfers when income redistribution is also feasible. In the presence of
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heterogeneous preferences, public provision of education (i.e. in-kind transfers) could
emerge as the result of a coalition between the rich and the young poor. Nevertheless,
in that case, in-kind redistribution arises because cash transfers are constrained to be
uniform for all the population.
In order to overcome the limitations imposed by modeling constraints, I in-
troduce a probabilistic voting model in the policy choice between cash and in-kind
transfers. That allows relaxing the constraints in policy tools allowing for di¤erential
targeting cash and in-kind transfers. I show that when there are no severe constraints
in redistributive schedules, in-kind transfers are possible but not politically necessary.
In the pre-election stage, political parties could announce di¤erent combina-
tions of net taxation and in-kind transfers policies. Then, policy divergence is possi-
ble. However, o¢ ce-motivated politicians propose economic policies that implement
the same allocation of resources once individuals make private choices in competitive
markets, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1:
cjN = cjNA = c
jN
B and h
jN = hjNA = h
jN
B 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (2.35)
Proposition 3 (Political Allocation) The political game between o¢ ce-motivated
politicians and self-interested citizens yields to a unique consumption bundle of nu-
meraire commodity and health services for each group, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1:
Distributive Politics
In equilibrium, parties announce economic policies such that ideologically neu-
tral voters (i = 0) are expected to be indi¤erent between political parties. Hence,
politicians compete in each group for pivotal indi¤erent voters that could swing their
vote. The electoral competition between o¢ ce-motivated politicians leads to the con-
sumption patterns of numeraire and health care across groups implicitly dened by
the following equations:
kuc(c




0N) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (2.36)
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0N) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (2.37)
The relative treatment across groups depends on both the concentration of
expected swing voters and the sensitivity of the expected ideological cut-point (3.27)
to policy proposals. Those incentives for political redistribution are consistent with
the well-known insights on distributive politics highlighted by Lindbeck and Weibull
(1997) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) who analyze the political allocation of cash
transfers across groups. I extend those results allowing for di¤erential targeting of
commodities when market provision is feasible.
Proposition 4 (Swing Voters) The group-specic consumption bundle of numeraire
and health care that results from the political process is monotonically increasing in
the density of expected swing voters in each group.
Proof. Given the assumption of homogeneity of preferences and concavity of
utility function, equilibrium conditions hold if and only if groups with larger densities
have lower marginal utility of both numeraire and health services. Therefore, these
groups must have larger allocations of both commodities.
if k > k
0 ! uc(ckN ; hkN) < uc(ck0N ; hk0N)! ckN > ck0N (2.38)
if k > k
0 ! uh(ckN ; hkN) < uh(ck0N ; hk0N)! hkN > hk0N (2.39)
The density of the distribution of ideological biases, j, measures the ideological
heterogeneity within a group. That density captures the expected concentration of
marginal voters in the group. Therefore, the political success of a group depends on
its degree of ideological homogeneity with respect to the rest of the groups.
Corollary 2 (Homogeneous Biases) Ideologically homogeneous groups consume
more numeraire and health services than groups with larger diversity in ideological
biases.
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The political process penalizes groups with more dispersed ideological views.
Those groups present a lower concentration of marginal voters who could change their
party attachment by partieseconomic promises. Instead, groups with more homoge-
nous views and larger concentration of citizens in the expected cut-point receive larger
benets.15In the particular case in which all the groups had the same dispersion of
ideological biases, the political game yields the utilitarian allocation. That result
holds because the expected marginal returns of targeting are identical across groups.
Claim 1 (Utilitarian Allocation) When social groups have the same extent of ide-
ological heterogeneity, o¢ ce-motivated politicians announce policies that implement
the utilitarian allocation. This allocation implies an egalitarian distribution of nu-
meraire and health care for all individuals of the polity.
Political incentives to discriminate across groups also depend on the sensitivity
of the expected cut-point to policy platforms. Di¤erentiating (3.27) with respect to
both policy alternatives, we can notice the relation between expected electoral returns
and convexity of preferences. The expected electoral gain is inversely related with
the curvature of the utility function over goods.
For instance, I could suppose the case in which the curvature over the consump-
tion of numeraire is lower than over health care (i.e. the marginal utility decreases
faster when individuals increase health care quality than when receive cash transfers).
In that case, citizenswillingness to compromise their attachments to political parties
falls quicker with increased targeting of health care. This implies that one unit of
resources devoted to health care is expected to generate lower electoral returns that
one unit targeted to the numeraire. Hence, in this case, opportunistic politicians have
incentives to announce policies that increase the consumption of numeraire because
of its larger electoral impact.
15See Lizzeri and Persico (2004) for a close discussion on the e¤ect of ideological heterogeneity in
the distribution of cash transfers across groups.
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Furthermore, the marginal electoral returns of di¤erential targeting health care
are lower than the returns from discrimination through cash transfers across groups.
On the one hand, with risk aversion over health care, politicians can court swing
voters by o¤ering lower amount of resources. On the other hand, pivotal voters
remain sensitive to larger o¤ers of cash transfers. Hence, the political process would
generate lower inequalities in the consumption of health care than in the numeraire
commodity.
Claim 2 The larger the curvature over the consumption of a good is, the lower the
groupsdi¤erences in the consumption of that good regardless of their expected con-
centration of swing voters.
Allocative E¢ ciency
The allocation of resources that results from the political process, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1,
is such that the rate at which consumers are willing to trade health care quality for nu-
meraire commodity is equal across groups and equal to the rate at which the economy
is able to transform numeraire into health care:
MRSjNh;c =MRTh;c = q 8j and P 2 fA;Bg (2.40)
Proposition 5 (E¢ ciency) The electoral competition game between o¢ ce-motivated
politicians who court self-interested citizens leads the economy to reach a Pareto Ef-
cient allocation.
Hence, the political process does not generate allocative ine¢ ciencies. As high-
lighted by Wittman (1989, 1995) that result illustrates an important feature of the
competition between politicians who strive to be elected. In the probabilistic elec-
toral competition game, if one party promises policies such that swing voters in one
group could be made better o¤ without making critical voters in other group worse
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o¤, the opponent party could announce policies that Pareto dominates its policy plat-
forms. Therefore, when politicians compete for marginal voters they have incentives
to exhaust the potential Pareto improvements in order to win the elections.
This e¢ ciency result contrasts with signicant political economy contributions
which viewed in-kind transfers as the distortionary result of political redistribution.
For instance, Epple and Romano (1996a) state that if in-kind transfers are purely
a consequence of the redistributive motive, then the equilibrium allocation of goods
is Pareto ine¢ cient. However, that ine¢ ciency arises because of the restrictions on
the technology of taxation but not by the political process. Once I remove these
constraints allowing for di¤erential targeting of cash and in-kind transfers, allocative
ine¢ ciencies disappear. This result is consistent with Besley and Coate (1998) and
Besley (2007) critique to the common claims about ine¢ ciency of political equilibria
in static settings. Ine¢ ciencies would be due to the imposed modeling constraints
in order to get existence of equilibrium. In static political economy models without
constraints in policy tools e¢ ciency should be reached.16
Furthermore, Persson and Tabellini (2000) highlight that the system of equa-
tions that gives equilibrium policies in partisanship probabilistic voting games cor-
responds to the solution of the maximization of a weighted utilitarian social welfare
function (SWF). Therefore, in those settings, political equilibrium allocations would
be Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, it is relevant to be clear on the signicant dif-
ferences between the normative approach that sustains the existence of a SWF and
probabilistic voting. On the one hand, the SWF embodies ad hoc distributional value
judgments on how society should weight the utility of di¤erent social groups (Sen,
1977). On the other hand, probabilistic voting takes a positive approach. The weights
of groups depend on their political inuence. Those weights determine equilibrium
policies which do not generate allocative ine¢ ciencies but modify the distribution of
16Ine¢ ciencies in representative democracies could be introduced through other sources such as
commitment problems and the strategic use of policy in dynamic settings (Besley and Coate, 1998,
and Acemoglu, 2003).
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real resources across groups with respect to market allocation.17
Market versus Political Allocation
In the previous section, I assumed competitive markets abstracting potential
imperfections in order to focus the analysis on the distributional side. I discussed
that, in a market economy without government intervention, the access to health
care depends on individualsavailable income. Is this market allocation sustainable
in a political process?
Proposition 6 (Market Sustainability) O¢ ce-motivated politicians announce poli-
cies that implement the market allocation of goods if and only if both i) the initial
endowment of resources is the same for all individuals; and ii) ideological polarization
is equal across groups.
Proof. i) if groups are not endowed with the same amount of resources, due
to concavity of utility function, candidates can increase their expected number of
votes targeting resources toward groups with an initial higher marginal utility (i.e.
lower initial endowment); ii) if the dispersion of ideological biases is not homogeneous
across social groups, politicians can increase their chances of winning elections tar-
geting more resources toward groups with larger ideological heterogeneity (i.e. higher
concentration of swing voters).
Hence, this paper points out that even in the case that markets work properly,
market allocation is not politically sustainable. In the presence of initial economic or
ideological heterogeneity across groups, o¢ ce-motivated politicians have incentives to
redistribute resources. The gainers of the political process are the groups with lower
initial amount of resources and homogeneous ideological positions.
17See Besley and Preston (2007) and Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010) for probabilistic voting




In view of the results outlined above, when citizens only care about their own
economic well-being, o¢ ce-motivated politicians could win elections without promis-
ing in-kind transfers. However, evidence shows that elected politicians steadily redis-
tribute resources through in-kind transfers on a large scale.
Normative analysis in public economics has suggested interdependent prefer-
ences as one of the leading candidates to explain the use of in-kind transfers. Par-
ticularly, literature has highlighted the potential externalities generated by the con-
sumption of health and education.18 In the normative literature, in-kind transfers
emerge as the optimal response of a benevolent government that correct those market
imperfections.
However, does this result hold in the presence of o¢ ce-motivated politicians
that compete for voters in elections? Individuals could feel better o¤when their fellow
citizens have access to health and education. Nevertheless, government programs need
to be funded and resources are scarce. Then, to what extend are citizens willing to
pay more taxes (or receive less cash transfers) in order to fund external e¤ects? And
most importantly, who must support the cost of funding those externalities?
I focus on a particular case in order to analyze whether the political game
internalizes the presence of externalities. Specically, I explore the case in which the
available health care coverage of the elderly generates a positive externality for the
rest of the population. This concern could be motivated by pure altruism between
generations. As an alternative, it could be justied by social insurance motives.
Individuals care about how society guarantees the access to health services to the
elderly.19
18See Stiglitz (1995) and Rosen and Gayer (2010) for a textbook treatment on the spillover e¤ects
of education or the positive externalities due to the consumption of health care. Currie and Gahvari
(2008) highlight justications based on interdependent preferences and paternalism. They also
survey alternative explanations such as the role of in-kind transfers to increase the e¢ ciency of the
taxation system; and its potential use as screening device to redistribute towards the needy.
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Regardless of the empirical relevance of this particular case, the goal of this
section is to analyze how incentives for political redistribution are a¤ected by the
presence of consumption externalities.
2.4.1 Distributive Politics with Externalities
Consider an economy composed of three social groups: the workers, L, the
enterpreneurs, F , and the elderly, E. Each individual located in group j 2 fL; F;Eg
is endowed with wj units of the numeraire commodity. O¢ ce-motivated politicians
compete for o¢ ce targeting both group-specic net taxation policy and in-kind trans-
fers. The selected combination of policies, fyjP ; hjgPgJj=1, must be feasible (2.11) and
citizens have access to competitive health care markets.
Preferences for the elderly are well-represented by the utility function (3.3)
whose properties were discussed in section II. However, now elderlys consumption of
health services, hE, is a positive externality for the workers and the enterpreneurs.
The preferences for non-elderly citizens, k 2 fL; Fg, are represented by an utility
separable in own-group consumption of goods and elderlys health care. Let k denote
the salience that captures groups relative weight between both concerns. The larger
the magnitude of the salience is, the greater the external e¤ect.
Uk(ck; hk; hE) = u(ck; hk) + kv(hE) 8k 2 fL; Fg (2.41)
The rst component measures utility derived from group ks own economic
well-being. The function u() is well-behaved. The second component captures the
external e¤ects. Citizens in group k value Es health care quality according to v().
I assume that this function is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave in hE.
vhE > 0 and vhEhE < 0 (2.42)
19The elderly are the big consumers of health care in the OECD countries. Increases in both life
expectancy and cost of treatments due to new technologies explain observed signicant increases in
health care spending. Source: OECD Health Data 2010.
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Political Allocation
Solving backwards, I characterize the Political Equilibrium of the game.20 For
both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for
any group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ), satisfy the same equilibrium conditions than in an economy

































8k 2 fL; Fg and 8P 2 fA;Bg: In the pre-election stage, politicians announce policies
to group E such that the marginal benet of targeting one unit of in-kind transfers
in terms of probability of winning elections is equal to the marginal opportunity cost.
The benet depends on both the direct e¤ect in group E and the electoral impact in
groups L and F . The cost is measured by the marginal decrease in probability due
to a reduction of targeted net income to group E by ph units.
Given the existence of competitive markets, both political parties are indi¤er-
ent to announce di¤erent combinations of net taxation policy and in-kind transfers to
the non-elderly groups, fL; Fg. Politicians are indi¤erent between announcing pure
private provision, pure public provision or a combination of public and private provi-
sion of health services for each group k such that the consumption bundle intended for
those groups is reached. However, for both political parties there is a unique equilib-
rium policy of net taxation and in-kind transfers to group E, (yENP ; h
EN
gP ). Politicians
constrain health consumption choices of the elderly in order to internalize the external
e¤ects in the rest of the groups.
The combination of choosen policies, fyjNP ; hjNgP gEj=L, imply consumption bun-
dles for all groups that satisfy the economy feasibility constraint. The set of bundles,
fcjNP ; hjNP gJj=1, is the one that maximizes politicianschances of winning elections given
20See Mathematical Appendix A.2. for a detailed discussion and complete characterization of the
political equilibrium and the propositions presented in this subsection.
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P  phhkNmP and hkNP = hkNgP +hkNmP 8k 2 fL; Fg
and P 2 fA;Bg.
Proposition 7 (Externalities and In-kind transfers) Politicians must target in-
kind transfers to the group which consumption choices generates positive externalities
in the rest of the population.
If politicians target group E uniquely with cash transfers, the elderly expected
behavior in markets imply that they would allocate available resources between health
and numeraire without taking into account the external e¤ects originated into groups
L and F . In order to maximize their chances of winning elections, politicians select a
combination of feasible policies such that E are constrained to consume more health
services than they would buy in competitive markets if targeted resources were given
in cash.
In equilibrium, o¢ ce-motivated politicians propose economic policies that, once
individuals make private choice in competitive markets, implement the same alloca-
tion of resources fcjN ; hjNgJj=1.
cjN = cjNA = c
jN
B and h
jN = hjNA = h
jN
B 8j 2 fL; F;Eg (2.46)
Proposition 8 (Political Allocation with External E¤ects) The political game
between o¢ ce-motivated politicians and self-interested citizens with interdependent
preferences yields to a unique consumption bundle of numeraire commodity and health
services for each group, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1:
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Distributive Politics
Political parties announce economic policies such that the ideological cut-point
is expected to be equal to zero for all groups. The equilibrium relative treatment
between groups in the presence of external e¤ects is implicitly dened by the following
system of equations:
kuc(c
kN ; hkN) = Euc(c
EN ; hEN) 8k 2 fL; Fg (2.47)
kuh(c











P ) 8k 2 fL; Fg (2.48)
The patterns of numeraire commodity are characterized by the same condi-
tions previously discussed. Groups with larger concentration of swing voters and
lower initial endowments receive more cash transfers (or pay fewer taxes). However,
the consumption of health care is a¤ected by the presence of externalities. The novel
element is that politicians can court simultaneously swing voters in all groups tar-
geting in-kind transfers to the groups which consumption choices generate positive
externalities in the rest of the population. Those incentives leads politicians to an-
nounce policies that change both the distribution of health services across groups and
its overall consumption in order to court a larger amount of pivotal voters.
In equilibrium, parties equalize across groups the expected electoral returns of
targeting one unit of health care. The expected returns of targeting in-kind trans-
fers in each group depends on the density of swing voters and the sensitivity of
the expected cut-point in each group to changes in o¤ers of health services. When
politicians target in-kind transfers to the elderly they expect to a¤ect the ideological
cut-point of the workers and the entrepreneurs. In order to attract swing voters in
those groups, politicians increase the amount of health services targeted to the elderly.
That increase raises the overall consumption of the good in the economy.
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Claim 3 In the presence of external e¤ects, the consumption of health services is
larger with respect to economies where individuals only care about their own economic
well-being.
The overall return of targeting in-kind transfers to the elderly depends on the
impact within that group and the external e¤ects generated in the rest of the groups.
The return on the elderly mimics previous results: the e¤ect of the amount targeted
is directly related with the concentration of pivotal voters and indirectly with the
curvature over health services.
The expected electoral returns on groups L and F depends on the salience of
external e¤ects and the convexity of preferences weighted by the density of expected
swing voters in each group. A larger salience, k, means that an extra unit of health
care targeted to the elderly is expected to a¤ect group k ideological cut-point by
a larger size. Furthermore, the impact on group ks ideological cut-o¤ is inversely
related with the curvature of utility v() over hE. Therefore, the quicker marginal
utility declines, the lower the expected electoral return in group k.
Resources are scarce and increases of in-kind transfers to the elderly must be
balanced with decreases of targeted resources in other groups. For instance, it could
imply a reduction of the amount of health services targeted to group k. That reduc-
tion implies a decrease in the expected number of votes in k which size depends on
its expected density of swing voters and the convexity of preferences. The expected
electoral losses in group k also depend on the relative size of the groups. The smaller
the elderly group is, the lower the expected losses in group k. Politicians can in-
crease in-kind transfers to the elderly decreasing group ks consumption in a lower
proportion.
In equilibrium politicians balance expected gains and losses of votes. The size
of in-kind transfers targeted to the elderly depends on the density of elderly swing
voters and the magnitude of other groups concerns on external e¤ects. The e¤ect of
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this magnitude on in-kind transfers is directly related with the success of the workers
and the entrepreneurs in distributive politics (i.e. their expected concentration of
swing voters). Furthermore, the size of in-kind transfers is inversely related with
the size of the group E. The larger the size of the group is, the lower the impact
of external e¤ects on the targeted amount. For instance, society ageing will reduce
elderly consumption of health care. In that situation, maintaining previous levels of
funding would imply additional reductions in the consumption levels of the rest of the
groups, L and F . Politicians should reduce in-kind transfers to the elderly in order
to court swing voters in the rest of the population.
Furthermore, o¢ ce-motivated politicians target a combination of cash and in-
kind transfers that constraint consumption choices of the elderly regardless of their
political clout. Two potential cases are worthy to discuss. For instance, when the
elderly group presents a broader support of ideological attachments (i.e. low density,
E), they could receive low cash transfers but large levels of health coverage. As an
alternative, when the elderly are highly inuential (i.e. high density, E), politicians
target larger in-kind transfers than desired by the old in order to court marginal voters
in non-elderly groups. The elderly would prefer allocations with lower health care
quality and larger available income. However, the expected marginal gains to court
swing elderly citizens with cash would be lower than the expected marginal losses of
swing voters within the workers and the entrepreneurs. Therefore, politicians must
constrain elderly consumption decisions in order to court marginal voters in the rest
of the population.
Allocative E¢ ciency and Markets
In equilibrium, the bundles of numeraire and health services consumed by the
workers and the enterpreneurs, fck; hkgFk=L, satisfy:
MRSkNh;c =MRTh;c = q 8k 2 fL; Fg (2.49)
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Furthermore, the consumption bundle of the elderly, (cE; hE), which results






kMRSkNhE ;ck =MRTh;c = q (2.50)
Proposition 9 (E¢ ciency and External E¤ects) The electoral competition game
between o¢ ce-motivated politicians who court self-interested individuals in the pres-
ence of external e¤ects yields an allocation in the set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations.
The e¢ ciency result is explained by the electoral competition for marginal vot-
ers. For instance, if one party announced only cash transfers to group E, its opponent,
with the same amount of resources, could target in-kind transfers in that group and
attract more swing voters from the rest of the population. The competition for court-
ing the maximum amount of swing voters leads politicians to announce net taxation
and in-kind transfers policies that lead the economy to reach e¢ cient allocations.
In the case that health care decisions were not subject to the political process,
competitive markets do not internalize external e¤ects. The elderly would not take
into account the e¤ect of their consumption decisions on the rest of the population.
Therefore, the political process leads the economy to achieve Pareto-e¢ cient alloca-
tions that markets cannot reach.
It is important to notice that this e¢ ciency result is not obtained by assum-
ing the presence of benevolent governments. E¢ ciency is the equilibrium outcome
of the political process. Looking for their own-interest, o¢ ce-motivated politicians
internalize the external consequences of elderly health consumption in the rest of the
population.
Few contributions have discussed the role of political competition to increase
e¢ ciency in the presence of market imperfections. One exception in the analysis of
in-kind transfers is Blomquist and Christiansen (1999). In the presence of asymmet-
ric information, in-kind transfers could be used as a screening device that alleviates
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the self-selection constraint and increases e¢ ciency.21In polities where citizens have
preferences for redistribution toward low income citizens, well-designed in-kind trans-
fers lead high and low ability individuals to reveal their type. Politicians compete
for o¢ ce announcing redistributive policies that improve e¢ ciency and equity in the
presence of asymmetric information.
Other relevant contribution that explores the e¢ ciency-enhancing role of elec-
toral competition is Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010). They analyze the e¤ect of
electoral competition on the choice of pro-growth policies in the US states. They
make use of probabilistic voting to model the electoral competition for voters with
partys loyalties (i.e. swing versus core voters). Their results show that political
competition between parties tends to increase e¢ ciency. The larger the competition
for marginal swing voters is, the larger the incentives to choose e¢ cient policies.
2.5 Commodity Egalitarianism
Recent contributions on positive political economy have suggested that citi-
zenssupport over redistributive policies depends not only on the e¤ect of policies on
individualsown economic well-being but on their beliefs on the fairness of social out-
comes.22 Individuals would be averse to inequalities generated by luck and support
policies that reduce those inequalities that they consider unfair. That literature has
focused on views about the proper distribution of income and citizenspreferences
over cash redistribution. However, citizens could also be concerned about the proper
consumption of specic commodities.
21Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) introduce the main insights of Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982)
on the screening role of in-kind transfers into a political economy setting. However, they impose
severe constraints into the number of groups and preferences in order to reduce the political game
to one dimension. Those assumptions limit the generality of their results.
22Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Bénabou and Tirole (2006) are important contri-
butions on the relation between social beliefs and preferences over redistributive policies. See Alesina
and LaFerrara (2004) and Fong (2001) for empirical work on the US case. Alesina and Giuliano
(2010) provide a comprehensive theoretical and empirical review of the literature.
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In particular, I work the case in which individuals are averse to inequalities in
the consumption of goods such as health and education.23For instance, individuals
could believe that health and education are fundamental rights. These rights not
should be related with citizensability to pay or any other characteristic.
Furthermore, inequalities in the consumption of these goods could be a proxy
for unfair inequalities. For instance, in a market economy, an unlucky child born
in a low income family would have access to a low quality education. The market
provision of education and its e¤ect on the future childrens income would be due to
luck.24The consumption of health services could also be associated to luck. As an
example, the fatal diseases and serious medical conditions caused not by individual
behavior but by random factors such as genetics and virus. In a market economy, the
access to expensive advanced treatments and then the probability of surviving to a
fatal disease depends only on citizensincome.
Hence, individuals could be against the inequality in the access to health care
and education because the relation between their consumption and random com-
ponents associated to luck. The existence of those unfair inequalities caused by
luck could sustain commodity egalitarian preferences. Other alternatives could be
suggested to model social preferences over the consumption of health and educa-
tion.25However, the goal of this section is to analyze how incentives for political re-
distribution change in the presence of equity concerns limited to specic goods.
23This notion of commodity egalitarianism was suggested by James Tobin (1970).
24Gasparini and Pinto (2006) presents a normative analysis based on equality of opportunities to
justify aversion to inequality in the access of education.
25For instance, citizens could support that everyone should have access to at least some minimum
level of schooling or medical care. Furthermore, individuals could disagree over the notion of fairness
and hold heterogeneous views about how the consumption of goods should be evaluated.
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2.5.1 Distributive Politics with Egalitarianism
Consider the same economy with a nite number of groups presented in the
preceding sections. Politicians announce taxation schedules and in-kind transfers,
fyjP ; hjgPgJj=1 8P 2 fA;Bg, in order to win elections. Economic policy platforms must
satisfy the economy feasibility constraint (2.11). Furthermore, there are competitive
markets where citizens are able to acquire health care services.
I assume that citizenspreferences have two components. The rst one mea-
sures individuals own economic well-being. The second component captures the util-
ity derived from social outcomes. Let 
(h) be citizenscommon valuation of health
care distribution where h = fhjgJj=1 is the allocation of health services across groups.
Furthermore, let j denote the relative weight that individuals who belong to group j
assigns to equity concerns with respect to private utility. The preferences of a citizen
i located in group j can be represented by an additively separable utility function:
U j(cj;h) = u(cj; hj) + j
(h) where h = fhjgJj=1 (2.51)
The individual private utility is well-represented by the non-satiable preferences
(2) discussed previously. However, it is common to assume that the social preference
component is better represented by satiated preferences. In the commodity egalitarian











Solving backwards, I characterize the Political Equilibrium of the game.26 For
both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for
26See Mathematical Appendix A.3. for a detailed discussion and complete characterization of the
political equilibrium and the propositions presented in this subsection.
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any group k, (ykNP ; h
kN

























8k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg: In the pre-election stage, the expected electoral
benet of targeting one unit of in-kind transfers depends on both the direct e¤ect in
group ks economic well-being and the e¤ect on the distribution of health consumption
across groups. Politicians announce policies to group k such that the marginal benet
of targeting in terms of probability of winning elections is equal to the marginal
opportunity cost. The cost is measured by the marginal decrease in probability due
to a reduction of targeted net income to group k by ph units.
In the presence of egalitarian views, for both political parties there exists a
unique equilibrium policy of net taxation and in-kind transfers for each group k,
(ykNP ; h
kN
gP ). Furthermore, politicians choose economic policies such that individuals
are expected to no supplement health services in competitive markets, hjNmP = 0. The
combination of choosen policies, fyjNP ; hjNgP gJj=1, imply a set of consumption bundles
fcjNP ; hjNP gJj=1, that maximizes politicianschances of winning elections given expected




























gP 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg.
Proposition 10 (Egalitarianism and In-kind transfers) Politicians constrain con-
sumption choices of individuals targeting in-kind transfers to all groups in order to
reduce inequalities in the consumption of specic commodities.
If politicians target group k uniquely with cash transfers, individuals would
allocate available resources between health and numeraire without taking into ac-
count the e¤ect of their decisions on the health consumption inequality in the overall
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population. Individuals value an egalitarian allocation of health, however this valua-
tion has a public good nature which is subject to free-riding behavior in competitive
markets. For this reason, vote-maximizer politicians select a combination of feasible
policies such that fully constrain consumption decisions of individuals. Hence, com-
modity egalitarianism prevents that individuals could make their private decisions
through competitive markets. The health care coverage of all individuals is decided
by o¢ ce-motivated politicians.
In equilibrium, o¢ ce-motivated politicians propose the same economic policies
(i.e. policy convergence) and therefore implement the same allocation of resources
fcjN ; hjNgJj=1.
cjN = cjNA = c
jN
B and h
jN = hjNA = h
jN
B 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (2.55)
Proposition 11 (Political Allocation with Commodity Egalitarianism) The
political game between o¢ ce-motivated politicians and citizens who are averse to in-
equalities in the consumption of specic goods yields to a unique consumption bundle
of numeraire commodity and health services for each group, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1.
Distributive Politics
The equilibrium patterns of cash and in-kind redistribution across groups are
implicitly dened by the following equations:
kuc(c





























these equilibrium conditions hold 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P = fA;Bg:
Electoral competition focuses on courting ideological neutral voters in each
group. Groups with higher concentration of swing voters are targeted with both
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larger cash and in-kind transfers. However, the existence of egalitarian views limits
the use of di¤erential targeting of in-kind transfers across groups.
In equilibrium, both parties equalize the expected electoral returns of targeting
one unit of health care across groups. The overall return of targeting in-kind transfers
to citizens who belong to any group k has two components. The rst one is the
increase of the expected number of votes in the targeted group by self-interested
motives. That e¤ect depends on both the concentration of swing voters in the group
and the marginal impact in citizensown-economic well-being.
The second component captures the e¤ect of targeting in-kind transfers in the
distribution of health. Citizens take into account how in-kind transfers a¤ect the
consumption of health in the overall population. When targeting in-kind transfers to
group k increases inequality, it implies a reduction of the expected number of voters
in all groups.
For the particular specication of social preferences previously presented (2.52),
the marginal e¤ect of targeting group k on the valuation of inequality for any group




=  k(hkN   hN) (2.58)
The impact on the expected ideological cut-point in any group j is increasing in
the utility losses which rise with health inequality. Therefore, the larger the inequality
is, the greater the expected loss of votes in all groups.
Although all groups are assumed to hold homogeneous valuations of social
outcomes, they could di¤er in their willingness to compromise social preferences in
return to economic benets. Thus, the larger the group-specic salience j is, the
larger the impact of health inequalities in the expected ideological cut-point of group
j. The electoral impact of egalitarian views in group j also depends on its density of
swing voters. The larger the density is, the greater the losses of voters.
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Furthermore, resources are scarce and increasing in-kind transfers to one group
must be balanced by reducing targeted resources in other groups. For instance, it
could imply a reduction of the amount of health care targeted to group k0. That
reduction implies a decrease in the expected number of votes in k0. The size of that
loss depends on group k0s expected density of swing voters and the convexity of
preferences over health. Furthermore, there is an additional increase in inequality
through the reduction of health consumption in k0. Hence, there are additional ex-
pected losses of votes in all groups. In equilibrium, politicians balance the expected
gains and losses of votes and implement a more egalitarian distribution of health.
Therefore, groups with more swing voters receive less health care with respect to a
political game in which citizens do not have egalitarian views.
Hence, in the presence of commodity egalitarianism, politicians announce uni-
versal in-kind transfers. However, the political process does not yield to uniform lev-
els of health consumption. O¢ ce-motivated politicians exploit individuals concerns
for their own economic well-being courting voters with di¤erential in-kind transfers.
Groups with larger concentration of swing voters have access to higher quality of
services. Therefore, even when all citizens agree that a perfect equal distribution of
a good is desirable, this allocation is not politically attainable.
Corollary 3 (Universal Public Provision with Targeting) In the presence of
commodity egalitarianism, opportunistic politicians implement universal public sys-
tems of health care. Nevertheless, politicians do not target the same quality of services
across groups.
However, commodity egalitarianism reduces the electoral returns of di¤erential
in-kind transfers. Those incentives reduce not only health care inequality but lower
politiciansincentives to allocate resources to in-kind transfers. Devoting resources
to cash transfers is electorally more protable.
Claim 4 In an economy with commodity egalitarianism, the inequality levels and the
53
overall consumption of health care would be lower with respect to economies in which
individuals only care about their own economic well-being.
This crowding out e¤ect is related with the main insights that we learnt from
Lizzeri and Persico (2001, 2004). In a distributive politics game, targetability yields
a premium for o¢ ce-motivated politicians. Politicians have electoral incentives to
devote more resources to a targetable policy tool such as cash transfers and reduce
the resources to fund public goods.
Commodity egalitarism introduce a public good nature in the consumption of
health services. The targetability of in-kind transfers is reduced because now the
valuation of the distribution of health consumption is non-rival and non-excludable.
Politicians aim to discriminate between voters and in-kind transfers lose part of their
e¤ectiveness. That leads the economy to a reduction in the aggregate consumption
of health services.
In the presence of egalitarian views, the political incentives for targeting in-
kind transfers di¤er from the ones in the consumption externality case. In the latter,
politicians use in-kind to court more swing voters in the rest of the population. Those
incentives lead the economy to increase the consumption of health care. In the former,
targeting in-kind transfers aims to reduce the loss of votes caused by unequal levels
of consumption of specic goods. However, di¤erential targeting is penalized and the
overall consumption of health care decreases.
Utilitarian Allocation In the particular case in which all groups had the same
extent of ideological heterogeneity, the marginal returns of targeting both cash and in-
kind transfers would be the same for all groups. Therefore, o¢ ce-motivated politicians
announce policies that implement the utilitarian allocation. Politicians do not have
incentives to make di¤erential targeting of cash transfers. Therefore, the relative
electoral advantage of cash over in-kind transfers disappears and the amount of health
care consumption in the economy is maximized.
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In that specic case, politicians would not need to resort on in-kind transfers.
They could announce a uniform level of cash transfers such that individuals acquire
the intended uniform amount of health services in competitive markets. Political
redistribution would be undertaken from groups with large initial endowments to low
income groups. Furthermore, only in this particular case, society reaches the socially
desired egalitarian allocation of health care.
Allocative E¢ ciency and Markets
The political process leads to a bundle of numeraire and health services con-









=MRTh;c = q (2.59)
Proposition 12 (E¢ ciency and Egalitarianism) The electoral competition game
between o¢ ce-motivated politicians and self-interested citizens who are averse to com-
modity inequalities yields an allocation in the Pareto set.
Politicians take into account that voters penalize policy proposals that lead to
unequal distribution of health consumption. Those incentives drive parties to select
menus of net taxation and in-kind transfers that internalize the presence egalitarian
views. Electoral competition for marginal voters leads to a more egalitarian con-
sumption of specic goods and to achieve allocative e¢ ciency that a market economy
cannot reach.
In competitive markets, even when all individuals share the same egalitarian
preferences, each individual has an incentive to free-ride on the egalitarian allocation
by others. Therefore, in economies with di¤erent income levels, normality of goods
leads markets to provide unequal distributions of consumption depending on the
dispersion of available income.
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In order to overcome the free-rider problem, politicians announce combinations
of economic policies that fully constrain individualshealth consumption decisions. In
spite of the existence of competitive markets, o¢ ce-motivated politicians must crowd
out individual market decisions and choose health consumption of all individuals.
That result is not obtained because of a benevolent government that takes into
account egalitarian tastes in order to maximize a given denition of social welfare.
However, it is the result of the electoral competition between o¢ ce-motivated politi-
cians. In order to win elections, politicians internalize the fact that citizens are willing
to sacrice part of their own economic well-being in order to get a more egalitarian
distribution of goods.
It is commonly presumed that politics leads to ine¢ cient provision of public
goods. However, as previously discussed, in static models of electoral competition,
those claims are due to the modeling restrictions in the available policy set. Besley
(2007) proposes a probabilistic voting electoral competition model to overcome those
limitations. As an example, Besley introduces the proposed model into the political
provision of pure public goods in the presence of distributive politics. Results show
that political competition leads politicians to implement a Lindhal Samuelson rule
depending on the politicial clout of core and swing voters. My analysis focuses on
swing voters and it is consistent with the e¢ ciency result when I introduce a public
good nature in the valuation of private goods.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper provides new insights on the political incentives to redistribution
through in-kind transfers. I have shown that even when markets work properly and
societies do not have preferences for redistribution, the market allocation is not polit-
ically sustainable. O¢ ce-motivated politicians have incentives to undertake political
redistribution. However, it does not necessarily imply that redistribution must occur
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through in-kind transfers.
Indeed, in economies with competitive markets, in-kind transfers are an ad-
ditional policy tool that politicians might use to reach their desired allocation of
resources. Nevertheless, political parties could win elections by promising di¤eren-
tial cash transfers across groups of voters. That result contrasts with former positive
political economy contributions in which in-kind transfers emerge as a political instru-
ment to redistribute resources across groups. This paper shows that without imposing
severe constraints in the available taxation technology, the pure redistributive motive
alone could not explain the use of in-kind transfers by politicians.
However, I found that in-kind redistribution is politically necessary in the
presence of interdependent preferences such as consumption externalities and equity
concerns. My research shows that when citizens care about other individualscon-
sumption of specic commodities, politicians have incentives to make use of in-kind
transfers. Targeting specic groups of voters with in-kind rather than cash trans-
fers allows politicians to simultaneously attract voters in other groups with the same
amount of resources.
Furthermore, I found that electoral competition for marginal voters exhausts
potential Pareto improvements in the economy. The political process reaches Pareto
e¢ cient allocations that markets cannot reach in the presence of equity concerns and
externalities. This e¢ ciency result is not obtained by assuming the existence of a
benevolent government that implements in-kind transfers either to correct market
imperfections or to satisfy equity concerns. Instead, the e¢ cient allocation is the
equilibrium outcome of political game between politicians and voters. Politicians
choose in-kind rather than cash transfers when the amount of voters that they can
attract is larger.
In order to handle political equilibria with multidimensional policy space, I
have adopted a well-known probabilistic voting model. That model is based on the
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literature of distributional politics and swing voters established by Lindbeck and
Weibull (19987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). Those contributions have focused
on the allocation of cash transfers across social groups. My research examines po-
litical incentives for redistribution when politicians are able to use both in-kind and
cash transfers when market alternatives are also feasible. Furthermore, I extend the
literature on redistributive politics exploring how political redistribution is a¤ected
by the presence of interdependent preferences between groups of voters.
Some direct extensions of this distributive politics framework with competi-
tive markets are worthy to be considered for further research. I rst aim to explore
the relation between heterogeneous preferences and political redistribution. For in-
stance, I could assume that individualsself-interested preferences over commodities
are related with some idiosyncratic characteristics such as age. As an example, the
young households could prefer higher quality educational services than the old cit-
izens. This extension would allow us to discuss the political incentives for tagging
individuals with immutable characteristic either through in-kind or cash transfers.
Furthermore, I intend to endogenize individualsincome by introducing labor
supply decisions. That would enable us to analyze the potential trade-o¤ between
allocative e¢ ciency and political redistribution. For instance, the existence of infor-
mation asymmetries would constraint the available government instruments to tax
individualsabilities. In that case, when governments can uniquely use distortionary
taxation, redistribution of resources generates deadweight losses. I aim to explore
the political incentives to use in-kind instead of cash transfers in order to increase
the e¢ ciency of the taxation system. That could enlarge the available amount of
resources for political redistribution. Further research is necessary to analyze these
extensions which might provide interesting new results.
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Chapter 3




Governments modify on a large scale the distribution of income that would be
generated by private markets without public intervention.1The most important com-
ponent of this redistribution is undertaken by raising taxes in order to fund both cash
transfers and the public provision of services such as health care, education or child-
care.2Furthermore, governments are usually constrained to raise revenues through
taxes over earned labor income, capital gains or the consumption of private goods.
Therefore, the redistribution of market income distorts economic decisions and cre-
1See for instance Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for a comprehensive analysis of redistributive policies
in OECD countries. The scope of interventions range from regulations in labor markets to social
insurance and to budget interventions through taxes and transfers.
2Public Economics usually refers by in-kind transfers the public funding of the consumption of
specic commodities, regardless of whether their production is public or private. These in-kind
transfers are signicant and represent on average one third of the budget and around 15% of GDP
in advanced economies. See Currie and Gahvari (2008) and the OECD Economic Outlook (2009)
for detailed data.
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ates welfare losses (Feldstein, 1995, 1999; Salanié, 2003). Do ine¢ ciencies generated
by taxation a¤ect the composition of redistributive spending? Has redistribution
through in-kind transfers di¤erent e¤ects on e¢ ciency than cash transfers?
Normative analysis has explored under what circumstances the provision of
in-kind transfers might increase the e¢ ciency of the taxation system (Guesnerie and
Roberts, (1984); Gahvari (1994); and Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a comprehensive
survey of the literature). In particular, benevolent governments should fund in-kind
transfers that increase labor e¤ort in order to reduce distortions generated by income
taxation. However, the redistribution of income is a political decision undertaken
by elected politicians who require the support of citizens. Why should politicians
implement policies that increase e¢ ciency?
Indeed, political economy has longly discussed the potential distortions and
welfare losses introduced by democratic policymaking (Besley and Coate, 1998; Lizzeri
and Persico, 2001). As an example, recent contributions by Acemoglu et al. (2008,
2010, 2011) point out how political economy constraints might distort the dynamic
resource allocation and the structure of taxation. Furthermore, in the particular case
in which income redistribution is carried out through in-kind transfers, Epple and
Romano (1996a) highlighted the allocative ine¢ ciencies created by the political use
of in-kind transfers.
In contrast with previous contributions, this chapter shows that electoral com-
petition might provide incentives to implement redistributive schedules that reduce
the e¢ ciency cost of income taxation. In fact, politicians who strive to be elected
should consider the e¤ect of income redistribution on individualsincentives to work.
In particular, politicians might fund in-kind transfers in order to reduce distortions
in labor markets and enlarge the scope of redistribution. Overall, this chapter points
out that political competition implements a size and composition of redistributive
spending that minimize the deadweight losses created by income taxation.
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In order to investigate the incentives for political redistribution, I build a static
electoral competition model in which politicians propose redistributive policies which
require the support of citizens to be implemented. I consider a competitive economy
in which individuals belong to a nite number of groups. Each group exhibits dif-
ferent productivities and individuals must choose their labor e¤ort which is costly in
terms of well-being. Individuals value their available income and the consumption of
goods such as health care which can be acquired in private markets. Furthermore,
citizens must elect a government which might levy linear taxes over earned labor in-
come to fund cash and in-kind transfers. Government is choosen from two political
parties who credibly commit to economic policy proposals uniquely to win elections.
Furthermore, each political party holds di¤erentiated xed positions on ideological
issues non-related with economic policy. Citizens exhibit heterogeneous biases toward
parties ideological positions. Each voter gives her support to the party which yields
higher well-being given policy platforms, ideological biases and a common valuation
of competing parties. The party that obtains the support of more than half of the
population implements the announced redistributive policies.
Several appealing results emerge from the proposed analysis. I nd that politi-
cians who compete for o¢ ce have incentives to change the market distribution of
income to obtain the support of citizens. In particular, politicians have incentives
to raise taxes and redistribute income toward groups of voters with lower earning
abilities and more pivotal voters who could swing their vote. However, distortions
and output losses generated by income taxation limit the scope of political redistrib-
ution. In order to overcome these limitations, politicians might constrain individuals
to consume more in-kind transfers than the amount of goods that they would buy in
private markets if targeted resources were given in cash. The overprovision of in-kind
transfers reduces the disincentive e¤ects of redistribution in labor e¤ort and enlarges
available resources for political redistribution. As a result, politicians are able to
implement redistributive transfers that improve the well-being of pivotal voters.
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Furthermore, politics removes the economy from an e¢ cient competitive mar-
ket allocation because of distortions created by income taxation. However this chapter
shows how the electoral competition for marginal voters leads politicians to choose
a composition of redistributive transfers that reduce allocative ine¢ ciencies gener-
ated by taxation. The idea that incentives to be elected force politicians to increase
e¢ ciency was rst raised by Wittman (1989,1995) but few work has investigated
the welfare enhancing role of political competition. One exception is Besley et al.
(2010) which provides theorical and empirical evidence for the US states on how the
extent of political competition might generate e¢ ciency gains. Another example is
Lopez-Rodriguez (2010) who points out the role of electoral competition to correct
externalities and reach allocative e¢ ciency. This chapter shows that this mechanism
could be also present in the political choice of size and composition of redistributive
spending.
Few contributions have analyzed the incentives for political redistribution through
in-kind transfers funded with proportional income taxation (Fernandez and Roger-
son, 1995; Epple and Romano, 1996a,b; Gouveia, 1997; Levy, 2005). Nevertheless,
these contributions impose severe policy constraints in order to ensure the existence
of equilibria which limit the generality of their analysis. In particular, proposed mod-
els constrain in-kind transfers to be uniform for all the population and they do not
consider the possibility of redistribution through cash transfers. Furthermore, individ-
ualsincome is not the result of labor e¤ort but given as xed. Therefore, it prevents
to examine how workersbehavioral responses to policies a¤ect the characterization
of redistributive schedules.3
In order to overcome the limitations imposed by modeling constraints, this
chapter presents a model which builds on the literature of distributive politics estab-
3Levy (2005) allows the possibility of both cash and in-kind redistribution. However, transfers
are constrained to be uniform across groups and she abstracts labor supply decisions; Meltzer and
Richard (1985) allow for uniform cash transfers and consider income as a result of labor e¤ort but
they focus on commodity taxation.
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lished by Lindbeck andWeibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). In particular,
by exploiting probabilistic voting I relax the constraints in policy tools allowing for
di¤erential targeting of cash and in-kind transfers across groups of voters. Moreover, I
extend distributive politics contributions considering that votersincome results from
labor decisions, and politicians levy taxes over citizensearned income. This allows to
analyze the distortions in labor markets created by redistribution and therefore the
trade-o¤ faced by politicians between e¢ ciency and political redistribution. Further-
more, it permits to examine how the composition of redistributive spending a¤ects
individualsincentives to work and governmentstax revenues. An appealing result of
the analysis shows that politicians consider the di¤erential impact on governments
tax revenues of targeting cash and in-kind transfers among groups with di¤erent
productivities. In particular, politicians have incentives to target high productiv-
ity groups with in-kind rather than cash to reduce tax losses generated by income
taxation.
This chapter rationalizes the political use of in-kind transfers as a tool of income
redistribution in the presence of distortionary policy tools. However, this rational-
ization does not rule out other sensible explanations proposed in the literature. For
instance, the presence of market failures such as external e¤ects or imperfect infor-
mation might justify the public funding of in-kind transfers.4Nevertheless, I abstract
away potential market imperfections in order to focus the analysis on the e¤ect of
politics on the distribution of income.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the bench-
mark of a competitive market allocation. Section III introduces an electoral com-
petition game in order to analyze the incentives for political redistribution through
income taxation, cash and in-kind transfers. Section IV examines the political choice
4In the presence of asymmetric information, in-kind transfers can be used as an screening device to
redistribute toward low income individuals (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Balckorby and Donaldson,
1988; Bruce and Waldman, 1991). Interdependent preferences such as externalities has also been
suggested as one of the leading candidates to explain the use of in-kind transfers (Currie and Gahvari,
2008).
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of income taxation and the allocation of redistributive spending among groups of
voters. Section V discusses how the electoral competition for marginal voters might
improve the e¢ ciency of the taxation system. Finally, the last section concludes and
discusses potential further research.
3.2 The Economy: Market Allocation
Consider an economy with a continuum of citizens whose measure can be nor-
malized to 1. Individuals are endowed with T = 1 units of time and idiosyncratic
abilities . There are J ability types, fjgJj=1, with measure j. No ability group con-
stitutes a majority of the population.5Each individual can sell her time in competitive
labor markets. The wage per hour of work, wj, in units of a numeraire commodity,
is equal to the productivity associated to her ability type (i.e. wj = j). Individuals
choose the amount of time devoted to work, nj. The rest of their time is enjoyed as
leisure, lj = 1  nj. Therefore, type j individuals market income, yj, is given by:
yj = wjnj = wj(1  lj) (3.1)





In this economy, perfectly competitive rms produce health services at di¤erent
quality levels, h.6Firms have available a linear technology that requires qh units of the
numeraire commodity to produce one unit of health services at quality h. Individuals
have homogeneous preferences over the consumption of the numeraire commodity, c,
health care quality, h, and leisure, l. Preferences are represented by the following
5As an alternative, groups could be interpreted as geographic districts (e.g.: states, regions or
municipalities) in which an average individual in district j exhibits a productivity (output per unit
of time spent working) of wj .
6For expositional reasons, I focus on health care but the analysis is also valid for other goods
that could be subject to in-kind transfers such as child and elderly care or education.
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utility function:
U j(cj; hj; lj) = u(cj; hj; 1  nj) 8j (3.3)
This function is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing (uc > 0; uh >
0; ul > 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the identied
argument) and strictly concave (ucc < 0, uhh < 0, ull < 0) in c, h and l. Marginal util-
ities are bounded away from 0 and uc(0; h; l) =1, uh(c; 0; l) =1 and ul(c; h; 0) =1.
Leisure, health care and numeraire commodity are assumed to be normal goods.
Competitive rms with constant returns to scale produce whatever quality of
health care that citizens demand at price, ph, equal to marginal cost, q. Individuals
choose their supply of labor, nj, given the competitive wage associated to their ability
level, wj. Furthermore, individuals decide the quality of health care that they acquire
at competitive market price, ph, given the market income obtained by their labor
e¤ort, yj. The residual income is left for consumption of the numeraire commodity,
cj. Thus, ability type j individuals budget constraint is given by:
yj = wjnj = cj + phh
j 8j (3.4)
The choice problem for individuals who belong to group j can be written as:
8i 2 j max
hj ;nj
U j(cj; hj; lj) = u(wjnj   phhj; hj; 1 nj) s.t. hj  0 and 0  nj  1
(3.5)




m) for individuals with ability type 
j,










m ; 1  njm) = ul(cjm ; hjm ; 1  njm) 8j (3.7)
These relations implictly dene the marshallian demand function for health









j; ph) 8j (3.8)
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Furthermore, individuals participate into the labor market and their e¤ort




j; ph) 8j (3.9)
Denition (Market Allocation): A competitive market equilibrium is an allo-
cation of numeraire commodity and health services quality, fcjm ; hjmgJj=1, and a supply
of hours of work, fnjmgJj=1, for each ability type, such that individuals solve problem
(3.5); and competitive rms with constant returns to scale produce whatever qual-
ity of health care that individuals demand at price, ph, equal marginal cost, q. In












In a competitive equilibrium, the rate at which consumers are willing to trade
health services for numeraire commodity, MRSc;h, is equal for all individuals and
equal to the rate at which the economy is able to transform numeraire into health
care quality, MRTh;c. Furthermore, the rate at which individuals are willing to trade
leisure for income is equal to the competitive wage for each ability type. Hence,
Market allocation is Pareto Optimal.
MRSjh;c =MRTh;c = q 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (3.11)
MRSjl;c = w
j 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (3.12)
Market equilibrium yields an allocation of resources such that individuals who
belong to groups with larger abilities choose higher quality of health services and
consume larger amounts of numeraire good than individuals who belong to groups
with lower abilities. Furthermore, labor e¤ort is lower for the more productive in-
dividuals. This folllows directly from assumptions about homogeneity of preferences
and normality of goods.
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3.3 The Polity: Political Game
The economy presented above constitutes a representative democracy where
individuals elect a government to rule economic policy. The government is elected
from two o¢ ce-motivated political parties, P 2 fA;Bg, that compete in elections.
Parties are able to make credible commitments on taxation and spending policies. I
assume that voting is costless, nobody abstains and winning corresponds to obtaining
the support of more than half of the population.
The government is able to levy taxes on labor income earned by citizens in
competitive markets. I assume that only a linear income taxation schedule is feasible,
0  t  1. The revenues raised by income taxation can be devoted to fund both cash
(i.e. numeraire commodity) and in-kind group-specic transfers. In-kind transfers
take the form of non-tradable conditional transfers that citizens can only spend to
acquire health care in private markets.
Let sjP denote the cash transfer targeted to group j and tP be the linear income
tax commited by party P . Furthermore, politicians can target groups with in-kind
transfers, hjgP , which marginal cost is equal to the market price, ph. Politicians can
credibly commit to a policy platform xP = (tP ; fsjPgJj=1; fhjgPgJj=1) to be implemented
if party P wins the elections. The promised allocation of cash and in-kind transfers











jwjnjP  tPyP (3.13)
Citizens care about their economic well-being represented by preferences (3.3)
and have access to labor and health care competitive markets. Once one of the parties
P wins the elections, individuals who belong to di¤erent ability groups make labor
decisions, njP , at their wage level, w






P . Furthermore, the quality of health services under government P by group






The residual net income is devoted to the consumption of numeraire commodity,
cjmP = z
j
P   phhjmP .
Furthermore, parties hold xed and di¤erentiated positions in some dimension
non-related to economic policy such as ideological issues. Citizens care about these
non-economic ideological issues and have biases toward partiespositions.7 Let i
be the relative attachment of citizen i to party Bs positions (i.e. i = iB   iA)
which can be positive or negative. Idiosyncratic party attachments are unknown
by political parties but group-specic distributions are common knowledge. Rela-
tive party attachments in group j are drawn from a uniform distribution over the
range [ja; 
j
b] with average ideological attachment 
j = (ja + 
j
b)=2 and density
j = 1=(jb   ja). The density measures the ideological heterogeneity within the
group and therefore  =
PJ
j=1 
jj denotes the weighted average of ideological het-
erogeneity across groups. I assume that in the overall population there is no aggregate
ideological bias and suppose that ideologically neutral voters, i = 0, are present in
all groups.
Citizens also care about political parties running in the elections. I assume that
between the announcement of taxation and spending policies and the elections each
party receives aggregate shocks, "A and "B, common to all voters in the population.
I normalize the common shock, " = "B   "A, which measures the relative popularity
of party B with respect to party A at the time of elections. For simplicity, I assume
that the common shock " is uniformly distributed, and independently from i; with
density  and expected value, E("), equal to 0.






The timing of the political game is as follows: 1) Political parties simultane-
ously and non-cooperatively credibly announce their taxation and spending policy
7In order to model individualsconcerns on non-economic issues, I use the partisanship stochastic
probabilistic voting model proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1999). See Persson and Tabellini
(2000) for a detailed discussion.
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platforms, xA = (tA; fsjAgJj=1; fhjgAgJj=1) and xB = (tB; fsjBgJj=1; fhjgBgJj=1). 2) The
random idiosyncratic, i, and common popularity, ", shocks are realized. 3) Citizens
vote for the party that they prefer, fA;Bg. 4) Whichever party P that obtains the
majority of the votes, wins the election and implements the economic policy promised
at the beginning of the game. Finally, 5) individuals make labor and consumption
choices through competitive markets, fcjmP ; hjmP ; njmPgJj=1.
3.3.1 Stages of the Game
The political game presented above has three stages: economic policy an-
nouncements, elections and market decisions. I characterize the Subgame Perfect
Nash equilibrium of the political game by backward induction.
Third Stage: Market Decisions
Once one of the parties, P 2 fA;Bg, wins the election, it is committed to
implement economic policies, xP = (tP ; fsjPgJj=1; fhjgPgJj=1). Then, individuals within
each ability group decide their labor e¤ort, fnjPgJj=1, and whether making purchases
of private health care, fhjmPgJj=1, with their net income, fzjPgJj=1. The residual net
income is allocated to the consumption of numeraire commodity, fcjmPgJj=1. There-
fore, the budget constraint of individuals who belong to ability group j under Ps




j(1  tP )njP + sjP  zjP 8j (3.15)
Hence, given income taxation and transfers policies under the government of
party P , xP , the choice problem for ability type 
j individuals, who participate in





U j(cj; hj; lj) = u(wj(1 tP )njP+sjP phhjmP ; hjgP+hjmP ; 1 njP ) s.to. hjmP  0
(3.16)
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The optimal market choices, (hjmP ; n
j
P ), for individuals endowed with ability
type j must satisfy the FOCs for a maximum such that:
[hjmP ] uh + 
j
h = phuc 8j (3.17)
[njP ] w
j(1  tP )uc = ul 8j (3.18)
jhh
j
mP = 0 ; 
j
h  0 8j (3.19)
where jh is the multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint, h
j
mP  0.
Depending on implemented economic policies, for each group j the choice problem
(3.16) yields two alternatives. In the rst alternative, elected government P levies
income taxes and fund transfers such that the quality of health services publicly
provided to group j, hjgP > 0, given available net income, z
j
P , is overprovided. In-
dividuals would prefer to modify their current resource allocation by a reduction of
one unit of the targeted resources through in-kind transfers compensated by a one
unit increase in cash transfers. Therefore, when in-kind transfers are overprovided,
individuals decide do not make purchases of health care, hjmP = 0, and devote the net
income obtained by their labor e¤ort to the consumption of numeraire commodity,
cjmP = z
j




j(1  tP ); sjP ; hjgP ), is implicitly dened by:
wj(1  tP )uc(zjP ; hjgP ; 1  njP ) = ul(zjP ; hjgP ; 1  njP ) 8j (3.20)
where zjP = w





gP ; 1  njP ) < phuc(zjP ; hjgP ; 1  njP ) 8j (3.21)
Hence, given individualschoices in competitive labor markets and targeted in-
kind transfers and net income under the government of party P , the indirect utility
function for ability type j individuals when their consumption of health care is
overprovided (OV ) is given by:
V jOVP  V jP (ph; wj(1  tP ); sjP ; hjgP ) = u(wj(1  tP )njP + sjP ; hjgP ; 1  njP ) (3.22)
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As an alternative, elected government could raise income taxes and allocate
transfers such that the quality of health services publicly provided to group j, hjgP ,
given available net income, zjP , is either underprovided or enough-provided. Only
when health care is underprovided individuals make private purchases in private mar-
kets, hjmP > 0.
8 In this case, individuals market choices are identical to the case where
group j would receive the market value of targeted in-kind transfers in terms of nu-




gP be the implicit cash transfers targeted
to group j. The optimality conditions of individuals choice in group j yields:
uh(z
j
P phhjmP ; hjgP+hjmP ; 1 njP ) = phuc(zjP phhjmP ; hjgP+hjmP ; 1 njP ) 8j (3.23)
wj(1 tP )uc(zjP phhjmP ; hjgP+hjmP ; 1 njP ) = ul(zjP phhjmP ; hjgP+hjmP ; 1 njP ) 8j
(3.24)
where zjP = w
j(1  tP )njP + sjP and hjmP  0. These conditions implictly dene both
the ordinary demand function for private health care, hjmP = h
j
m(ph; w
j(1  tP ); IjP ),
and the labor supply function, njP = n
j
P (ph; w
j(1   tP ); IjP ), for group j conditional
to income taxation and transfers implemented by party P .
Given net income, targeted in-kind transfers and market choices in competitive
markets under the government of party P , the indirect utility function for individuals
with ability type j whose consumption of health care is not overprovided (UN) is
given by:
V jUNP  V jP (ph; wj(1  tP ); IjP ) = u(wj(1  tP )njP + sjP   phhjmP ; hjmP + hjgP ; 1  njP )
(3.25)
8In the particular case where government targets in-kind transfers and net income to group j
such that health care is enough provided, individuals do not supplement health care in private
markets, hjP = h
j
gP . Individuals would be indi¤erent between a one unit reduction of in-kind




Citizens vote for the political party that they prefer given income taxation and
spending policy proposals, their ideological biases and the popularity of parties. At
the voting stage, individuals value economic policy platforms taking into account that
they can make private decisions in competitive labor and health care markets. There-
fore, individualsvaluation of income taxation and transfers policies are summarized
by either indirect utility function (3.22) or (3.25) depending on whether quality of
health care publicly funded is overprovided or not given the available income in group
j implied by proposed policies.
Suppose that a member of group j is promised economic policies xjA = (tA; s
j
A;
hjgA) by party A and x
j




gB) by B. Given ideological biases and the
popularity of politicians, citizen i in group j votes for party A over B conditional on









B) + i + " (3.26)
where V jP = fV jOVP ; V jUNP g 8j and for P 2 fA;Bg. While voting for party B if this
inequality is reversed.
In each ability group, given proposed policy platforms, there might be citizens
whose idiosyncratic ideological bias, j, makes them indi¤erent between voting for
party A and B. The swing voter type in each group j is dened as:
j(xjA; x
j




A)  V jB(xjB)  " (3.27)
where V jP = fV jOVP ; V jUNP g 8j and for P 2 fA;Bg. Voters who belong to group j
with and ideological bias i below (above) the cut-o¤ ideological type nd optimal to
vote for A (B). I assume that a swing voter who is indi¤erent between both parties
randomizes equally over the set of parties. Previously, I assumed that in each group
the idiosyncratic ideological preferences are uniformly distributed. Furthermore, there
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does not exist an ideological bias to any of the parties in the overall population.
Therefore, the overall vote share for party A is dened as:









The complement share of citizens votes for party B, SB.
First Stage: Policy Announcements
At the rst stage of the game, when politicians announce policy platforms,
the common popularity shock has not been observed. The swing voter type in each
group depends on both economic policy proposals and the realized value of the shock,
j = j(xjA; x
j
B; "). Hence, parties are uncertain about the identity of pivotal voters
in each group and voting is a random variable from politiciansperspective. Under
majority voting, o¢ ce-motivated politicians care about the probability of obtaining
the support of more than half of the population. Given the denition of the swing
voter type in each group (3.27) and distributional assumptions on ideological biases
and popularity shock, the probability that party A wins the election can be expressed
as:
















Party B anticipates winning the election with the complementary probability
1 P (xA; xB). This probability function captures partiesuncertainty regarding elec-
toral outcome and summarizes expected voting behavior of citizens given announced
policies and implied market decisions. Probabilistic voting introduces heterogeneity
at citizens voting decisions because of the presence of idiosyncratic party attach-
ments. Thus, parties expected number of votes are a smooth function of policy
platforms. Furthermore, given that both group-specic distributions of ideological
biases and individualsutility functions are continuous, the probability of winning is
a continuous function in both policy platforms. Moreover, this probability function
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is also strictly concave in party As platform and strictly convex in party Bs policy
proposal. These properties are insured by assumptions on strict concavity of voters
utility functions and uniform distribution of ideological biases.9
Taking the opponents policy choice problem as given, each political party
chooses a linear tax over labor income and a combination of cash and in-kind transfers
for each ability group, xP = (tP ; fsjPgJj=1; fhjgPgJj=1) for P 2 fA;Bg, that maximizes
its chances of winning elections subject to governments budget constraint and non-
negativity constraints. Parties take into account citizensexpected voting decisions
(stage 2 ) and individualschoices in competitive labor and health care markets (stage
3 ). Thus, the policy choice problem of party A is given by:
max
tP ;fsjP gJj=1;fhjgP gJj=1
P (xA; xB) (3.30)
s.to. (3.13) and 0  tA  1 ; sjA  0 8j ; hjgA  0 8j (3.31)
Political partyB makes policy announcements simultaneously. Its policy choice
problem is symmetric to the one of party A.
3.4 Political Equilibrium
Denition: A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the electoral
competition game is i) a menu of income taxation and group-specic transfers an-
nounced by each political party P , xNP = (t
N
P ; fsjNP gJj=1; fhjNgP gJj=1); ii) a voting decision
for each individual of the polity, fA;Bg; and iii) individualsprivate choices in com-
petitive labor and health care markets under Ps government, fcjNmP ; hjNmP ; njNP gJj=1,
such that:
9See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a discussion on the properties of objective functions in
probabilistic voting games. Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Banks and Duggan (2006) provide
a detailed technical argument on continuity and concavity properties.
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1) Each political party commits to a policy proposal that maximizes its
chances of winning elections subject to the governments budget constraint, taking
into account both citizensexpected voting and market decisions and its opponents
policy choice problem.
2) Each citizen votes for the party that provides her with the maximum
well-being given proposed economic policies, ideological biases, popularity shock and
decisions in competitive labor and health care markets.
3) Each individual, given implemented economic policies by the winner
party, chooses the labor e¤ort and private health care services that maximize her
well-being.
In the electoral competition game with competitive markets, a SPNE in pure
strategies exists and it is unique.10 Furthermore, in this unique equilibrium, both par-
ties propose the same income tax and distribution of cash and in-kind transfers across
groups, xNA = x
N
B = x
N . This policy convergence follows because both parties make
simultaneous policy announcements facing exactly the same policy choice problem.
Both political parties aim to maximize their chances of winning elections constrained
by the same taxation policy tools. Hence, regardless of which party wins the elec-
tion, the electoral competition game implements the same allocation of resources once
individuals make private choices in competitive markets, fcjN ; hjN ; njNgJj=1.
Furthermore, when parties commit to the same policy proposals, citizenseco-
nomic well-being would be the same under the government of either party A or B,
V j(xjA) = V
j(xjB) 8j. Therefore, in equilibrium non-biased voters (i.e. i = 0) in
each group are expected to be indi¤erent between parties. Hence, politicians choose
income taxation and transfers in order to court ideologically neutral voters who could
swing their vote. I characterize equilibrium policies, xN = (tN ; fsjNgJj=1; fhjNg gJj=1),
when politicians undertake political redistribution.
10See Mathematical Appendix B.1. for a formal discussion on the existence and uniqueness of the
political equilibrium.
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3.4.1 Linear Income Taxation
Politicians need to raise income taxes in order to undertake political redistrib-
ution. Higher tax rates levied over labor income yield more revenue for redistribution.
However, income taxation reduces votersprivate utility and therefore raising taxes
has a negative impact on partiesexpected number of votes. Furthermore, taxes over
earned income lead workers to reduce their labor e¤ort. Therefore, these behavioral
responses of workers decrease the endogenous pool of resources available for political
redistribution. Hence, the size of the income tax choosen by politicians is limited by
both its negative e¤ect on chances of winning elections and individualsadjustment
of their labor e¤ort.11
For both political parties, the equilibrium choice of income taxation satises
the following relation:
tN






where j is the net electoral marginal valuation of income in group j; yj is the market
income of individuals of group j; and "jcn;w is the group js compensated labor supply
elasticity.
This equation shows how various factors a¤ect the equilibrium linear income
tax choosen by political parties and it is close to the expression that results from the
classical optimal income taxation problem with linear tax and uniform cash trans-
fers.12I extend that framework allowing for group-specic transfers. Furthermore, now
the implemented tax rate is not the optimal choice of a benevolent planner who aims
to maximize social welfare. However, income tax rate is the equilibrium outcome of
11See Mathematical Appendix B.2. for a detailed characterization of the equilibrium linear income
tax choosen by o¢ ce-motivated political parties.
12See seminal work on optimal income taxation by Mirrlees (1971); Stiglitz (1987) and Kaplow
(2008) for a discussion of the linear income tax case.
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the electoral competition between o¢ ce-motivated politicians. I discuss with some
detail the di¤erent elements that a¤ect the political choice of the income tax.13
Consider that politicians had available one unit of numeraire that could be
targeted to whichever group j. Then, the net electoral marginal valuation of the











The rst term measures the marginal e¤ect on partieschances of winning by
targeting an additional unit of numeraire commodity to a swing voter in group j. This
contribution is normalized by the value of a unit of numeraire to politicians (i:e: it is
converted in numeraire units dividing by the equilibrium shadow price of government
revenue, ). This marginal contribution depends on three elements: the marginal
utility of consumption, uc; the relative concentration of pivotal voters in group j with
respect to the average concentration of swing voters in the overall population, j=;
and the uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome measured by the parameter  .
The second component captures the e¤ect of behavioral responses of workers
to cash transfers into governments revenues. In particular, asssuming that leisure
is a normal good implies that an additional unit of numeraire targeted to a voter in
group j reduces her labor e¤ort. Therefore, per each unit of labor supply reduction
there is a twj marginal cost of revenues.
Equation (3.32) shows that the larger the covariance between the net electoral
marginal valuation and the market income in each group is, the greater the income
tax rate announced by politicians. The magnitude of this covariance depends on
the dispersion of yj and j. Market income exhibits a higher dispersion when the
distribution of abilities across groups is more unequal. The dispersion of j depends
13The exposition of the results is close to Stiglitz (1987) and Kaplow (2008) in order to high-
light both similarities and di¤erences with optimal taxation literature in which governments are
benevolent.
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on both the relative concentration of swing voters among groups and the concavity
of utility over consumption of numeraire.
Furthermore, income tax rate proposed by parties is larger when the compen-
sated labor supply elasticities to changes in net wages of the groups are low. Compen-
sated elasticities capture the ine¢ ciencies introduced by income taxation and measure
the income and tax revenues that are lost per unit of reduction in labor e¤ort. Politi-
cians consider the impact of these elasticities more relevant for groups with larger
productivities and size because of the larger lost in tax revenues.
Hence, larger di¤erences in the relative concentration of swing voters among
groups; greater individualsaversion to risk; higher inequality in the distribution of
abilities across groups; and lower compensated labor supply elasticities contribute to
a higher equilibrium tax rate which allows politicians to fund larger transfers.
Politicians do not have incentives to undertake political redistribution in the
particular cases in which either the deadweight losses associated with income taxation
are huge or there does not exist dispersion of yj and j.14 Nevertheless, I focus on the
general case in which there exists dispersion in both productivity and concentration
of pivotal voters among groups. Furthermore, e¢ ciency costs of taxation are not
excessive.15
3.4.2 Overprovision of Health Services
In equilibrium, political parties commit to a linear income tax and a combi-
nation of transfers such that the quality of health services publicly funded for each
group, given their available net income, is overprovided. Overprovision implies:
uh(z
jN ; hjNg ; 1  njN) < phuc(zjN ; hjNg ; 1  njN) 8j (3.34)
14For instance, politicians would not have incentives to redistribute when groups exhibit both the
same productivity and concentration of non-biased voters. See Appendix B for additional details.
15See Salanié (2003) for a discussion on the e¢ ciency cost of taxation and estimates of the com-
pensated elasticities of labor supply.
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where the equilibrium net income is given by zjN = wjnjN(1   tN) + sjN , with
sjN  0. Thus, politicians constrain individuals to consume more health services than
they would buy in private markets if targeted resources were given in cash. Why do
politicians who require the support of citizens to be elected might have incentives to
overprovide the consumption of goods? The political reason relies on the fact that
overprovision might increase the scope of political redistribution which is limited by
distortions generated by income taxation.
In order to examine under which conditions there exists political incentives for
in-kind redistribution, consider an economy in which both political parties do not over-
provide health care. In that case, politicians announce the same set of policies which
implies that health care publicly funded in all groups is either under or enough pro-
vided. Suppose that one party, for instance A, decides to modify its policy platform.
In particular, for a given income tax, party A increases in-kind transfers targeted to
group k reducing the funding of cash transfers. Suppose that the magnitude of the
policy change involves that now in-kind transfers in group k are overprovided. Whats
the e¤ect of this change in policy platforms on the economic well-being of non-biased
voters in group k? I nd that pivotal voterswell-being raises, dV kA=dh
k
g > 0, when
the change in the composition of targeted transfers increases individualsincentives
to work.16
Workers raise their labor e¤ort as long as leisure is a normal good and there
exists complementarities betwen labor and the good subject to in-kind transfers,
(i.e. @lck=@hkg < 0, where l
c is the compensated demand of leisure). The latter
condition holds when either: i) preferences between leisure and goods subject to in-
kind transfers are weakly separable, @lck=@hkg = 0; or ii) leisure and health are Hicks
substitutes, @lck=@ph > 0. The raise in labor e¤ort enlarges aggregate labor income
16See Mathematical Appendix B.3. for a technical proof that shows the conditions under which
overprovision is a political equilibrium. The exposed procedure follows closely Gahvari (1994) who
analyzes the e¤ect of cash and in-kind transfers in labor supply and tax revenues when government
is benevolent.
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and therefore governments revenues for any level of income taxation. That increment
of resources allows politicians targeting group k with larger in-kind transfers reducing
targeted cash in a lower magnitude. Party As change of policy platforms modies
the identity of expected swing voters in group k. Non-biased individuals and a share
of voters with attachments to party B would be expected to vote for party A. Thus,
this net gain in the expected number of votes provides incentives to modify the
composition of redistributive transfers. Furthermore, these incentives are also present
in the rest of the groups and therefore parties would deviate from the initial set of
policy platforms. Thus, it is showed that either under or enough provision cannot be
an equilibrium.
Hence, when there exists complementarities between labor and goods subject
to in-kind transfers (@lck=@hkg < 0), politicians overprovide the consumption of these
goods for all the population. The greater the complementarities are, the larger the
rise in workers labor e¤ort and governments tax revenues to fund redistributive
transfers. Therefore, politicians would have more incentives for overproviding these
goods because it expands the scope of political redistribution which is limited by the
disincentive e¤ects created by income taxation.
3.4.3 In-Kind Transfers
In equilibrium, when political parties need to resort to in-kind transfers to









= ph 8j (3.35)
where the equilibrium net income is given by zjN = wjnjN(1 tN)+sjN , with sjN  0.
Hence, for each group of voters, politicians equalize the marginal cost of funding in-
kind transfers to their marginal political valuation. This valuation consists of both
the marginal contribution of targeted in-kind transfers to partieschances of winning
and their marginal e¤ect on tax revenues. Overprovision of goods increases incentives
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to work, dnj=dhjg > 0, and therefore raises governments resources by tw
j per each
additional unit of time devoted to work.
The electoral competition between politicians leads to a distribution of in-kind
transfers across groups of voters that satises:
kuh(z









g ; 1  nk0N)
1  tNwk0 dnk0N
dhk0g
8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg
(3.36)
The interplay of three elements determine the equilibrium allocation of in-kind
transfers among groups: i) the individualsrisk aversion over the consumption of the
good subject to in-kind transfers; ii) the concentration of swing voters in the group;
and iii) its level of productivity.
By concavity of utility function, politicians have incentives to transfer resources
toward low ability groups because they exhibit higher marginal utility (i.e. lower
market income). The larger the risk aversion is, the lower the groupsdi¤erences
in the consumption of the good. Furthermore, politicians compete for pivotal non-
biased voters who could swing their vote. Therefore, groups with larger concentration
of non-biased individuals are favored in the allocation of in-kind transfers.
The e¤ect of concavity and swing voters in the political allocation of transfers
is well-known. Distributive politics points out how these factors a¤ect the expected
electoral returns of targeting transfers among groups (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987;
Dixit and Londregan, 1996). The novelty of this contribution relies on considering
the e¤ect of transfers on workersincentives to work and governments revenues.
Income redistribution reduces workerslabor e¤ort and therefore the tax basis
to fund redistributive transfers. Previous section discusses under which conditions
overproviding in-kind transfers might mitigate the disincentive e¤ects of taxation.
Furthermore, an extra unit of labor e¤ort for high productivity groups generates more
aggregate labor income and enlarges governments revenues for any level of taxation.
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Therefore, high productivity is a factor that contributes positively to receive larger
in-kind transfers. Politicians have incentives to target high productivity groups with
in-kind rather than cash to reduce tax losses generated by income redistribution.
Nevertheless, the impact of this component on the targeted transfer depends on the
groupselasticities of labor supply to in-kind transfers.
3.4.4 Cash Transfers
Politicians can also undertake income redistribution through di¤erential target-
ing of cash transfers among groups of voters. However, parties do not have incentives
to target cash transfers to groups in which the net electoral marginal valuation of
promising one unit of numeraire, j, is lower or equal than than the cost of the









 1 8j (3.37)
Otherwise, politicians promise cash transfers. In equilibrium, when group k is
targeted with transfers, politicians equalize the marginal contribution of the transfer
to their chances of winning, expressed in terms of numeraire, to its marginal cost. This
cost consists of the direct e¤ect of funding the transfer and the lost of tax revenues
because of behavioral responses of workers. In particular, cash transfers reduce labor
e¤ort through the income e¤ect (i:e: dnj=dsj < 0). Hence, in equilibrium the cash
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where the equilibrium net income is given by zkN = wknkN(1  tN) + skN .
Furthermore, for any pair of groups targeted with cash transfers, k and k0, the
equilibrium relative allocation of transfers among groups is given by:
17See Mathematical Appendix B.5. for technical details on necessary conditions for targeting cash
transfers and equilibrium characterization of the distribution of transfers across groups of voters.
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The factors that a¤ect the electoral incentives to redistribute among groups
through cash are the same that the elements previously discussed for in-kind transfers.
Groups with higher concentration of swing voters and lower productivities (i.e. higher
marginal utility of consumption) exhibit larger electoral benets of being targeted.
On the other side, politicians must consider the di¤erential impact on tax revenues of
targeting cash transfers among groups with di¤erent productivities. Indeed, the cost
of targeting cash transfers is greater for groups with larger productivities because of
the decrease of their labor e¤ort represents a larger loss of tax revenues per unit of
labor supply reduction. Hence, politicians have incentives to target low rather than
high productivity groups with cash in order to reduce income and tax revenues losses
generated by political redistribution.
3.5 Normative Analysis
When politicians are constrained to raise revenues through income taxation,
political redistribution generates allocative ine¢ ciencies. Taxation over earned in-
come introduces distortions in labor markets through the substitution e¤ect reducing
individualsincentives to work. Indeed, the rate at which individuals are willing to
trade leisure for consumption is lower than their competitive wage rate:
MRSjNl;c = w
j(1  tN) < wj for all j 2 f1; :::; Jg (3.40)
Furthermore, politicians implement redistributive policies that create distor-
tions in goods markets. In fact, under the conditions previously discussed, the allo-
cation of resources that results from the political process, fcjN ; hjN ; njNgJj=1, is such
that the consumption of health care is overprovided for all individuals in the economy.
Hence, in each income group, the rate at which consumers are willing to trade health
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care quality for numeraire commodity is lower than the rate at which the economy is
able to transform numeraire into health care:
MRSjNh;c < MRTh;c = q for all j 2 f1; :::; Jg (3.41)
Nevertheless, the feasibility of in-kind transfers reduces ine¢ ciencies with re-
spect to a situation in which governments were able to redistribute only through cash
transfers. By overproviding in-kind transfers, politicians introduce a friction in the
consumption of goods. However, this distortion provides workers incentives to in-
crease their labor e¤ort with respect to a situation in which targeted transfers were
given in cash. Therefore, it reduces the distortions in labor markets generated by in-
come taxation. Overall, politicians choose redistributive schedules that increase the
well-being of all individuals.
The increase in allocative e¢ ciency can be showed as follows. The economic
well-being of citizens when publicly funded health care is either under or enough
provided is equivalent to the case in which the same amount of resources was targeted
in cash.18 Furthermore, I showed the conditions under which, for any level of income
taxation, all individuals increase their well-being when health care is overprovided.
In that case, politicians are able to raise in-kind reducing cash transfers in a lower
magnitude. Hence, it is shown that voters can be made better o¤ when politicians
are able to redistribute income through in-kind transfers.
Thus, the allocation that results from the political game when in-kind trans-
fers are available is Pareto superior to the case in which redistributive spending is
restricted to cash transfers. Furthermore, the larger the complementarities between
publicly funded goods and labor are, the greater the e¢ ciency gains. Hence, the
composition of redistributive spending choosen by politicians is not neutral in terms
of e¢ ciency.
18In the case that politicians do not overprovide consumption and target group j with in-kind
transfers, hjg, these are equivalent to a cash transfer of value I
j = phh
j
g. Therefore, in this situation
cash and in-kind transfers are equivalent in terms of individualswell-being.
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Individuals work more and their consumption of health care is overprovided.
However, citizens are better o¤ with respect to a situation were only cash transfers
were available because redistributive schedules enlarge their net income. Indeed,
the equilibrium income tax is lower than the implemented tax rate when in-kind
transfers are not feasible. On the one hand, the increase in labor e¤ort raises the
marginal utility of leisure, ul. On the other hand, larger net income decreases the
marginal utility of consumption, uc. Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution
between income and leisure for each group, MRSl;c, is higher when in-kind transfers
are feasible. In equilibrium, this marginal rate of substituion is equal to the net
wage, wj(1  tN). Hence, the net wage is larger with respect to a situation in which
only cash transfers are available and therefore a lower equilibrium income tax rate is
implemented. Thus, an economy where in-kind transfers are feasible exhibits lower
distortions in labor markets with respect to a situation in which politicians were
constrained to redistribute income only through cash transfers.
Normative analysis justies the use of in-kind transfers to increase the e¢ -
ciency of the taxation system. Literature relies on an important contribution due to
Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) who show how forced consumption of goods which are
complements to labor can made all individuals better o¤ when the economy is in a
second best because of the presence of distortions.19 For the particular case in which
the government is only able to levy linear taxes over labor income, Gahvari (1994,
1995) points out the welfare-enhancing role of in-kind transfers in an economy with
uniquely two groups, the rich and the poor. Gahvari nds that government could
decrease cash transfers and choose a uniform level of in-kind transfers that reduces
distortions generated by income taxation. The funding of in-kind transfers results in
overprovision (undeprovision) of goods for the poor (rich) that leads to an increase
(decrease) of their labor e¤ort. Overall, the government is able to enlarge its tax
revenues and funds larger transfers that increase the welfare of all individuals.
19See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for an exhaustive review of the normative literature and a dis-
cussion on the role of in-kind transfers in second best economies.
85
However, why should elected politicians implement Pareto improving policies?
This chapter points out that when governments are elected by citizens they would
have incentives to choose redistributive policies that minimize e¢ ciency losses created
by taxation. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the reason is not a welfare
improving goal of a benevolent government. Instead, politicians who strive to be
elected propose redistributive schedules that enlarge the scope of redistribution which
is limited by distortions. Politicians aims to enlarge resources to court pivotal voters
who could swing their vote. Therefore, it is the competition for non-biased voters
that leads politicians to choose policies that yield to constrained e¢ cient allocations.
This e¢ ciency result contrasts with a signicant contribution by Epple and
Romano (1996) in which in-kind transfers emerge as an ine¢ cient tool of income
redistribution. Instead, this chapter shows that when income is the result of labor
e¤ort and policies modify individualsincentives to work, redistribution through in-
kind rather than cash might increase e¢ ciency. Furthermore, the reduction of welfare
losses attainable by the political mechanism analyzed in this paper are larger than
e¢ ciency gains explored in the normative literature. By exploiting probabilistic voting
I can remove the constraint that transfers must be uniform. Once di¤erential targeting
of transfers is feasible, politicians can design redistributive schedules that increase
labor e¤ort of all individuals regardless of their productivity. Therefore, it provides
larger reductions in the distortions introduced by income taxation.
These results show the potential role of electoral competition to increase al-
locative e¢ ciency in economies which allocations of resources are the result of a
political process. This idea was rst raised by Wittman (1989,1995) who suggested
it as an important feature of the competition between politicians who strive to be
elected. Furthermore, few contributions have analyzed how the competition for piv-
otal citzens who could swing their vote improves e¢ ciency. One exception is Besley
(2007) who proposes a framework to analyze groupsinuence on policy depending
on individualsattachments to parties. That set up is adopted by Besley, Persson and
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Sturm (2010) who showed how the competition for non-biased voters in the US states
leads to pro-economic growth policies and e¢ ciency gains. Another example in the
literature is Lopez-Rodriguez (2010) who discusses the role of electoral competition
for pivotal voters to achieve allocative e¢ ciency in the presence of market imperfec-
tions such as external e¤ects.20 In the current chapter, I show how the competition
for non-biased voters leads politicians to redistribute resources through tax-transfers
schedules that minimize the e¢ ciency cost of income taxation.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the scope of income redistribution when it is a politi-
cal decision undertaken by elected politicians. The political incentives for redistribu-
tion are examined through an electoral competition model which provides interesting
new insights. I rst show that politicians have incentives to raise taxes and mod-
ify the market distribution of income to be elected. Nevertheless, when politicians
are constrained to levy taxes on labor income the extent of political redistribution
is limited by distortions and output losses created by income taxation. In order to
mitigate these limitations, I show that politicians who compete for o¢ ce might fund
in-kind transfers and overprovide the consumption of goods which are complements
to labor. This policy increases individuals labor e¤ort with respect to a situation
in which only cash transfers are available. As a result, politicians extend resources
for political redistribution which allows them to fund larger transfers to court pivotal
voters.
An appealing contribution of this chapter is its focus on the positive analysis of
policymaking. I point out that the reason for redistribution and the characterization
of redistributive schedules does not result from the optimal choice of a benevolent
20Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) also point out the potential e¢ ciency gains generated by
political competition. In particular, they show how in the presence of both asymmetric information
and tastes for redistribution toward low ability individuals, politicians that compete for o¢ ce might
implement policies that improve e¢ ciency and reach distributive goals.
87
government who maximizes a normative criteria of social justice. However, it is the
equilibrium outcome of a political process between politicians and voters. Further-
more, the normative properties of the political allocation are also suggestive. In spite
of that redistribution through distortionary policy tools introduces ine¢ ciencies, I nd
that political competition can be welfare improving. In particular, I show how the
electoral competition for marginal voters who could swing their vote might improve
the e¢ ciency of the taxation system.
This chapter extends the literature of distributive politics examining how the
political allocation of transfers depends on the e¤ect of redistribution on individuals
incentives to work. In particular, this chapter provides a framework in which income
is the result of labor e¤ort, and politicians are constrained to raise revenues through
distortionary taxation tools. This allows to analyze the trade-o¤ faced by politicians
between e¢ ciency and political redistribution. Furthermore, I contribute to the lit-
erature examining the case in which not only cash but also in-kind transfers can be
targeted across groups of voters. This gives interesting insights about how behav-
ioral responses of workers to redistribution a¤ect the composition of redistributive
spending.
Some extensions of the proposed distributive politics framework with distor-
tionary taxation are worthy to be considered for further research. As an example, I
might allow for the possibility of commodity taxation over the consumption of goods.
For instance, politicians could also subsidize goods that are complements to labor in
order to stimulate labor e¤ort. This extension would permit us to analyze the e¤ect
of both price and quantity interventions on political redistribution.
Other venue for research would consist of analyzing how political redistribution
a¤ects the extensive margin responses of individuals in labor markets. I developed
the case in which everyone participates into the labor market. However, empirical
evidence shows that individuals responses to taxation policy are specially signicant
in the extensive margin (Eissa and Liebman, 1996). Indeed, literature has focused on
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designing optimal tax-transfers schedules that increase the incentives to participate
in labor markets (Saez, 2002). Hence, it would be worthy to examine whether in-kind
rather than cash transfers could provide incentives to participate in labor market.
Furthermore, the implementation of these schedules should be rationalized not by the
presence of benevolent governments but as the result of a political mechanism. Further




Distributive Politics and Economic
Ideology
4.1 Introduction
Individuals broadly disagree on the extent of government provision of goods
and services such as public health care coverage, the magnitude of national defense
expenditure and public education extension and quality. The heterogeneity of indi-
vidualspositions on the economic role of government might arise because of either
di¤erent views on how society should work or perceptions on the relative merits of
governments and markets (Bénabou, 2008).1For instance, some citizens believe that
society should rely on individual responsibility and advocate for a reduced involve-
ment of government in the economy. As an example, this ideological view considers
that individuals should be free to choose their doctors, health insurance plan and
the school of their children in private markets. Furthermore, perceptions and beliefs
over the benets of competitive markets may also justify positions against govern-
1International surveys such as the World Values Survey report both the persistence over time
and the signicant large disparity in citizenseconomic beliefs across and within countries. For the
particular case of beliefs on the relative merits of governments and markets, the International Pew
Research Survey (2007) documents di¤erent views about the extent of free-market beliefs and the
economic role of government around the World.
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ment intervention. Individuals who perceive that markets work properly, or at least
better than the public sector, would limit the scope of government to the provision
of pure public goods such as national defense or property rights protection. On the
other side, equality of opportunities claims are often argued by individuals who be-
lieve that all citizens have right to a¤ordable health care and education which access
should be guaranteed by governments. Moreover, some individuals believe that mar-
ket failures are specially common in markets for health and education and therefore
public provision could be justied to correct the presence of ine¢ ciencies.2
Whichever set of subjective beliefs and perceptions individuals hold, it con-
stitutes economic ideology about the proper role of government. These ideologies
translate into heterogeneous policy preferences over the resources that governments
should devote to the provision of goods. Nevertheless, resources are scarce and govern-
ments are usually constrained to fund the provision of goods through income taxation.
Therefore, it is not possible to disregard the public provision of goods from the ef-
fect of taxation schedules on the private well-being of citizens. In fact, individuals
prefer to pay lower taxes and receive more transfers to increase their own economic
well-being. Thus, examining how societies solve the ideological conict on the role of
government requires to consider the distributive conict generated by the posibility
of income redistribution (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Hence, how do societies solve
the simultaneous presence of both conicts?
In representative democracies, these conicts are resolved through elections
where citizens choose among political parties to rule economic policy. Nevertheless,
political parties are composed of politicians who are also citizens with their own par-
tisan preferences over policy outcomes (Wittman, 1977, 1983; Alesina, 1988; Besley
and Coate, 1997). Thus, do partiesideologies over the role of government matter?
2For instance, the existence of asymmetric information in health care insurance markets which
creates moral hazard and adverse selection; the spillover e¤ects and externalities generated by ed-
ucation; or capital market imperfections such as liquidity constraints that constrain the access to
some goods for low income individuals. See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a comprehensive survey
of the literature.
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This chapter examines under what circumstances the presence of partisan politicians
a¤ect the public provision of goods and the design of income taxation schedules. Fur-
thermore, ideological parties need to obtain the support of a majority of citizens to
be elected. Therefore, electoral incentives should also be considered in the analysis
of partisan competition among politicians (Calvert, 1985). In particular, this chapter
investigates whether the political redistribution of income to court voters a¤ects both
the extent of electoral competition and public goods proposals by partisan politicians.
In order to investigate the e¤ect of ideological positions on public goods provi-
sion and income taxation schedules, I build an electoral competition model with par-
tisan politicians. I consider an economy in which citizens belong to groups di¤erenti-
ated by identiable features which are associated to levels of gross income obtained by
individuals in a market economy. Through an electoral process citizens choose a gov-
ernment to rule economic policy. In particular, governments can redistribute income
among groups through tax-transfers schedules, and fund public goods with revenues
raised by these income taxation schedules. There are no constraints in the available
income taxation schedules that government might use (i.e. non-linear schedules are
feasible). Furthermore, I assume that income taxes and government expenditures do
not distort economic decisions and create income losses. This assumption is made
in order to isolate the e¤ect of partisan preferences on public good provision and
income redistribution. The government is elected from two partisan political parties,
right and left, that compete for o¢ ce. Right-wing (left-wing) party holds pro-market
(pro-government) ideological views and advocate by a reduced (signicant) public
provision of goods. Besides, politicians might have private benets associated to win
elections. In spite of their partisan views, politicians can credibly commit to policy
platforms that depart from their ideological positions. Individuals care about the
net income that results from taxation, and the public provision of goods over which
they exhibit heterogeneous views. I assume that partisan positions on public goods
are represented by satiated Euclidean quadratic preferences. Therefore, departures
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from desired levels of public provision decrease individualswell-being. Furthermore,
citizens also consider the relative valence or popularity of politicians running for of-
ce. Hence, every citizen votes for the party that provides her larger well-being given
policy platforms and partiesvalence. The party that attracts the larger number of
votes wins elections and implements the announced economic policies.
The proposed analysis provides interesting new insights. I rst show that the
presence of both politicianspartisan preferences and uncertainty about the electoral
outcome supports partieseconomic policy divergence. In fact, the pro-government
party o¤ers larger public good provision than the right-wing party which holds pro-
market ideological positions. The extent of the divergence between partiespublic
goods platforms depends on the magnitude of the electoral uncertainty; the ideo-
logical polarization between parties; and the presence of politiciansprivate benets
associated to win elections. Furthermore, income taxation schedules proposed by par-
ties aim to maximize their electoral returns. As we learnt from distributive politics
literature, electoral incentives lead politicians to redistribute income toward groups
with lower gross income and more pivotal voters who are most likely to change their
vote. Nevertheless, despite both parties have incentives to favor the same groups of
voters, I show that the right-wing party targets larger net income to all groups because
its lower provision of goods. I nd that the public provision of goods is funded by
reducing in larger proportion the net income of groups targeted with more resources.
Therefore, given that the left-wing party commits to higher provision of goods, it an-
nounces income taxation schedules that implement lower income inequality than that
proposed by the right-wing party. Hence, in spite of politicians who do not exhibit
partisan preferences over the distribution of income, net income inequality depends
on partiespartisan positions over public goods provision.
An appealing result of my research shows that the presence of partisan prefer-
ences over economic policies might a¤ect the extent of political competition between
parties. In particular, I point out that ideological citizens are willing to trade their
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partisan views for increases of net income. Thus, rightist politicians strategically tar-
get larger income to groups with higher concentration of moderate pro-leftist citizens
who could swing their vote. The funding of public goods through income taxation
confers an electoral advantage to pro-market ideological positions. As a result, the
political redistribution of income allows the right-wing party to exhibit larger chances
of winning elections. I show that this advantage leads the left-wing party to support
larger ideological sacrices because risk aversion leads it to reduce its public good
proposals aiming to prevent the victory of distasteful ideological positions of its op-
ponent.
Several political economy contributions have analyzed the e¤ect of electoral
incentives on the size and scope of government (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2000;
Lizzeri and Persico, 2001, 2004); Milessi-Ferreti et al., 2002). These contributions as-
sume that voters have homogeneous preferences over policy and politicians uniquely
care about winning elections. Under these assumptions, electoral competition leads
politicians to announce the same combination of public goods and redistributive trans-
fers that maximizes their chances of being elected. Nevertheless, the economic policy
convergence predicted by the literature is refused by empirical evidence (Besley and
Case, 2003). In particular, empirical research for the US shows that politiciansparti-
san preferences a¤ect policy outcomes at federal and state levels of government (Lee,
Moretti and Butler, 2004; Bartels, 2008).3Recent contributions have highlighted the
existence of citizenseconomic beliefs which create heterogeneous preferences over eco-
nomic policy.4Hence, in order to overcome these limitations, this chapter introduces
3Besley and Case (2003) reports that the larger the fraction of Democrat party seats in the state
legislature is, the larger the state spending per person: Lee et al. (2004) show the highly partisan
voting behavior of legislators in the US Congress; Bartels (2008) nd out a signicant partisanship
e¤ect in the American redistributive policy between Republicans and Democrats. Nevertheless,
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) nd lack of partisan e¤ect in policy outcomes at local level in the
US; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) point out that policy divergence could not be caused by
politicianspreferences over policy outcomes. Instead, politicians might choose strategically policy
divergence in order to mobilize core voters, increase turnout and raise their chances of winning
elections.
4The literature mainly focuses on examining how beliefs over the fairness of social competition
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partisan politicians and voters who exhibit heterogeneous preferences on the extent of
government provision of goods (Bénabou, 2008; Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007).5
The proposed model builds on contributions by Wittman (1977, 1983) and
Calvert (1985) who introduce partisan electoral competition with commitment. In
particular, I extend these models to a multidimensional policy space to examine the
political choice of both public goods provision and income taxation schedules. By ex-
ploiting probabilistic voting model, I can handle political equilibrium and analyze the
e¤ect of both electoral incentives and ideological preferences on policy outcomes.6The
theoretical predictions raised by this chapter are consistent with the main insights
provided by Wittman-Calvert models of partisan electoral competition. The pres-
ence of uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome breaks politiciansincentives to
full policy convergence. Thus, in contrast with previous results in the literature, po-
litical parties matter and the composition of government spending depends on the
ideology of the party which wins elections. Furthemore, it is important to notice
how this chapter extends the distributive politics literature (Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). It examines the political redistribution of income
when both voters and politicians exhibit ideological preferences over economic policy.
On the other hand, it permits to investigate how distributive politics a¤ects the race
between partisan politicians. In particular, this analysis shows how pro-government
ideology is more di¢ cult to pursue in terms of electoral feasibility.
a¤ect individualspreferences for income redistribution policy. For instance, theoretical contributions
by Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006); and empirical work
by Fong (2001), Alesina and Glaeser (2004) Alesina and LaFerrara (2005). See Alesina and Giuliano
(2009) for a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical literature.
5Bénabou (2008) develops a model in which ideology emerges as the result of collectively sustained
distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of the public sector providing good and services;
Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) points out that indoctrination could be a relevant source to
explain the formation of economic beliefs over the role of government in the economy. In particu-
lar, they show how communist dictatorship in East Germany might cause stronger preferences for
government intervention and redistribution.
6As an alternative, the citizen-candidate literature (Besley and Coate, 1997; and Osborne and
Slivinsky, 1996) considers that politicians with policy preferences cannot make credible commit-
ments. However, this chapter departs from citizen-candidate approach and abstracts away potential
commitment problems.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the
electoral competition model on which the analysis relies. Section III characterizes the
political equilibrium and discusses the main results on the e¤ect of partisan politics
on the scope of government, income taxation schedules and competition between
parties. Section IV analyzes some comparative statics regarding electoral uncertainty
and private benets associated to winning elections. Section V presents the normative
analysis and characterizes the set of policies that would be choosen by an utilitarian




Consider a polity with a continuum of citizens with measure 1. Citizens are
divided into J groups with measure j for j 2 f1; :::; Jg and none of them constitutes
a majority of the population. These groups are distinguished by identiable features
such as occupation, age, race or geographic location. Each individual i in group j
is endowed with yj units of a private good. This endowment can be thought as the
gross income obtained by individuals in a market economy. Therefore, the aggregate





Through a voting process the polity has to choose a government in order to rule
economic policy. There are two parties, left, L, and right, R, competing for o¢ ce in
elections. I assume that winning elections correponds to obtaining the support of the
majority of the population. Voting is costless and nobody abstains. Politicians can
raise income taxes to fund both public goods and group-specic cash transfers. There
are no constraints on the taxation schedule that government can use and economic
policies are non-distortionary.
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The elected government has available a linear technology which produces one
unit of public good, g, with one unit of income. Political parties can make promises
over the amount of resources that they would devote to the production of those
goods, gP for P 2 fL;Rg. Furthermore, let cP = fcjPgJj=1 denote the vector of net
income promised by party P to the J groups. That distribution of net income is
the result of the net taxation policy targeted to each group j by P . Politicians can
credibly commit to a policy platform xP = (gP ; cP ) to be implemented if party P wins





jcjP = y (4.2)
This constraint denes a budget set of private and public spending allocations
which are feasible. The policy set of available and attainable scal policies that
captures all restrictions, X  RJ+1; is non-empty, convex and compact.
CitizensPreferences
Citizens care about the e¤ect of income tax-transfers schedules on their own
economic well-being. All individuals have the same preferences over available income,
c, represented by the utility function u(c). This function is continuous, twice di¤er-
entiable, strictly increasing (uc > 0) and strictly concave (ucc < 0) in c. Marginal
utility is bounded away from 0 and uc(0) =1.
Citizens hold heterogeneous views over the role of government providing goods
and services. In particular, each individual has a desired level of public goods provi-
sion, g. The larger the ideological bliss point is, the stronger the belief in government
intervention. It is common to assume that ideological preferences over social outcomes
are well represented by satiated preferences. I adopt Euclidean quadratic preferences
to capture individualspartisan valuation over public provision of goods:
W (g; gi ) =  (g   gi )2 (4.3)
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where the functionW () is twice di¤erentiable, continuous and strictly concave in the
distance, zi, between implemented and ideologically desired public goods policy for
individual i, i.e. zi = jg   gi j.
Preferences over announced policies xP = (gP ; cP ) of citizen i located in group
j with ideological type gi are represented by the following additively separable indi-




P ; gP ; g

i ) = u(c
j
P ) +W (gP ; g

i ) (4.4)
this function is continuous, twice di¤erentiable and concave in cj and g.
I adopt a preference stochastic probabilistic voting model. Parties do not
know the ideological position of each citizen, gi . However, ideological beliefs are
persistent over time and the distribution of partisan preferences in each group is
common knowledge. I assume that the idiosyncratic ideological parameter of indi-
viduals who belong to group j are drawn from a uniform distribution, F j, over the
range [gja ; g
j
b ]. Groups might di¤er with respect to both their average ideological
positions, gj, and the ideological homogeneity within the group. The density of the




jj the weighted average of the densities across groups.
Given the assumption on uniform distribution of ideologies across groups, let
gm be the weighted average of the mean ideology in each group weighted by the size







This weighted average measures the median ideological type in the overall
population. That type di¤ers from the mean ideological type as long as the level of
ideological heterogeneity varies across social groups.
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In addition to economic policies, citizens care about the personal qualities of
politicians ruling the polity. I suppose that once parties announce policy platforms,
along the electoral campaign, political parties receive popularity shocks, "L and "R,
common to all citizens. The relative popularity shock, " = "L   "R; measures the
perception that voters have on party L with respect to R at the time of elections. I
assume that the common shock " is uniformly distributed, and independently from
gi ; with density  and expected value, E("), equal to 0.







Political parties have heterogeneous positions on the role of government in the
economy. Specically, each party has a desired level of public provision of goods and
services denoted by gP . The residual resources of the economy should be in hands of
citizens. However, parties do not have partisan preferences about how these resources
should be distributed across groups. Politicianspreferences over public goods are
represented by the same Euclidean quadratic preferences previously discussed:
WP (g; g

P ) =  (g   gP )2 8P 2 fL;Rg (4.7)
Suppose that party L; pro-government party, is the one with the highest pref-
erence for public intervention and party R, pro-market party, believes in a lower
involvement of government in the economy, gL > g

R. Partiesideological leanings are
symmetrically located around the median ideological type in the overall population




L=2). Hence, there is not overall population bias toward any party
ideological position. However, there may be group biases toward either rightist or
leftist ideological views. Furthermore, I assume that in each group there are citizens
whose ideological views correspond to political partiesideological positions.
In spite of partisan views, politicians can credibly commit to a policy platform
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xp = (gp; cp) that departs from their ideological positions.7 Besides partisan pref-
erences, politicians could assign non-material private benets associated to power.
Denote Q as the ego-rents or value that both parties attach to winning elections.
This parameter measures politicianso¢ ce-holding motivation and is assumed to be
weakly positive if P comes to power and 0 otherwise.
Given the presence of electoral uncertainty, the expected utility of party R is
dened as:8
EUR(xR; xL) = P (xR; xL)[Q+WR(gR; g

R)] + [1  P (xR; xL)]WR(gL; gR) (4.8)
where the probability that party R comes to o¢ ce, P (xR; xL), captures the uncer-
tainty regarding electoral outcome and summarizes expected voting behavior of citi-
zens. The expected utility for party L is symmetric with probability of winning equal
to 1  P (xR; xL).
4.2.2 Stages of the Game
The timing of the political game is as follows: 1) Political parties simulta-
neously and non-cooperatively credibly announce their economic policy platforms,
xR = (gR; cR) and xL = (gL; cL). 2) The random common popularity shock, ", is re-
alized. 3) Citizens vote for the party that they prefer, fR;Lg. Finally, 4) Whichever
party P that obtains the majority of the votes, wins the election and implements the
economic policy promised at the beginning of the game. Hence, the political game
presented above has two stages: policy announcements and elections. I characterize
the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game by backward induction.
7Alesina (1988) points out the credibility problem of partisan politicians in one-shot static games.
To avoid candidatescommitment problem, I assume that this model represents the reduced form
of a dynamic game in which political parties run in repeated elections. Parties will be punished by
losing credibility if politicians do not deliver the announced policy.
8This politiciansobjective function with mixed motivations was introduced by Wittmman (1983)
in his classical work on partisan electoral competition.
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Second Stage: Voting
Citizens vote for the party that they prefer given economic policy announce-
ments and the relative popularity of political parties. At the voting stage, policy plat-
forms (xR; xL) and common bias " are observed by voters. Suppose that a member of
group j with ideological preference gi is promised public goods provision and income
tax-transfers schedules (gR; c
j
R) by pro-market party and (gL; c
j
L) by pro-government
party. Given individualspreferences over economic policies (4.4) and the realization










i ) + " (4.9)
while voting for party L if this inequality is reversed.
Given the proposed policies, in each group there might be citizens with an
idiosyncratic ideological parameter, gjs , such that they are indi¤erent between voting
for the pro-market, R, as for the pro-government, L, party. The swing voter type in
group j is implicitly dened by:
u(cjR) +W (gR; g
j
s ) = u(c
j
L) +W (gL; g
j
s ) + " (4.10)
Voters located in group j with an ideological type gi below (above) the cut-o¤
ideological type, gjs , vote for pro-market party (pro-government party). I assume
that pivotal voters who are indi¤erent between political parties randomize equally
over the set of parties. The swing voter type in group j when citizens have Euclidean
quadratic preferences over public goods is given by:
gjs = gLR +
1
2g
[u(cjR)  u(cjL)  "] (4.11)
where gLR is the average of parties promises regarding public provision of goods
and g is the di¤erence between leftist and rightist proposals.9Given that partisan
9See Mathematical Appendix C.1. for full development and discussion of swing voter types, vote
shares and probability of winning.
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preferences over public goods are uniformly distributed in each group, the overall vote
share for party R is given by:






jj[gjs   gj] (4.12)
The complement share of citizens, 1 
JP
j=1
jF j(gjs ), votes for pro-government
party L; SL.
First Stage: Policy Announcements
Rolling back to the rst stage of the game, when politicians commit to eco-
nomic policies, the common valuation shock has not been realized. Thus, parties are
uncertain about who are the swing voters in each group and voting is a random vari-
able for politicians. Given that the expected value of the shock is equal to zero, the
expected swing voters in group j are citizens indi¤erent between partieseconomic
policy proposals. Therefore, political parties choose their platforms being in mind
that the expected voting decisions in each group are given by the expected cut-point
ideological type, E[gjs ] = bgjs . Denote bgs the weighted average ideological type of
the expected swing voters in each social group.10 The weights depend on the con-
centration of voters located at the cut-points. This type captures the expected swing







I assumed majority voting and then winning the election corresponds to ob-
taining more than fty per cent of the total vote. Given the expected swing voter
type in each group and distributional assumptions on ideological types and popularity
shock, the probability that pro-market party R wins the election can be expressed as:
10This denition follows from Dixit and Londregan (1998) discussion about swing voters ideology.
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P (xR; xL) =
1
2
+  2g[bgs   gm] (4.14)
Pro-government party L anticipates winning the election with the complemen-
tary probability 1 P (xR; xL). The stochastic preference probabilistic voting provides
continuity of the probability function in a multidimensional policy space. The indi-
vidual heterogeneity in voting decisions introduced by the ideological types smooths
the expected vote share for both parties. That smoothness is due to the continuity
of individualsindirect utility function (4.4) and distributions of ideological types in
each group. Therefore, partiesprobabilities of winning elections are continuous in
both policy platforms. Furthermore, the concavity of citizensutility functions and
the uniform distribution of ideological types in groups ensure that probabilities are
concave in a partys own platform, xP , and convex in its opponents proposal, x P .11
Taking the opponents policy choice problem as given, each party chooses a
combination of public good provision and net income for each group, xP = (gP ; cP )
for P 2 fR;Lg, that maximizes its expected utility subject to economic feasibility
and non-negativity constraints. Parties take into account the uncertainy regarding
electoral outcome by the probability function (4.14) which summarizes expected vot-
ing behavior of citizens given announced policies. Thus, the policy choice problem of
the right-wing party R is given by:
max
gR;fcjRgJj=1
EUR(xR; xL) s.t. gR +
JX
j=1
jcjR = y and gR  0 ; cjR  0 8j
(4.15)
Pro-government party L makes policy announcements simultaneously and its
policy choice problem is symmetric to party R.
11See Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Banks and Duggan (2006) for a discussion on continuity
and concavity properties in preference stochastic probabilistic voting models.
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4.3 Political Equilibrium
Denition: A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the partisan
electoral competition game is i) a menu of income taxation schedules and public




P ); and ii) a voting
decision for each individual of the polity, fR;Lg, such that:
1) Each political party commits to a policy proposal that maximizes its ex-
pected utility subject to the economy feasibility constraint, taking into account citi-
zensexpected voting decisions and its opponents policy choice problem.
2) Each citizen votes for the party that provides her greater well-being given
policy platforms, ideological preferences and valuation of political parties.
Proposition 13 (Existence) In the partisan electoral competition game, a SPNE
in pure strategies exists and it is unique.
Proof. [1] For each citizen, partiespolicy proposals, idiosyncratic ideological
preferences and popularity shocks yield di¤erent utility levels under the government
of either party R or L. Then, every citizen votes for the party which provides her the
maximum level of utility. When the utility level implied by each party is the same,
indi¤erent individuals randomize equally over the set of candidates and vote for one
of the parties.
[2] Given that for each political party i) the feasible set of strategies dened by
the governments budget constraint is non-empty, compact and convex; and ii) parties
expected utility functions are 1) continuous in both policy platforms, (xR; xL); and
2) strictly concave in xP and strictly convex in x P for P 2 fR;Lg, because of the
continuity and concavity properties of both probability functions and partiespartisan
preferences. Then, according to Glicksbergs Fixed Point Theorem, there does exists
a unique Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies in the rst stage of the game.
Therefore, given [1] and [2], in the political game there exists a Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies and it is unique.
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4.3.1 Equilibrium Policies
The system of equations formed by the best responses for each political party
and their budget constraints simultaneously determine the Nash Equilibrium in the
rst stage of the game. Therefore, equilibrium parties proposals of public goods
and net income taxation, (gNP ; c
N




























= j 8 j (4.17)



















= j 8 j (4.19)
where 
NP for P 2 fR;Lg denotes party Ps benet of winning elections. This ben-
et is dened as the di¤erence between partys payo¤s under victory and under de-
feat;12and where P > 0 is the Langrange multiplier associated to party Ps budget
constraint which measures the value of one extra unit of income for partisan politi-
cians.13
12The benets of winning are divided into two components. The rst component captures politi-
ciansweakly positive private payo¤s associated to win elections. The second component measures












P ) WP (gN P ; gP )
In equilibrium, this magnitude is weakly positive to prevent the situation where party P prefers
to lose.
13See Mathematical Appendix C.2. for a detailed discussion and complete characterization of the
political equilibrium and the propositions presented in this subsection.
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This system of equations shows that, in equilibrium, parties equalize the mar-
ginal cost of providing public goods to the marginal benet in their expected utility
expressed in terms of income (i.e. normalized by the Lagrange multiplier, P ). Fur-
thermore, for each group, parties equalize the marginal cost of increasing one unit of
net income in a group of size j to the marginal contribution to their expected utility,
expressed also in terms of income.
The system of best responses reveals that both parties o¤ering the same eco-
nomic policy cannot be an equilibrium. Politicians are tradding o¤ the desirability
of the policy from their partisan views against the probability that their policy pro-
posal wins the election. Thus, in the presence of electoral uncertainty, the electoral
competition between partisan politicians, who can commit to policy platforms, yields
to divergent equilibrium policy platforms.
Proposition 14 (Policy Divergence) In equilibrium partisan parties announce di-
vergent economic policy platforms, xNR 6= xNL .
In the case that both parties uniquely consider the electoral returns of policy
platforms and converge completely, there would not be incentives to modify platforms
to increase their chances of winning elections. Nevertheless, both parties still would
have incentives to adjust policies toward their ideological positions because departing
from them is costly. Therefore, full convergence cannot be an equilibrium.
If parties choose their most preferred policies, there would not be incentives
to adapt platforms to parties ideological bliss points. However, politicians would
have incentives to adjust policies to increase their electoral returns because they care
about the electoral outcome. Indeed, politicians compete for o¢ ce aiming to avoid
the victory of their opponents who would implement distasteful ideological views.
The potential presence of private benets associated to victory would increase the
relevance of electoral incentives. Thus, full policy divergence cannot be an equilib-
rium.
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In equilibrium, there is partial economic policy divergence in which each party
balances its policy preferences with its chances of ruling the polity. These insights on
partisan electoral competition with commitment are well-known and rely on classical
contributions due to Wittman (1977, 1983) and Calvert (1985). This theoretical
framework has not been considered to investigate how partisan preferences a¤ect the
simultaneous political choice of public goods provision and income redistribution.
Wittman-Calvert models of partisan competition focus on unidimensional pol-
icy space.14This chapter extends previous analysis introducing a stochastic preference
probabilistic voting model which allows to handle equilibria in pure strategies with
multidimensional policy space. The uncertainty about the heterogeneous idiosyn-
cratic ideological preferences of voters ensures continuity in politiciansobjective func-
tions. The valence shock provides uncertainty about the identity of expected swing
voters in each group. This creates aggregate uncertainty about the electoral outcome
and yields policy divergence in the presence of ideological politicians. The proposed
model provides a new framework to examine the incentives of partisan politicians to
provide public goods and redistribute net income across groups of voters.
Public Goods Provision
In equilibrium, the provision of public goods and income taxation schedules
proposed by partisan politicians satises economic feasibility and the following system
of best responses:
  2(gNR   gm)










R 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg
(4.20)
  2(gNL  gm)










L 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg
(4.21)
14Calvert (1985) presents an extension with multidimensional space but he relies on strong sym-
metry conditions (Ploot, 1967).
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gP ;cP is the marginal rate of substitution between public goods and net
income for individuals in group j with median ideological type given policy platform
by party P 2 fR;Lg; MRSjgPgP ;cP is the rate at which individuals in group j who hold
ideological positions of party P 2 fR;Lg are willing to trade public goods for net
income; and MRTg;c is the rate at which the government is able to transform income
into public goods. In equilibrium, NR and 
N
L are given by:
NR =










These equations capture how electoral incentives and ideological positions si-
multaneously determine the equilibrium choice of public goods proposals by political
parties. When one party announces public goods provision closer to its ideological
leanings, it reduces its expected number of votes. That raises its chances of losing
in front of politicians who would provide public goods more distant from its parti-
san preferences. It is important to notice that even pure ideological politicians (i.e.
Q = 0) do not announce public goods platforms that perfectly reect their partisan
preferences. Politicians have concave utility over public goods and therefore they ex-
hibit ideological risk aversion. The marginal increase in utility from a distasteful level
of provision is larger than the marginal gain in utility because public goods provision
is closer to their partisan positions. Ideological risk aversion limits partiesincentives
to diverge. In particular, risk aversion leads pro-market (pro-government) party to
propose public goods provision larger (lower) than its ideological bliss point. Thus,
15See Mathematical Appendix C.2.4. for a complete description of how this system of equations
is obtained.
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electoral competition generates an ideological sacrice in platforms proposed by party
P , zP . This ideological sacrice is dened as the di¤erence between proposed and
ideologically desired public goods policy by party P , zP = jgNP   gP j 8P 2 fR;Lg.
Each party might increase its electoral returns by adjusting public goods to
the preferred policy by individuals with median ideological type. This adjustment
would raise its chances of winning elections and implementing its policy platforms.
However, parties hold ideological positions regarding public goods provision and it
would be costly to depart from these positions. In case of victory politicians should
implement a less preferred policy. Furthermore, electoral incentives to adjust policies
are decreasing because of concavity of probability function. Therefore, parties do not
have incentives to promise the same level of public goods.
Political parties share the same electoral incentives but hold di¤erent ideolog-
ical positions on the extent of public good provision. In the presence of electoral
uncertainty, politicians choose public goods proposals that balance their ideological
leanings and the expected electoral returns of policy platforms.
Proposition 15 (Partisan Public Goods Provision) In equilibrium, the pro gov-
ernment partys proposal of public good provision is larger than the pro-market partys
policy platform, gNL > g
N
R .
In equilibrium parties propose di¤erent provision of public goods and income
taxation schedules across groups. The extent of policy divergence between parties
policy proposals depends on i) the degree of aggregate uncertainty regarding of the
electoral outcome; ii) the polarization between partiesideological leanings; and iii)
the presence of politiciansprivate benets associated to win elections.16




Politicians commit to income taxation schedules that maximize their expected
electoral returns. In equilibrium, the electoral competition between partisan politi-
cians leads to taxation schedules that satisfy:
kuc(c
kN
P ) = 
k0uc(c
k0N
P ) 8 k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fR;Lg (4.25)
The electoral incentives for political income redistribution are consistent with
the well-known insights on distributive politics highlighted by Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). In equilibrium, both parties redistribute
resources towards groups with lower gross income because of the concavity of utility
over consumption. Furthermore, political parties favor groups with larger concen-
tration of pivotal voters who could swing their vote. In the proposed model, the
concentration of expected swing voters is measured by the densitiy of the uniform
distribution of ideological preferences within each group, j.
The factors that characterize income taxation schedules are identical for both
parties and therefore both parties favor the same groups of voters targeting either
larger transfers or lower taxes. However, politicians commit to di¤erent levels of
public goods provision and therefore they promise di¤erent net income in absolute
terms. The larger the provision of public goods is, the lower the magnitude of net
income targeted to individuals.
Proposition 16 (Income Tax-Transfers Schedules) The pro-market party o¤ers
larger net income than the pro-government party to all groups of the polity, cjNR > c
jN
L
8j 2 f1; :::; Jg.
The public provision of goods is funded through non-linear income taxation
schedules. Hence, given the assumption on concavity of utility over income, politicians
fund public goods reducing in larger proportion the net income of groups targeted with
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more resources (i.e. public goods are funded through progressive income taxation).
Therefore, given that the left-wing party commits to higher provision of goods, the
pro-government party announces income taxation schedules that implement lower
income inequality than the proposed by pro-market party.
It is important to notice that although politicians do not exhibit partisan
preferences over the distribution of income, ideological preferences over public goods
provision lead parties to o¤er di¤erent levels of income inequality. Redistributive
politics is a¤ected by the presence of partisan politicians even when parties do not
hold ideological positions over the distribution of income.17
Each party committs to its largest public good platform in the particular case
in which all groups exhibit the same concentration of expected swing voters, j = 
8j. In this case, according to (4.25), the marginal utility of private consumption is
equalized across groups of voters. The expected marginal electoral returns of target-
ing net income are identical across groups and politicians do not have incentives to
discriminate among them in terms of net income. In equilibrium, both political par-
ties commit to income taxation schedules that implement an egalitarian distribution















Political parties do not have constraints on the income taxation schedule that
they can commit to during the electoral campaign. Furthermore, income redistribu-
tion does not create distortions and income losses. Formally, these assumptions imply
that, once in government, politicians are able to tax away all the initial individuals
gross income. We can think of it as the presented model captures how political parties
17Dixit and Londregan (1998) consider a distributive politics game in which citizens and parties
exhibit ideological concerns about the distribution of income and the extent of inequality. However,
this important contribution abstracts away the possibility of partisan preferences over the public
provision of goods.
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choose the allocation of a xed budget among the public provision of goods and cash
transfers across groups of voters.
Corollary 4 (Composition of Government Spending) In the presence of un-
certainty about the electoral outcome, the composition of government spending among
public goods and transfers depends on the economic ideology of the party ruling the
government (i.e. partisanship e¤ect).
The leading political economy models of size and scope of government rely
on o¢ ce-motivated politicians who adjust policies uniquely to win elections. These
contributions predict that, regardless of which party comes to power, electoral in-
centives lead politicians to announce the same composition of government spending.
Instead, I extend this signicant literature considering partisan politicians and citi-
zens who exhibit heterogeneous preferences over the extent of public good provision.
The introduction of these assumptions allow to examine the conditions under which
the composition of government spending depends on the ideology of the party that
wins the election. In particular, I nd that policy convergence is not feasible in the
presence of both electoral uncertainty and heterogeneous partisan preferences.
4.3.2 Advantage of Pro-Market ideological positions
In equilibrium, the expected swing voter type in group j, bgjNs , is implicitly
dened by:
u(cjNR )  u(cjNL ) =W (gNL ; bgjNs ) W (gNR ; bgjNs ) 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (4.28)
I showed that the net income promised to any group j by right-wing party
is larger than the income that results from taxation schedules committed by left-
wing party, cjNR > c
jN
L 8j. It leads that, in equilibrium, expected swing voters
private well-being is larger under right-wing partys income taxation platform, i.e.
u(cjNR ) > u(c
jN
L ). I found that pro-government party promises larger provision of
public goods than pro-market party, gNL > g
N
R . According to (4.28), in equilibrium, the
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ideological utility loss of expected swing voters under left-wing proposal is lower than
the ideological loss implied by right-wing platform, i.e. W (gNL ; bgjNs ) > W (gNR ; bgjNs ).
Hence, given policy platforms, equilibrium pivotal swing voters are indi¤erent
between the ideological benets associated to left-wing partys victory (i.e. lower
ideological sacrice) and the larger private economic well-being obtained if right-wing
party wins elections. Therefore, in equilibrium, the ideological positions of expected
swing voters in each group are closer to pro-government than to pro-market ideological
positions.
Proposition 17 (Ideology Swing Voters) In equilibrium, the expected pivotal vot-
ers who could swing their vote are moderate pro-leftist citizens.
Thus, the ideological type of the equilibrium indi¤erent voter in each group is
larger than the median ideological position in the overall population, bgjNs > gm. This
result shows that in equilibrium parties commit to policies such that in each group
there exists a subset of citizens biased towards pro-government ideological positions
who prefer economic policy platforms by the right-wing party. Therefore, a subset
of centrist and moderate pro-leftist citizes are expected to vote for pro-market party.
Hence, in equilibrium the probability that left-wing party wins elections is lower than
the chances for right-wing party, P (xNR ; x
N
L ) > 1=2.
Corollary 5 (Electoral Advantage of the Right) In equilibrium the probability
that pro-market politicians win the elections is higher than the chances for pro-government
politicians.
Citizens hold ideological positions but also care about their own economic well-
being. In fact, voters are willing to trade ideological positions by promises of larger net
income. This provides an advantage to pro-market party which can court centrist and
moderate pro-leftist voters in every group targeting them with larger net income and
reducing the public provision of goods. This strategic targeting of net income allows
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right-wing politicians to increase their expected electoral returns and, at the same
time, propose public good provision closer to its partisan positions. The expected
strategy of the right-wing party forces ideological risk-averse pro-government party
to decrease its promises of public goods. Thus, left-wing party is able to increase the
targeted amount of net income to groups with larger concentration of pivotal voters
in order to increase their expected number of votes. As a result, in equilibrium,
public good platform by left-wing party supports a larger ideological sacrice than
the proposal by the right-wing party, zNL > z
N
R .
Proposition 18 (Ideological Sacrice left-wing party) In equilibrium, the pro-
government public goods proposal supports a larger ideological sacrice that the pro-
posal of the pro-market party.
In previous subsection, I showed that each political party promises its largest
public goods platform when all groups exhibit the same concentration of pivotal
voters. In this particular case, both the electoral advantage of the right-wing party
and the ideological sacrice of the left-wing party are minimized. However, when
the concentration of expected swing voters di¤ers across groups, politicians have
incentives to discriminate them through di¤erential net income. The di¤erentiation
across groups is possible because of the availability of non-linear income taxation
schedules. Furthermore, there exists more competition to attract pivotal moderate
pro-leftist voters who could swing their vote. This competition leads both parties
to reduce resources to fund public goods provision and to increase the net income
targeted to groups.
Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001, 2004) rst
pointed out that in a distributive politics game with public goods, targetability of
cash transfers yields a premium over public goods. Electoral incentives lead o¢ ce-
motivated politicians to reduce the provision of public goods, because of their lack
of targetability, and to increase the amount of resources devoted to cash transfers.
This chapter shows that these incentives also exist in partisan electoral competition.
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Furthermore, the main novelty relies on pointing out that now targetability yields
a premium for particular partisan politicians. Indeed, the possibility of di¤erential
targeting of net income, given the availability of non-linear taxation schedules, allows
the right-party to attract larger expected number of voters. Therefore, non-linear tax-
ation increases the electoral advantage of right-wing party and raises the ideological
sacrice of the left-wing party.
Several contributions have examined the e¤ect of various factors non-related
to economic policy on the electoral competition between parties. For instance, Grose-
close (2001) analyzes partisan competition when one party exhibits a valence advan-
tage over the other competing party (e.g. incumbency advantage). In particular,
Groseclose shows that in this situation the advantaged party adopts a more moderate
policy than the disavantaged party which moves toward its ideological preferred posi-
tion; Roemer (1998) examines how the presence of value issues such as religion might
confer an advantage to right-wing parties and limits the extent of income redistribu-
tion; Besley and Preston (2007) and Besley et al. (2010) investigates the advantaged
generated by the larger presence of core voters attached to one party in districts with
majoritarian elections.
These contributions introduce exogenous elements non-related to policy in or-
der to create advantages in the electoral race between politicians. In contrast to
the previous literature, this paper examines an electoral advantage that depends on
choosen economic policies and therefore it is an endogenous variable in the electoral
competition game. In particular, the analysis starts from a situation in which society
does not exhibit an aggregate bias towards any ideological position. Indeed, political
partiesideological leanings are symmetrically located around the median ideological
type in the overall population. However, the funding of public goods through income
taxation confers an electoral advantage to pro-market ideological positions. This
chapter nds that pro-government ideological positions could be more costly to pur-
sue in terms of electoral feasibility. Hence, the presence of partisan preferences over
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economic policies a¤ect the extent of political competition between political parties.
4.4 Comparative Statics
Equilibrium policy platforms proposed by political parties diverge because of
both uncertainty about electoral outcome and politicianspartisan preferences on the
economic role of government. Hence, it is worthwhile to examine how the presence
of private benets associated to come to o¢ ce-holding and the extent of uncertainty
a¤ect equilibrium policies and the competition between parties.
4.4.1 Electoral uncertainty
In the proposed model, citizensvoting decisions do not uniquely depend on
economic policy platforms. In fact, citizens also consider the valence of politicians
running for o¢ ce.18Furthermore, this valuation is unknown by politicians when they
choose policy platforms and therefore it generates uncertainty about the electoral
outcome. This uncertainty has been introduced through a common shock received by
political parties along the electoral campaign. In particular, the relative valuation of
politicians is drawn from a uniform distribution with density  . Thus, the parameter
 can be interpreted as a measure of the relative weight between policy platforms
and politiciansvalence on individualsvoting decisions.
Hence, when the valence of politicians might have a large impact on voting
decisions (i.e. low parameter  ), the electoral uncertainty faced by parties when
choose policy platforms would be hight. For instance, consider the limit case in
which  ! 0 (i.e. huge electoral uncertainty). In this situation, party Rs equilibrium
condition (4.20) can be written as:
 2(gNR   gR)P (xNR ; xNL ) = 0 (4.29)
18This valence could be interpreted as the charisma or popularity of politicians who compete for
o¢ ce. In some particular elections and systems of government (e.g. presidential systems), citizens
voting decisions might be highly determined by personal characteristics of politicians.
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Similarly, given (4.21), party Ls equilibrium condition is given by:
 2(gNL   gL)[1  P (xNR ; xNL )] = 0 (4.30)
Furthermore, given that the expected valence is equal to zero, when  ! 0 the
equilibrium probability that party R wins elections tends to one-half. Therefore, by
(4.29) and (4.30), when politicians face huge electoral uncertainty equilibrium public
goods proposals tend to converge to partiesideological bliss points:
gNR ! gR and gNL ! gL (4.31)
Hence, these results show that when uncertainty raises, public good policy
divergence also rises. The larger the electoral uncertainty is, the closer public goods
proposals to partiesideological positions. The extent of policy divergence depends
on partiesideological polarization (i.e. gL   gR > 0). Furthermore, as uncertainty
raises, the advantage of ideological market positions decreases. Indeed, both parties
tend to exhibit the same chances of winning elections, i.e. P (xNR ; x
N
L ) ! 1=2, and
their platforms do not support ideological sacrice, zNR = z
N
L ! 0.
As an alternative, citizens could vote mainly on economic policy proposals
rather than politiciansvalence (i.e. high parameter  ). In that case, the electoral
uncertainty faced by politicians when choose policy platforms would be low. For
instance, consider the limit case in which uncertainty tends to be residual (i.e.  !














g;c !MRTg;c 8P 2 fR;Lg (4.32)
Therefore, in equilibrium, both politicial parties tend to converge to identi-
cal economic policy platforms (i.e. gN = gNR = g
N
L and c
j N = cjNR = c
jN
L 8j).
In particular, the equilibrium public goods provision and income taxation schedules
tend to converge towards the weighted average of the preferred policy of individuals
located in group j with median ideological type. Thus, both parties tend to imple-
ment the same income inequality through taxation schedules characterized by (4.25).
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Furthermore, when policy platforms tend to converge, individuals are expected to
be indi¤erent between political parties. Thus, the equilibrium partiesprobability
of winning elections tend to one-half. Nevertheless, despite the electoral advantage
of right-wing party declines as uncertainty decreases, pro-government party supports
larger ideological sacrice, zNR < z
N
L .
As showed above, in the particular case in which all groups exhibit the same
concentration of pivotal voters (j =  8j), both political parties announce income
taxation schedules that implement an egalitarian distribution of income (cj N = cN




! 1 then MRSgmg;c !MRTg;c 8P 2 fR;Lg (4.33)
Hence, both parties tend to converge towards the preferred public good policy
by the median ideological type in the overall population.
These insights point out that when uncertainty decreases, policy platforms
tend to converge and left-wing policy platform supports larger ideological sacrice.
These strong forces toward policy convergence in models of partisan electoral com-
petition were rst raised by Calvert (1985). Indeed, ideological risk aversion leads
parties towards policy convergence. Therefore, the presence of uncertainty about the
identity of swing voters is a necessary condition to prevent that risk-averse politicians
implement identical policy platforms.
4.4.2 Private Benets of winning elections
As I discussed previously, even pure ideological parties (i.e. Q = 0) consider
the e¤ect of policy platforms on their chances of winning elections. Policy moti-
vated politicians sacrice ideological positions in order to prevent the victory of their
opponents partisan preferences. Hence, the potential presence of private benets
associated to win elections would increase the relevance of electoral incentives even
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more. Indeed, o¢ ce-motivated politicians are willing to sacrice ideology in order
to raise their expected number of votes. In the limit case in which uniquely o¢ ce-
motivations matter (Q ! 1), politicians concerns on public good policy only rely
on the extent that platforms lead to electoral victory. In equilibrium, public goods
provision and income taxation schedules tend to converge and satisfy (4.32).
4.5 Normative Analysis: Utilitarian Allocation
In this section, I investigate the allocation of resources that would be imple-
mented by a benevolent government. In particular, I examine the case in which
government aims to maximize the overall well-being of citizens. Consider the utili-
tarian social welfare function (UW ) which aggregates all individualsutilities giving
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jdgi (4.34)
A benevolent utilitarian government maximizes this social welfare function
subject to the available resources given by the economy feasibility constraint.19The





U ) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (4.35)
Thus, a benevolent government implements income taxation schedules that
lead to an egalitarian distribution of income, cjU = cU 8j. This result follows from
the assumptions on homogeneous preferences over net income represented by concave
utility functions, and the absence of distortions and income losses generated by income




= 1!MRSgg;c =MRTg;c (4.36)
19See Mathematical Appendix C.4. for details regarding the characterization of the utilitarian
allocation.
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Hence, a benevolent utilitarian government provides the level of public goods
preferred by individuals with average ideological type subject to economic feasibility.
Does electoral competition implement the utilitarian allocation?
On the one hand, only in the particular case in which groups exhibit the same
concentration of expected swing voters, politicians do not have electoral incentives
to discriminate across groups and political parties implement an egalitarian distrib-
ution of income. On the other hand, politiciansprovision of public goods tends to
converge when either i) the uncertainty about the electoral outcome is low; or ii) the
private benets associated to win elections are large (i.e. reduced weight of partisan
preferences).
Hence, political parties choose income redistribution schedules and public goods
provision that implement the utilitarian allocation if and only if: i) groups exhibit
the same concentration of expected swing voters; and ii) politicians only consider
electoral incentives because of either large private benets associated to win elections
or absence of electoral uncertainty.
It is important to notice that when only the rst condition holds (i.e. egali-
tarian distribution of income), politicianspartisan preferences prevent to implement
the utilitarian allocation. Indeed, pro-market (pro-government) party underpovides
(overprovides) public goods with respect to the utilitarian level of provision (i.e.
gNR < gU < g
N
L ). In that situation, when the right-wing party (left-wing party) wins
elections, there would be a majority of the population which would prefer an increase
(reduction) in public good provision.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter has investigated the e¤ect of heterogeneous partisan preferences
over public goods provision on the scope of government and the political redistri-
bution of income. I rst showed that the presence of both ideological politicians
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and uncertainty about the electoral outcome generates a partisanship e¤ect. The
economic ideology of the party ruling the polity a¤ects the extent of public good pro-
vision and the distribution of income among individuals. In particular, I pointed out
that pro-government politicians promise larger provision of public goods and lower
net income than pro-market politicians. As a result, the composition of government
spending between public goods and cash transfers depends on the ideology of the
party ruling the polity. Furthermore, I have shown that pro-government party com-
mits to income taxation schedules that implement lower income inequality than the
schedules proposed by the right-wing party.
This chapter shows how ideological preferences over economic policy might af-
fect the electoral competition between partisan politicians. Partisan citizens are will-
ing to trade their economic ideology for promises of higher income. In that case, pro-
market politicians make use of redistributive schedules to court moderate pro-leftist
citizens and increase their expected number of votes. The presence of redistributive
politics provides an electoral advantage to pro-market politicians who exhibit a higher
probability of winning elections. This advantage implies that pro-government parties
support larger ideological sacrices aiming to avoid the victory of more distasteful
policies from its opponent.
Leading political economy contributions have focused on how electoral incen-
tives a¤ect the size and scope of government. Literature points out that politicians
who compete for o¢ ce commit to the same redistributive schedules and composition
of government spending in order to win elections. The contribution of this chap-
ter relies on introducing the main insights on partisan electoral competition due to
Wittman (1977, 1983) and Calvert (1985) into models of distributive politics and
scope of government. I showed that when there exists uncertainty about the electoral
outcome, the economic ideology of parties matter for income redistribution and public
goods provision.
Political economy has put emphasis on how political institutions, in particu-
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lar electoral rules, a¤ect size and composition of government spending across coun-
tries.20Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Shelton (2007) point out that there exists
signicant variation in both the level of public good provision and the scope of govern-
ment across countries with similar levels of economic development, social and demo-
graphic features and even political institutions such as electoral rules. The theoretical
predictions raised in this chapter suggest that economic ideological positions hold by
citizens and politicians may be a complementary source to explain these disparities
across countries. That source of variation has not been explored in the literature and
constitutes a venue of future research. It would be worthwhile to test the existence
of a partisanship e¤ect on the extent of public good provision and the composition
of public spending across countries. It is important to notice that the feasibility of
this empirical research is seriously limited by the current availability of microdata
on individualspreferences over public good provision. Furthermore, it would be also
necessary to overcome the absence of data on parties ideological positions on the
extent of government provision of goods and services.21
This chapter also makes a suggestive contribution regarding the existence of
an electoral advantage between partisan parties. I found that that pro-government
ideological positions could be more costly to pursue in terms of electoral feasibility.
In contrast to the previous contributions that examined the e¤ect of exogenous non-
economic factors, this chapter provides a new source of electoral advantage which is
directly related to economic policy and endogenous to the political process. The model
presented in this chapter can be viewed as the reduced form of a two-party competition
in a majoritarian electoral system. As a further research, it would be interesting to test
20Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Milessi-Ferreti et al. (2002)
discuss the direct e¤ect of electoral rules on politiciansincentives to allocate public budgets. Fur-
thermore, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2008) examine the indirect e¤ect of electoral rules on
government spending through party structure and the existence of coalition governments.
21Few empirical work has been done to identify and estimate economic partisan preferences of
political parties. One exception is Kim and Fording (2002) who present measures of both parties
and governments ideologies based on Party Manifesto Data provided by Budge et al.(2001). One
of the main components included in politicians ideology are their views on the economic role of
government.
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whether in this electoral system right-wing parties exhibit higher chances of winning
elections than parties which favor a larger involvement of government in the public
provision of goods. I might test whether in the majoritarian system the electoral
advantage of pro-market ideological leanings yields lower public goods provision and
larger income inequality.
Interesting further research would consist on examining how di¤erent dimen-
sions of ideology interact and a¤ect the choosen economic policy. In this chapter, I
investigated the case in which individuals have ideology only over the role of govern-
ment providing goods and services. The analysis could be extended to include citizens
di¤erent views regarding the fair distribution of income and the level of inequality.
Furthermore, the model might be enlarged to incorporate the fact that some citizens
vote taking into account mainly values (e.g. moral and religious issues) represented
by parties and they abstract away from economic policy proposals. It would be wor-
thy to analyze the simultaneous impact of both value issues and economic ideologies
on implemented economic policies and political competition between parties. Further
research is necessary to analyze these extensions.
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Taking the opponents economic policies as given, each political party P 2
fA;Bg chooses a combination of net taxation policy and public provision of health
care for each group, fyjP ; hjgPgJj=1; that maximizes its chances of winning elections sub-
ject to economic feasibility and non-negativity constraints. Parties take into account
citizensexpected voting decisions (stage 2 ) and individualschoices in competitive










































The policy choice problem of political party B is symmetric. The First Order








































P = 0 8j ; jhPhjgP = 0 8j (A.5)
P  0 jyP  0 8j ; jhP  0 8j (A.6)
Solving backwards, I characterize the Political Equilibrium of the game. The
system of equations formed by the best responses for each political party and their
feasibility constraints, simultaneously determine the Nash Equilibrium in the rst
stage of the game.Therefore, for both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation
and in-kind transfers policies announced to group j, (yjNP ; h
jN
























8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg. Those equilibrium conditions hold if and only if
taxation policies announced by parties imply a positive level of net income for all
groups, fyjNP gJj=1 > 0. .








= uc(0; h) =1 (A.8)
Thus equation (A.7) would not hold. Therefore, equilibrium net taxation policy must
imply a positive available income for each group, yjNP > 0; and then, in equilibrium,
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the multipliers associated to the non-negative constraints of net income are equal to
zero, jNyP = 0 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg.
Furthermore, for each group j, politicians must decide whether targeting in-
kind transfers. In the case that party P 2 fA;Bg chooses not targeting in-kind
transfers to group j, hjNgP = 0, politicians take into account that voters are expected
to purchase health care in competitive markets with their available income yjNP > 0.
For any positive net income targeted by party P , the optimal behavior in competitive
markets of an individual who belongs to group j is characterized by:
uh(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjmP ) = phuc(yjP   phhjmP ; hjmP ) (A.9)
When individuals purchase health care through competitive markets and there


















P   phhjmP ; hjmP ) (A.11)
Given the expected behavior of voters in competitive markets, equilibrium
condition (A.7) for a group j not targeted with in-kind transfers holds if and only
if the targeted net taxation policy, yjNP , implies that the multiplier associated to
the non-negative constraint of in-kind transfers must be zero, jNhP = 0. Hence, the
equilibrium condition for a group j not targeted with in-kind tranfers that acquires
health services in competitive markets, hjNmP , is given by:
uh(y
jN
P   phhjNmP ; hjNmP ) = phuc(yjNP   phhjNmP ; hjNmP ) (A.12)
As an alternative, political party P 2 fA;Bg could choose targeting in-kind
transfers to group j, hjNgP > 0 and then 
jN
hP = 0. In that case, politicians take into
account that voters in group j are expected not to make private purchases of health
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gP )  phuc(yjP ; hjgP ) (A.13)
Otherwise, when the sigh of this condition is reversed, politicians expect that
individuals make private purchases, hjNmP > 0. The expected optimal behavior of
individuals that suplement health services in competitive markets is given by:
uh(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) = phuc(yjP   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) (A.14)
In the rst alternative, when individuals do not purchase health care through























Thus, party Ps equilibrium condition (A.7) when group j is targeted with
in-kind transfers, hjNgP > 0, and net income, y
jN
P > 0, such that individuals do not










Therefore, in equilibrium, condition (A.13) for group j holds with equality.
Otherwise, when individuals purchase health care through competitive markets


















P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) (A.19)
Hence, party Ps equilibrium condition (A.7) when group j is targeted with in-
kind transfers, hjNgP > 0, and net income, y
jN
P > 0, such that individuals do supplement
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health services with purchases in markets, hjNmP > 0, is given by:
uh(y
jN
P   phhjNmP ; hjNgP + hjNmP ) = phuc(yjNP   phhjNmP ; hjNgP + hjNmP ) (A.20)
Thus, the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for any group
j, (yjNP ; h
jN





















8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg: In the pre-election stage, politicians announce
policies such that the marginal benet of targeting one unit of in-kind transfers in
terms of probability of winning elections is equal to the marginal opportunity cost.
That cost is measured by the marginal decrease in probability due to a reduction
of targeted net income by ph units. The presence of competitive markets allows
the existence of multiple equilibrium policies for each group j. In equilibrium, both
political parties are indi¤erent to announce di¤erent combinations of net taxation
policy and in-kind transfers for each social group j such that (A.21) holds. Therefore,
the targeted consumption bundle of numeraire and health care to group j implicitly











where cjNP = y
jN
P   phhjNmP and hjNP = hjNgP + hjNmP 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg;
with yjNP > 0; h
jN
gP  0 and hjNmP  0.
A.1.2 Distributive Politics
From the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2 fA;Bg;


























Given the equilibrium policies for each group j discussed above, the relative
treatment between groups in terms of numeraire are implicitly dened by:
kuc(c




0N) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.24)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and
P 2 fA;Bg; with ykNP > 0; hkNgP  0 and hkNmP  0:
Similarly taking the FOCs (A.3) for a pair of groups k and k0, the equilibrium
patterns of health services across groups of voters are given by:
kuh(c




0N) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.25)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and
P 2 fA;Bg; with ykNP > 0; hkNgP  0 and hkNmP  0:
A.1.3 First Best Allocations: Allocative E¢ ciency
The rst-best problem consists of the maximization of the weighted average of
individual utilitites with group-specic Pareto weights, j, subject to the economy
feasibility constraint. The solution to this optimization problem yields the set of















The FOCs for an interior optimum are given by:
[cj] jjuc = 
j 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.27)
[hj] jjuh = 
jq 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.28)
The set of Pareto e¢ cient allocation of resources, fcjPO; hjPOgJj=1, satises












= q !MRSjh;c =MRTh;c 8j (A.29)
In a Pareto e¢ cient allocation the rate at which individuals are willing to trade
health services for numeraire commodity is equal across groups and equal to the rate
at which the economy is able to transform numeraire into health care.
In the political equilibrium, the combination of choosen policies, fyjNP ; hjNgP gJj=1
is such that (A.22) holds for all P 2 fA;Bg. Those equilibrium policies imply con-
sumption bundles for all groups, fcjNP ; hjNP gJj=1, that satisfy the economy feasibility










P )!MRSjNh;c =MRTh;c 8j (A.30)
where cjNP = y
jN
P   phhjNmP and hjNP = hjNgP + hjNmP 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg;
with yjNP > 0; h
jN
gP  0 and hjNmP  0.




The stages of the political game with externalities follow symmetric to the pure
distributional game. However, in the presence of external e¤ects, the indirect utility







gP ) = u(y
k





gP ) = u(y
E
P   phEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) (A.32)
where yjP  0; hjmP  0; and hjgP  0 8j 2 fL; F;Eg and 8P 2 fA;Bg:
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Therefore, the swing voter type in group k 2 fL; Fg is dened as:






gA)  V kB(ykB; hkgB; hEgB)  " (A.33)
The swing voter type in the elderly group, E, follows:




gA)  V EB (yEB ; hEgB)  " (A.34)
Taking into account the presence of external e¤ects, the policy choice problem





















































The policy choice problem is symmetric to political party B. The First Order
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kyP = 
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khP = 
















































gP = 0 8j 2 fL; F;Eg (A.41)
P  0 jyP  0 ; jhP  0 8j 2 fL; F;Eg (A.42)
The system of equations formed by the best responses for each political party
and their feasibility constraints, simultaneously determine de Nash Equilibrium in
the rst stage of the game. For both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation
and in-kind transfers policies for any group k 2 fL; Fg, (ykNP ; hkNgP ), satisfy the same
equilibrium conditions discussed for an economy without external e¤ects. Further-
more, the equilibrium net taxation policy must also imply a positive available income
for group E, yENP > 0: Therefore, in equilibrium the multiplier associated to the
non-negative constraint of net income of the elderly is equal to zero, ENyP = 0 8



































Politicians must decide whether targeting in-kind transfers to the elderly. In
the case that party P 2 fA;Bg chooses not targeting in-kind transfers to group E,
hENgP = 0, politicians take into account that voters are expected to purchase health
care in competitive markets with their available income yENP > 0. For any positive
net income targeted by party P , the optimal behavior in competitive markets of an
individual who belongs to group E is characterized by:
uh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEmP ) = phuc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEmP ) (A.44)
When the elderly purchase health care through competitive markets and there



















P   phhEmP ; hEmP ) (A.46)
Furthermore, elderlys health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals
































P   phhEmP ; hEmP )















375 = ph (A.49)





















By concavity, vh > 0 and uc > 0. Therefore, equilibrium condition holds if and
only if EhP < 0 which is not possible. Thus, in equilibrium parties must target in-kind
transfers to the elderly, hENgP > 0 8 P 2 fA;Bg, and then EhP = 0 8 P 2 fA;Bg.
Hence, for both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers
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policies announced to group E, (yENP ; h
EN



































8k 2 fL; Fg and 8P 2 fA;Bg:
Politicians choose in-kind transfers to the elderly taking into account that vot-
ers in group E are expected not to make private purchases of health care in markets,
hENmP = 0, if and only if this condition holds:
uh(y
E; hEgP )  phuc(yEP ; hEgP ) (A.52)
otherwise, when the sigh of this condition is reversed, politicians expect that individ-
uals make private purchases, hENmP > 0. The expected optimal behavior of individuals
that suplement health services in competitive markets is given by:
uh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) = phuc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) (A.53)
In the rst place, when the elderly purchase health care through competitive


















P   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) (A.55)
Furthermore, elderlys health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals









































P   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP )






























uc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP )
#
= ph (A.59)
By concavity, vh > 0 and uc > 0. Therefore, equilibrium condition does not
hold. Thus, in equilibrium both parties fA;Bg must target a combination of net
taxation policy and in-kind transfers to the elderly (yENP ; h
EN
gP ) such that the elderly
do not supplement health services in competitive markets, hEmP = 0. When the
elderly do not purchase health care through competitive markets and there is public























Furthermore, elderlys health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals





































Arranging terms, party Ps equilibrium condition when group E is targeted
with in-kind transfers, hENgP > 0, and net income, y
EN
P > 0, such that individuals do



















8 k 2 fL; Fg and 8 P 2 fA;Bg; where cENP = yENP and hENP = hENgP .
A.2.2 Distributive Politics
The relative treatment of health services across groups is a¤ected by the pres-
ence of external e¤ects. From the the First Order Conditions for both political parties





































375 8k 2 fL; Fg
(A.65)
Hence, the political relative treatment in terms of health services between
elderly and non-elderly citizens is given by:
kuh(c
kN ; hkN) = Euh(c






EN) 8k 2 fL; Fg (A.66)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkN = hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k 2 fL; Fg;
cEN = cENP = y
EN
P and h
EN = hENP = h
EN
gP ; with y
kN
P > 0; h
kN
gP  0, hkNmP  0;
yENP > 0 and h
EN
gP > 0 for all P 2 fA;Bg.
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Similarly, I can characterize the relative treatment of numeraire commodity
across groups. From the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2






















8k 2 fL; Fg (A.67)
Thus, the political relative treatment in terms of numeraire between elderly
and non-elderly citizens is given by:
kuc(c
kN ; hkN) = Euc(c
EN ; hEN) 8k 2 fL; Fg (A.68)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkN = hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k 2 fL; Fg;
cEN = cENP = y
EN
P and h
EN = hENP = h
EN
gP ; with y
kN
P > 0; h
kN
gP  0, hkNmP  0;
yENP > 0 and h
EN
gP > 0 for all P 2 fA;Bg.
A.2.3 Allocative E¢ ciency
The rst-best problem consists of the maximization of the weighted average of
individual utilitites with group-specic Pareto weights, j, subject to the economy
feasibility constraint. The solution to this optimization problem yields the set of







u(ck; hk) + kkv(hE)
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The FOCs for an interior optimum are given by:
[cj] jjuc = 
j 8j 2 fL; F;Eg (A.71)
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[hk] kkuh = 






The set of Pareto e¢ cient allocation of resources, fcjPO; hjPOgEj=L, satises
(A.71,A.72,A.73) and the economy feasibility constraint. Therefore, Pareto e¢ cient









= q !MRSkh;c =MRTh;c 8k 2 fL; Fg (A.74)









































kMRSkhE ;ck = MRTh;c
In the political equilibrium, both parties, P 2 fA;Bg, announce a menu of net
taxation and in-kind transfers policies targeted to the elderly, (yENP ; h
EN



















8 k 2 fL; Fg and 8 P 2 fA;Bg; where cENP = yENP and hENP = hENgP .









8k 2 fL; Fg (A.78)












































kMRSkNhE ;ck = MRTh;c (A.79)
Hence, the consumption bundle of the elderly, (cEN ; hEN), that results from
the political process is Pareto e¢ cient.
Furthermore, from the the First Order Conditions for both political parties






















8k 2 fL; Fg (A.80)
In the political equilibrium, both parties, P 2 fA;Bg, announce a menu of net
taxation and in-kind transfers policies targeted to each group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ), such that
(A.22) holds. Those equilibrium policies imply consumption bundles for each group
k, (ckNP ; h
kN
P ), that satisfy the economy feasibility constraint given expected voting










MRSkNh;c = MRTh;c 8k 2 fL; Fg
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkN = hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k 2 fL; Fg; with
ykNP > 0; h
kN
gP  0, hkNmP  0 for all P 2 fA;Bg:





The stages of the political game with commodity egalitarianism follows sym-
metric to the pure distributional game. Nevertheless, in the presence of egalitarianism,




P ;hgP ) = u(y
j
P   phjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) + j
(hP ) (A.82)
where yjP  0; hjmP  0; hjgP  0; and hP = fhjgP + hjmPgJj=1 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and
8P 2 fA;Bg. Furthermore, I work with the case:













Therefore, the swing voter type in group j 2 f1; :::; Jg is dened as:
j = V jA(y
j
A;hgA)  V jB(yjB;hgB)  " (A.84)
Taking into account the presence of egalitarianism, the policy choice problem








































The policy choice problem is symmetric to political party B. The First Order









+ kkyP = 









































gP = 0 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.89)
P  0 jyP  0 ; jhP  0 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.90)
The system of equations formed by the best responses for each political party
and their feasibility constraints, simultaneously determine the Nash Equilibrium in
the rst stage of the game. For both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation
policy must imply a positive net income for all groups, yjNP > 0 8j and 8P 2 fA;Bg.
Thus, in equilibrium the multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint of
net income is equal to zero for all groups, jNyP = 0 8j and 8P 2 fA;Bg. Hence,


















375+ kkhP = ph kk dV kP (ykP ;hgP )dyk 8k 2 f1; :::; Jg
(A.91)
Politicians must decide whether targeting in-kind transfers to group k. In
the case that party P 2 fA;Bg chooses not targeting in-kind transfers to group k,
hkNgP = 0, politicians take into account that voters are expected to purchase health
care in competitive markets with their available income ykNP > 0. For any positive
net income targeted by party P , the optimal behavior in competitive markets of an
individual who belongs to group k is characterized by:
uh(y
k
P   phhkmP ; hkmP ) = phuc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkmP ) (A.92)
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When individuals who belong to group k purchase health care through com-



















Furthermore, group ks health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individ-









8j 6= k (A.95)



































3775+ kkhPkkuc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkmP )  = ph (A.97)
Given the expected behavior in competitive markets of individuals who belong











uc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkmP )
37775+ kkhPkkuc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkmP )  = ph (A.98)
8k 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg:
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This equilibrium condition holds if and only if all groups have the same ideolog-
ical heterogeneity and therefore are targeted with the same amount of cash transfers.
Otherwise, in equilibrium parties must target in-kind transfers to all groups, hkNg > 0
8P 2 fA;Bg, and then khP = 0 8P 2 fA;Bg. Hence, for both political parties,
the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies announced to group k,
(ykNP ; h
kN



























8k 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg:
Politicians choose in-kind transfers to individuals who belong to group k taking
into account that voters in group k are expected not to make private purchases of
health care in markets, hkNmP = 0, if and only if this condition holds:
uh(y
k; hkgP )  phuc(ykP ; hkgP ) (A.100)
Otherwise, when the sigh of this condition is reversed, politicians expect that
individuals make private purchases, hkNmP > 0. The expected optimal behavior of
individuals that suplement health services in competitive markets is given by:
uh(y
k
P   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP ) = phuc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP ) (A.101)
In the rst alternative, when individuals who belong to group k purchase health



















Furthermore, group ks health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individ-










8j 6= k (A.104)
Given (A.102), (A.103) and (A.104) and introducing into the equilibrium con-
dition (A.99), it yields:
 















P   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP )
(A.105)










uc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP )
37775 = ph (A.106)
Given the expected behavior in competitive markets of individuals who belong










uc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP )
37775 = ph (A.107)
This equilibrium condition holds if and only if all groups have the same ideo-
logical heterogeneity and therefore are targeted with the same amount of cash trans-
fers. Otherwise, in equilibrium both parties fA;Bg must target a combination of
net taxation and in-kind transfers to each group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ) for k 2 f1; :::; Jg and
8P 2 fA;Bg, such that individuals who belong to any group k 2 f1; :::; Jg do not
supplement health services in competitive markets, hkNmP = 0 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg. When
individuals who belong to group k do not purchase health care through competitive
























Furthermore, group ks health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individ-









8j 6= k (A.110)
Given (A.108), (A.109) and (A.110) and introducing into the equilibrium con-






























Arranging terms, party Ps equilibrium condition when group k is targeted
with in-kind transfers, hkNgP > 0, and net income, y
kN
P > 0, such that individuals do





















8 k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fA;Bg; where ckNP = ykNP and hkNP = hkNgP .
A.3.2 Distributive Politics
The relative treatment of health services across groups is a¤ected by the pres-
ence of egalitarianism. From the the First Order Conditions for both political parties
















































375 8k:k0 2 f1; :::; Jg
(A.113)
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Hence, the political relative treatment in terms of health services across groups
of voters is given by:




























375 8k:k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.114)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P and h
kN = hkNP = h
kN











gP 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg; with ykNP ; yk0NP > 0 and hkNgP ; hk0NgP > 0 for all
P 2 fA;Bg.
Similarly, I can characterize the relative treatment of numeraire commodity
across groups. From the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2






















8k:k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.115)
Thus, the political relative treatment in terms of numeraire between elderly
and non-elderly citizens is given by:
kuc(c




0N) 8k:k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.116)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P and h
kN = hkNP = h
kN











gP 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg; with ykNP ; yk0NP > 0 and hkNgP ; hk0NgP > 0 for all
P 2 fA;Bg.
A.3.3 Allocative E¢ ciency
The rst-best problem consists of the maximization of the weighted average of
individual utilitites with group-specic Pareto weights, j, subject to the economy
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feasibility constraint. The solution to this optimization problem yields the set of





















The FOCs for an interior optimum are given by:
[ck] kkuc = 








= kq 8k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.120)
The set of Pareto e¢ cient allocation of resources, fcjPO; hjPOgJj=1, satises
(A.119), (A.120) and the economy feasibility constraint. Furthermore, from the FOCs
















































= MRTh;c 8k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg
In the political equilibrium, both parties, P 2 fA;Bg, announce a menu of net
taxation and in-kind transfers policies targeted to group k, (ykNP ; h
kN





















8 k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fA;Bg; where ckNP = ykNP and hkNP = hkNgP .
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k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg (A.124)


















































Hence, the consumption bundle of group k, (ckN ; hkN) 8k 2 f1; :::; Jg, that





B.1 Existence of Equilibrium
Proposition 19 In the electoral competition game with competitive markets, a Sub-
game Perfect Nash Equilibrium exists and it is unique.
Proof. [1] Given that i) the budget constraint of individuals who belong




j(1   tP )njP + sjP  zjP . Then, individualsbudget sets are non-
empty, compact and convex for all ability groups in the economy; and ii) citizens
utility functions are assumed to be continuous and strictly concave in the consumption
of numeraire, health care and leisure. Therefore, for any policy implemented by
P 2 fA;Bg, individuals choose a unique bundle of private health care and labor
supply.
[2] For each individual, partiespolicy proposals, idiosyncratic ideological biases
and popularity shocks imply di¤erent utility levels under the government of either
party A or B. Then, every citizen votes for the party which yields him the maximum
level of utility. When the utility level provided by each party is the same, indi¤erent
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individuals randomize equally over the set of candidates and vote for one of the
parties.
[3] Given that for each political party i) the feasible set of strategies dened by
the governments budget constraint is non-empty, compact and convex; and ii) the
probability of winning elections is 1) continuous in both policy platforms, (xA; xB);
and 2) strictly concave in xP and strictly convex in x P for P 2 fA;Bg. Then, ac-
cording to Glicksbergs Fixed Point Theorem, there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium
in pure strategies in the rst stage of the game.
Therefore, given [1], [2] and [3], in the political game there exists a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies and it is unique.
B.2 Equilibrium Income Taxation
Equilibrium policies are determined as the Nash Equilibrium of the rst stage
of the game in which both parties make simultaneous policy announcements. Taking
the opponents policy choice problem as given, each political party chooses a linear
tax over labor income and a combination of cash and in-kind transfers for each group,
xP = (tP ; fsjPgJj=1; fhjgPgJj=1) for P 2 fA;Bg, that maximizes its chances of winning
elections subject to government budget constraint and non-negativity constraints.
Parties take into account citizensexpected voting decisions (stage 2 ) and individuals
choices in competitive labor and health care markets (stage 3 ). Thus, the policy choice











































where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint. The policy
choice problem of political party B is symmetric. There exists a unique equilibrium in
which both parties propose the same income tax and distribution of cash and in-kind
transfers across groups, xNA = x
N
B = x
N . Therefore, the First Order Conditions for
both political parties evaluated at xNA = x
N
B = x


































































jN = 0 8j ; jNs  0 8j (B.6)
jNh h
jN
g = 0 8j ; jNh  0 8j (B.7)











Furthermore, using the Slutsky relation, the e¤ect of income taxes on labor











Consider that politicians had available one unit of numeraire which could be
targeted to group j. Then, the net electoral marginal valuation of income promised

























Given the denition of j, equation (B.11) captures the equilibrium weighted




jj = 1 (B.12)







































Given the denition of the electoral marginal valuation of income in group j























Arranging terms, the equilibrium choice of income taxation satises the fol-
lowing expression:1
t






Furthermore, the equilibrium shadow price of revenue can be obtained solving














Therefore, the equilibrium net marginal electoral valuation of income promised






















Notice that the equilibrium market allocation would be a political equilibrium
(i.e. parties propose do not undertake redistribution) if and only if this condition




jnj   phhjm ; hjm ; 1  nj)

= 1 8j (B.20)
1The procedure to obtain the equilibrium relation follows closely Stiglitz (1987) and Kaplow
(2008). However, I show how this expression arises as the equilibrium outcome of the electoral
competition between politicians rather than from the optimal choice of a benevolent planner.
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Therefore, the following relation must hold for any pair of groups, k and k0, of
the economy:
kuc(w




0   phhk0m ; hk
0
m ; 1  nk
0) (B.21)
This would be the case when all groups exhibit both the same productivity
and concentration of pivotal voters.
B.3 Overprovision of Health Services
In equilibrium, political parties choose a combination of policies that over-
provide the consumption of health services for all the population. In order to show
this result, consider an economy in which both parties do not overprovide health
services.2Suppose that one party, for instance A, deviates from the common policy
announcement. In particular, for a given income tax, party A increases in-kind trans-
fers targeted to group k reducing the funding of cash transfers. This change in policies
involves that now in-kind transfers in group k are overprovided. Whats the e¤ect of
this change on the economic well-being of non-biased voters in group k?
The indirect utility function of non-biased individuals in group k when party
A overprovides health services is given by:
V kOVA  V kA (ph; wk(1  tA); hkgA; skA) = u(wk(1  tA)njA + skA; hkgA; 1  nkA ) (B.22)













2The logic and steps to proof the results follow closely Gahvari (1994, 1995) who analyzes the
di¤erentiated e¤ect of uniform cash and in-kind transfers in labor supply and tax revenues of an
exogenous government. Nevertheless, I work the case in which group-specic transfers are feasible
and the government must be elected by citizens.
162
The combination of policies proposed by political party A is constrained to













For a given income tax rate, tA > 0, totally di¤erentiating party As bud-












Thus, introducing the value of dskA=dh
k






















Party A departs from a situation in which the consumption of health care is








= uh   phuc = 0 (B.27)
Hence, the e¤ect of the marginal change of transfers policy on economic well-
being of non-biased voters, dV kA=dh
k





The ordinary labor supply function of a worker who belongs to group k when




k(1  tA); hkgA; skA) (B.28)
Totally di¤erentiating this labor supply function with respect to in-kind trans-












Given the value of dskA=dh
k





































Leisure was assumed to be a normal good, then @nkA=@s
k < 0. Therefore, the
sign of the denominator of (B.31) is positive. In order to analyze the sign of the
numerator, consider the ordinary demand function of leisure which is dened as the
amount of time that individuals do not devote to work, i.e. lk = 1 nk. The compen-
sated demand of leisure conditional to policies promised by party A, lckA , is obtained
from the dual of the utility maximization problem that gives the ordinary demand of
leisure under party As government, lkA. Ordinary and compensated demand functions
for leisure are related by the identity:
lkA(ph; w
k(1  tA); hkgA; skA)  lckA

ph; w
k(1  tA); hkgA; V kA (ph; wk(1  tA); hkgA; skA)

(B.32)






























Introducing the value of @lckA =@V
k















Substituting (1 nkA) for lkA and multiplying both sides of (B.35) by the inverse























































The rst component of the RHS of (B.37) is positive when either preferences be-
tween leisure and the rest of the goods are weakly separable or leisure and health care
are Hicks substitutes. On the one side, Gahvari (1994) shows that weakly separability
of preferences and normality of leisure are enough to guarantee net substitutability,
i:e. @lc= @hg < 0. This result holds in the current setting because given (B.35), when
@lkA= @h
k
g = 0 and @l
k
A= @s











k < 0 (B.38)
As an alternative, Neary and Roberts (1980) show that when leisure and the
good subject to in-kind transfers are Hicks substitutes, i.e. @lck=@ph > 0, then there
also exists net substitutatibility, @lck=@hkg < 0.
3
Furthermore, the second component of the RHS of (B.37) is negative. Indeed,





















Thus, given that leisure is a normal good, @nk=@sk < 0, we can obtain the sign











> 0! dnkA=dhkg > 0 (B.40)
Therefore, for a given income tax, when party increases in-kind transfers and re-
duces cash transfers in group k such that health services are overprovided, individuals
have incentives to work more, dnkA=dh
k
g > 0, as long as there exists complementarities
3See Gahvari (1994, 1995) for a detailed discussion of the results obtained by Neary and Roberts
(1980).
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Hence, the change in policy platforms increases the economic well-being of
non-biased voters in group k:
B.4 Equilibrium In-Kind Transfers
Consider the equilibrium FOC for in-kind transfers promised to group j, (B.4).
I showed that the unique equilibrium involves overprovision of in-kind transfers for all
groups (i.e. hjNg > 0 and then 
j
h = 0 for all j). Therefore, the equilibrium condition









= ph 8j (B.42)
where the equilibrium net income is given by zjN = wjnjN(1 tN)+sjN , with sjN  0.
Furthermore, given the equilibrium condition (B.4), the equilibrium distribu-
tion of in-kind transfers across groups satises:
kuh(z









g ; 1  nk0N)
1  tNwk0 dnk0N
dhk0g
8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg
(B.43)
B.5 Equilibrium Cash Transfers
Consider the equilibrium FOC for cash transfers targeted to group j,(B.3).










 1 8j (B.44)
Otherwise, parties promise cash transfers. In equilibrium, politicians target
cash transfers to group k such that the net electoral marginal valuation of income,











where the equilibrium net income is given by zkN = wknkN(1  tN) + skN .
Furthermore, given the equilibrium condition (B.3), for any pair of groups
targeted with cash, k and k0, the equilibrium relative allocation of transfers is given
by:
kuc(z

















Given policy platforms, there might be citizens in group j with an idiosyncratic
ideological parameter, gjs , such that they are indi¤erent between voting for the pro-










s ) + "
u(cjR) +W (gR; g
j
s ) = u(c
j
L) +W (gL; g
j
s ) + " (C.1)
For the case in which individualspreferences over public goods are represented
by Euclidean quadratic preferences, the swing voter type in group j can be obtained
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as follows:
u(cjR)  (gR   gi )2 = u(cjL)  (gL   gi )2 + "
[u(cjR)  u(cjL)]  g2R   gi 2 + 2gRgi =  g2L   gi 2 + 2gLgi + "
g2L   g2R + [u(cjR)  u(cjL)] + 2gRgi   2gLgi   " = 0
(gL   gR)(gL + gR) + [u(cjR)  u(cjL)] + gi 2(gR   gL)  " = 0
(gL   gR)(gL + gR) + [u(cjR)  u(cjL)]  " = gi 2(gL   gR)










2(gL   gR) (C.2)
gjs = gLR +
1
2g
[u(cjR)  u(cjL)  "] (C.3)
where gLR is the average of partiespromises regarding public provision of goods and
g is the di¤erence between leftist and rightist proposals.
C.1.2 Vote Share
I assume that the idiosyncratic ideological parameter of individuals who be-
long to group j is drawn from a uniform distribution, F j, over the range [gja ; g
j
b ].
Therefore, the fraction of citizens who vote for party R in group j is given by:
SjR(xR; xL) = F
j(gj) = j[gjs   gja ] = j[gjs   gja + gj   gj] =





  gj] = j[gjs +
gjb   gja
2
  gj ] =







+ j[gjs   gj] (C.4)
Hence, the overall vote share for party R can be written as:









jj[gjs   gj] (C.5)
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The complement share of citizens, 1 
JP
j=1
jF j(gjs ), votes for pro-government
party L; SL.
C.1.3 PartiesProbability of winning
Given that the expected value of the popularity shock is equal to zero, the
expected swing voters in group j are citizens with an ideological type, bgjs , such
that they are indi¤erent between partieseconomic policy proposals. Therefore, the
expected cut-o¤ ideological type is given by:
E(gjs ) = bgjs = gLR + 12g [u(cjR)  u(cjL)] (C.6)
I assume majority voting and then winning the election corresponds to obtain-
ing more than fty per cent of the total vote. Given the expected swing voter type
in each group and the assumed uniform distribution of ideological types and popu-
larity shock, the probability that pro-market party R wins the election is obtained as
follows:



















































Thus, pro-market partys probability of winning is given by:









jj[bgjs   gj] (C.9)
Pro-government party anticipates winning the election with the complementary
probability 1   P (xR; xL). Furthermore, the median ideological type, gm, and the












Hence, party Rs probability of winning can also be expressed as:
P (xR; xL) =
1
2
+  2g[bgs   gm] (C.11)
As an alternative, making use of (C.6) this probability can be written in terms
of policy platforms as:









+ 2g[gLR   gm]
1CCCA (C.12)
C.2 Political Equilibrium
C.2.1 Policy Choice Problem
Taking the opponents policy choice problem as given, each political party
chooses a combination of public good provision and net income for each group, xP =
(gP ; cP ) for P 2 fR;Lg, that maximizes its expected utility subject to economic
feasibility and non-negativity constraints. Thus, the policy choice problem of party
R is given by:
max
gR;fcjRgJj=1
EUR(xR; xL) s.t. gR +
JX
j=1
jcjR = y and gR  0 ; cjR  0 8j
(C.13)
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Party Lmakes simultaneous policy announcenments and its policy choice prob-
lem is given by:
max
gL;fcjLgJj=1
EUL(xR; xL) s.t. gL +
JX
j=1
jcjL = y and gL  0 ; cjL  0 8j
(C.14)






R;R) = P (xR; xL)[QR +WR(gR; g

R)] + [1  P (xR; xL)]WR(gL; gR)
+R[y   gR  
JX
j=1










L;L) = [1  P (xR; xL)][QL +WL(gL; gL)] + P (xR; xL)WL(gR; gL)
+L[y   gL  
JX
j=1






where P is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the economy feasibility constraint
for P 2 fR;Lg; and gP  0 and jcP are the multipliers associated to the non-
negativity constraints gP  0 and cjP  0 for all groups j 2 f1; :::; Jg for P 2 fR;Lg.



















R) WR(gL; gR)] = jR 8j (C.18)
The First Order Conditions for pro-government party for an interior optimum
are given by:
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L) WL(gR; gL)] = jL 8j (C.20)
Let 
P denote party Ps benet of winning elections which is dened as the
di¤erence between the payo¤ under victory and defeat. Hence:

P = 
P (xR; xL) = QP +WP (gP ; g

P ) WP (g P ; gP ) (C.21)
C.2.2 Equilibrium Policy Divergence
The set of FOCs implicitly dene the best responses of each party as function of
its opponents strategy prole. When both candidates are playing their best responses
there exists a Nash Equilibrium in which neither candidate has an incentive to o¤er
an alternative policy. Therefore, a Nash Equilibrium of the policy announcement
stage, (xNR ; x
N
L ), is a solution to the system of equations consisting of partiesFOCs
and their budget constraints. In the examined political game, we have k = J + 1
FOCs and a budget constraint for each candidate. Hence, the Nash equilibrium in




























= j 8 j (C.23)




















= j 8 j (C.25)
C.2.3 Equilibrium Income Taxation Schedules
Consider the equilibrium FOCs for net income promised to group j by party
R (C.18) and party L (C.20). Given these conditions, the equilibrium allocation of
net income across groups promised by party P satises:
1
k















NP 8 k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fR;Lg
(C.26)
By (C.9) the change in parties probability of winning because of marginal
increase in group js net income is given by:



















L ) 8 j
(C.27)
Hence, equilibrium distribution of net income satises:
kuc(c
kN
P ) = 
k0uc(c
k0N
P ) 8 k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fR;Lg (C.28)
C.2.4 Equilibrium Public Goods Provision
By (C.9) the changes in partiesprobability of winning because of marginal
increase in public goods provision are given by:




=   2(gNR   gm) and




=  2(gNL   gm) (C.29)
Furthermore, in the particular case that preferences over public goods are
quadratic, the e¤ect in ideological well-being because of marginal changes in policy














=  2(gNL   gL) (C.30)
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Consider party Rs equilibrium FOCs for public goods (C.17) and net income
promised to group j (C.18). When voters and politicians exhibit quadratic prefer-
ences, equilibrium conditions satisfy:
  2(gNR   gm)










jR 8 j (C.32)
The equilibrium conditions for party L satisfy:
  2(gNL   gm)










jR 8 j (C.34)
Taking (C.31) and (C.32), party Rs equilibrium choice between allocating one
unit of income to public goods provision and to net income to group k satises:
  2(gNR  gm)










R 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg
(C.35)
Similarly, the equilibrium policy choice for party L satises:
  2(gNL  gm)










L 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg
(C.36)
Simplifying and arranging terms, (C.35) can be written as:
 2(gNR   gm)  2(gNR   gR)







R ) 8 k (C.37)
The weighted average of the density of group-specic distributions of ideological
















8 j; k 2 f1; :::; Jg (C.39)
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Making use of both the denition (C.38) and the relation (C.39), equilibrium








































































Given the assumption on available technology to provide public goods, the
marginal rate of transformation between income and public goods,MRTg;c, is equal to
one. Furthermore, given partyRs platform, the marginal rate of substitution between
public goods and net income for individuals in group j with median ideological type,
MRS
jgm
gR;cR , and ideological position of party R, MRS
jgR






































; and equilibrium 
NR is given by:





LR   gR) (C.45)
The equilibrium condition for party L can be obtained following the same steps,















[1 P (xNR ;xNL )]
 
NL
; and equilibrium 
NL is given by:





L   gNLR) (C.47)
The system of equations formed by (C.44), (C.46) and the feasibility constraints






In the particular case in which all groups exhibit the same concentration of
expected swing voters (j =  8j), both political parties implement income taxation
schedules that implement an egalitarian distribution of income (cj NR = c
N and cj NL =
cN 8j). Thus, the system of equations that simultaneously determine equilibrium















C.2.5 Electoral Advantage Right-wing Party
In equilibrium, the expected indi¤erent swing voter in group j, bgjNs , is im-
plictly dened by:
u(cjNR )  u(cjNL ) =W (gNL ; bgjNs ) W (gNR ; bgjNs ) 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (C.50)
In equilibrium, net income in group j promised by party R is larger than the
income that results from party Ls platform, therefore expected swing votersprivate
well-being is larger under party Rs income taxation policy platform:
cjNR > c
jN
L ! u(cjNR )  u(cjNL ) > 0 8 j (C.51)
Furthermore, party L commits to larger public goods proposals than party R,
gNL > g
N
R . Therefore, according to (C.50), in equilibrium, swing voters ideological
177
utility loss under party Ls proposal is lower than the ideological loss implied by party
Rs proposal:
W (gNL ; bgjNs ) W (gNR ; bgjNs ) > 0 8 j (C.52)
Hence, expected swing voters are indi¤erent between the ideological benets
associated to party Ls victory and the larger private economic well-being if party R
wins elections. Therefore, in equilibrium the ideological positions of expected swing
voters in group j are closer to pro-government party Ls ideological leanings than to
pro-market Rs positions. Hence, the ideology of the equilibrium indi¤erent type in
any group is larger than the median ideological position in the overall population:
bgjNs > gm 8 j ! bgNs > gm (C.53)
This shows that in each group there exists a subset of citizens biased toward
pro-government ideology who are expected to vote for pro-market party. Thus, in
equilibrium the probability that party R wins elections is larger than one-half:
P (xNR ; x
N
L ) > 1=2 (C.54)
C.3 Comparative Statics
C.3.1 Electoral Uncertainty
In the limit case in which  ! 0 (i.e. huge electoral uncertainty), party Rs
equilibrium condition (C.35) can be written as:
 2(gNR   gR)P (xNR ; xNL ) = 0 (C.55)
Similarly, given (C.36), party Ls equilibrium condition is given by:
 2(gNL   gL)[1  P (xNR ; xNL )] = 0 (C.56)
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Furthermore, when  ! 0, the equilibrium probability that party R wins
elections tends to one-half. Therefore, given (C.55) and (C.56), partiesequilibrium
public goods proposals tends to their respective ideological bliss points:
gNR ! gR and gNL ! gL (C.57)
Both parties exhibit the same chances of winning elections, i.e. P (xNR ; x
N
L ) =
1=2, and partiesplatforms do not support ideological sacrice, zNR = z
N
L = 0.
C.3.2 Private Benets of winning
When partiesprivate benets associated to win elections are huge (i.e. Q !














g;c !MRTg;c 8P 2 fR;Lg
(C.58)
Therefore, in equilibrium, whenQ!1 both politicial parties tend to converge
to the same economic policy platform (i.e. gN = gNR = g
N
L and c
j N = cjNR = c
jN
L 8j).
The equilibrium distribution of net income across groups is characterized by (C.28).
Furthermore, the equilibrium public goods provision and income taxation schedules
tend to converge towards the weighted average of the preferred policy of individuals
located in group j with median ideological type.
In the particular case in which all groups exhibit the same concentration of
expected swing voters (j =  8j), both political parties implement income taxation
schedules that implement an egalitarian distribution of income (cj N = cN 8j).
Furthermore, partiesequilibrium policy platform satises:
 2(gNP   gm)
uc(cN)
! 1 then MRSgmg;c !MRTg;c 8P 2 fR;Lg (C.59)
Hence, both parties tend to converge towards the preferred public good policy
of the median ideological type. Furthermore, when political parties converge to the
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same policy platforms, individuals are expected to be indi¤erent between parties.
Thus, the equilibrium probability that party R wins elections tends to one-half.
C.4 Utilitarian Allocation






























W (g; gi )]
jdgi (C.61)
A benevolent utilitarian government maximizes (C.61) subject to the economy











W (g; gi )
jdgi + 
"






The First Order Conditions for an interior optimum are given by:
[cj] juc(c
j) = j ! uc(cj) =  8j (C.63)
[g]   2(g   g) =  ! Wg(g; g) =  (C.64)





U ) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (C.65)
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= 1!MRSgg;c =MRTg;c (C.66)
Therefore, a benevolent utilitarian government implements an egalitarian dis-
tribution of income and the level of public goods provision preferred by individuals
with average ideology.
